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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the conflict transformation capacity of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). It identifies the types of conflicts and security challenges that 
the regional organization has to contend with at the systemic, institutional and member state level. 
The above are then assessed within the framework of conflict transformation theory which has a 
focus on transforming factors that tend to perpetuate conflicts and establishing a culture of non-
violence, empathy and mutual understanding in communities to give them the capacity to resolve 
conflicts in a manner that is effective and that guarantees a self- sustainable and durable peace. It 
thus assesses SADC’s capacity to transform the context of conflicts, the structures that perpetuate 
conflicts, the issues core to conflicts in the region, the attitudes of actors involved in conflicts, the 
rules of the conflicts as well as the contents of the conflict which are often stubborn to resolve. It 
looks at the manner in which SADC has transformed and positioned itself for the above task and 
concludes on whether such measures are adequate. The dissertation demonstrates that SADC has 
limited capacity to transform conflicts due to a host of factors and dynamics at the systemic, 
institutional and national / member state level. To gauge SADC’s capacity at the member state 
level an assessment is done of three SADC interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Zimbabwe and Lesotho with a view to determining SADC’s success in transforming the 
conflicts in those countries. Further, SADC’s capacity to deal with the human security related 
aspects of conflict transformation is also shown to be limited. Based on the foregoing the 
dissertation recommends the formulation of a framework for a Regional Infrastructure for Peace 
(RI4P) to be established in SADC by advancing convincing reasons regarding its feasibility based 
on previous successes of similar structures and the growing international impetus for such a 
framework. The key argument in support of a RI4P is that it deepens current efforts to build peace 
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and transform conflicts by putting its focus on the needs of the ordinary citizens rather than the 
interests of SADC leaders. Additionally, a RI4P ensures that solutions are sought and found within 
the communities where they started led by members of the community rather than a focus on 
external mediators. As such it holds that peace attained under such conditions would be an effective, 
durable and self-sustainable peace. Ultimately the dissertation provides a snapshot of the status 
quo of conflicts in the SADC region, whether and how they can be transformed all in an effort to 
deepen our understanding of the dynamics that impede and erode SADC’s capacity to transform 
conflict contexts as well as seek innovative methods to continuously enhance this capacity. In the 
end the research recommends reforms that would result in the creation of an effective and self-
sustainable RI4P in SADC. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction, Background, Review of Relevant Literature, Theoretical 
Framework and Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
Emerging international trends have seen regional organizations engaging in efforts to transform 
themselves in response to changing demands of the environment as well as the changing needs and 
problems of their member states. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one 
such organization which was originally formed with a mandate to reduce economic reliance on 
then apartheid South Africa but which has now expanded its mandate to include the maintenance 
of peace and security in Southern Africa. As such it is the desire of this research to investigate 
SADC’s efforts to transform itself for this new responsibility as well as to assess its capacity to 
transform the context, structure, content, issues, actors and rules of conflicts within the region 
towards the realization of long lasting and durable peace. The focus is also on how this 
transformation has embraced and respected the role of local actors as opposed to celebrating only 
the role of external actors as the panacea to local conflicts. 
The research conducts its assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at three levels; 
the systemic, institutional and member state levels. This is in recognition of its status as an Inter-
governmental organisation made up of fifteen member states.1 Conflict transformation capacity is 
also assessed through the lens of Human Security which is a cross cutting issue needing attention 
at all the above three levels. The relationship between Human Security and conflict stems from a 
recognition of poverty as a conflict issue which both triggers and exacerbates pre-existing conflicts. 
                                                 
1 These are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe  
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As such the research assesses SADC’s capacity to transform the human security aspects of 
conflicts in the region. A key finding of the study is that although the number and extent of regional 
conflicts has generally abated, some member states are still entangled in cycles of deep rooted 
protracted social conflicts. These are a result of a multiplicity of factors including historical and 
colonial legacies of injustice and underdevelopment, incomplete DDR and reconciliation 
programmes, mediation failures, economic inequalities, poor service delivery, recurring cycles of 
violence, democratic deficits, corruption and economic mismanagement and elitist and 
authoritarian cultures of governance just to mention a few examples. 
The findings of the research reveal the fact that SADC has at a minimum established a rudimentary 
capacity to transform the context, content, structure, actors, issues and rules of regional conflicts 
at the systemic, institutional and member state levels. This finding extends to a recognition of the 
existence of at least some modicum of capacity to transform the human security aspects of regional 
conflicts. However these efforts have only gone skin deep in managing the conflicts but have failed 
to bring an end to violence at the national and regional levels. More importantly they have failed 
to contain and transform the sources and drivers of residual tension which often escalate into 
violence in the communities of member states. This was revealed in the three mini case studies of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Lesotho all of which are SADC member states 
in which SADC has recently intervened in an effort to transform their conflicts. The findings show 
that SADC does possess the capacity to initiate interventions in its member states although the 
impact of its interventions have  only borne short term fragile peace outcomes as opposed to long 
term self-sustainable durable peace.  In its analysis the research thus sought to explore more 
dynamic and innovative methods of capacitating SADC to be able to adequately and effectively 
intervene in these intricate and sensitive contexts of protracted conflicts rooted in cultures of 
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violence and repeated conflict. The research findings thus walk the tight rope of recommending 
that SADC ought to at the risk of violating the sovereignty of its member states, earnestly develop 
a capacity to root out the deep seated sources and drivers of conflicts in its member states both in 
the short and long term. In recognition of these findings and in tandem with emerging global 
consensus, this study recommends that SADC should create a Regional Infrastructure for Peace 
(RI4P) in an effort to develop and deepen SADC’s capacity to transform conflicts at the above 
mentioned levels.  
At the systemic level it is argued that the RI4P would fill the policy and strategy vacuum 
that would help SADC better engage with stakeholders and project the right image to all by 
clarifying its common values and interests. At the institutional level, the RI4P would help to 
enhance SADC’s efficiency by introducing institutional, strategic and policy reforms which will 
turn SADC into a tight ship with capacity to transform conflicts. At the member state level, the 
research proposes the creation of an elaborate infrastructure of peace committees starting from the 
lowest ward, district and regional levels in member states feeding into national peace councils and 
fully fledged ministries of peace on a case by case basis. Another cog in the machinery of the RI4P 
would ensure that SADC develops a more concerted and deliberate capacity to transform the 
human security aspects of regional conflicts. This will be through the creation of dedicated human 
security institutions, strategies and policies targeted at addressing the drivers and causes of 
conflicts and capacity constraints at the systemic, institutional and member state levels. 
The research utilizes conflict transformation theory as its conceptual and theoretical lens 
which equips it with guiding posts and indicators in its assessment. The data collection and analysis 
is guided by the use of Qualitative research methods. A key conclusion from the research findings 
is that SADC has established the minimum capacity to transform conflicts which is hamstrung by 
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implementation failures, resource constraints and the absence of an efficient and dependable 
institutional and policy framework underpinned by the appropriate strategies.  
 
1.2 Historical and Contextual Background  
 
SADC member states like most other African states have experienced long periods of bloody and 
repressive colonial occupation. During the 1970s and 80s, the Southern African region was one of 
the most dangerous regions in the world owing to the incessant and violent liberation wars which 
dominated the region. This earned the region many titles one such being ‘the vortex of violence’2, 
this came as no surprise since in 1992 at the end of its conflict, battle death statistics for one 
Southern African country, Mozambique alone for example stood at 1.5 million.3 The SADC region 
is as such the last part of Africa to be decolonized due to the protracted liberation wars that gripped 
the region abating only in the 1990s.4  The end of the Cold War and attainment of majority rule in 
South Africa and Namibia saw a reduction in the levels of violence in the region. This was mainly 
because some of the conflicts were proxy wars fought in aid of the ideological ambitions of the 
two superpowers in the prevailing bipolar world order of the time.  
Relative peace has since prevailed in the territories of South Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique 
and to some extent Angola at least in as far as the incidence of violent conflict is concerned. The 
                                                 
2 Thomas M. Callaghy. “South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence”, New York, N.Y: 
Praeger, 1983 
3 O. Ramsbotham, T Woodhouse and H. Miall.  “Contemporary Conflict Resolution” 2nd Ed, Polity Press, 2008 
4 International Crisis Group, 2012 
5 
 
rest of the region also saw a growth and maturity in their democratic projects which created fertile 
ground for the seeds of peaceful coexistence to be sown. Around the same period in 1992 the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) underwent a major 
transformation which went beyond just dropping one “C” to become the Southern African 
Development Community. The new regional arrangement was widened to more deliberately 
accommodate issues of a political and security related nature resulting in the signing of the 
Protocol on Politics Defence and Security, establishing the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and 
Security (OPDS). This was underpinned by the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO I) 
which was revised in 2010 to SIPO II as the implementing roadmap of the objectives set out in the 
protocol.  
SADC is one of the eight Regional Economic Communities (REC) recognised by the African 
Union. These are vehicles used by member states of the African Union to pursue their agreed 
development agendas through their respective sub regional groupings known as Regional 
Economic Communities (REC’s) which are all coordinated through the African Union head- 
quarters. The others are; The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); The Maghreb 
Union (UMA); The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS); The East African Community (EAC); The 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); The Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern African States (COMESA).5 
According to the Union of International Associations (UIA), since 1909, the number of 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) increased from 37 to over 6400 (including more than 2000 
                                                 
5 Comberbach, Stuart. “Power Point Presentation: History of SADC and Situating SADC within the Broader African 
Development Context”, SADC International Symposium, Kyoto University of Foreign Studies, 26 th November 2012 
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multilateral treaties) and the number of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) grew from 176 to 
over 44 000.6 IGOs are constructed by states to facilitate cooperation and provide a forum for states 
to discuss and negotiate how to deal with conflicts. Their roles range from firstly, providing a 
forum for discussion which is less costly for states to discuss issues with one another. Secondly 
they serve as information providers and enhance transparency to minimize misperceptions among 
states. Thirdly they help facilitate issue linkages which may facilitate cooperation, fourthly they 
help allow states to take a long term perspective, which makes them less concerned about 
immediate pay-offs. Lastly, the multilateral nature of IGOs lends them an air of impartiality that 
enhances their effectiveness.7  
The Southern African region like other regions on the continent had for more than half a century 
suffered from the brutality and injustice of colonialism. Countries such as Namibia, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola were on the receiving end of the dehumanising and 
oppressive policies of their settler colonial regimes. In solidarity with the above minority white 
ruled states, the few Southern African states which had attained majority rule by the 1970s formed 
an informal entity called the Front Line States (FLS) aimed at offering military and political 
support towards the liberation of the rest of the region. 
By 1980 the FLS moved its focus towards coordination of economic development in an effort to 
reduce economic dependence on the then apartheid South African regime which had begun its own 
strategy of attempting to control the black run governments of the region through what it called 
                                                 
6 Union of International Associations quoted in Mitchell S.M. Introduction to CMPS Special Issue: Building 
Synergies, Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics, Conflict Management and Peace Science Journal, 2009 
7 Brahm, E, “Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs)”, Beyond Intractability (Eds) Guy Burgess & Heidi Burgess, 
Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado Boulder. Posted: March 2005 
<http://www.beyondintractibility.org/essay/role-igo [accessed on 10-11-13] Pg.1 
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the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). On the 1st April 1980 the leaders of 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Swaziland and Zimbabwe established the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) through signing the Lusaka 
Declaration whose theme was “Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation”. On 20th July 
1981 the SADCC heads of state and government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
which was legally binding on member states in Harare, Zimbabwe which established the 
institutions of SADCC delineating their powers and competencies.8 It is commendable that a group 
of developing countries still largely preoccupied with the urgent business of post-independence 
state building had as early as then and well ahead of other regions of the world managed to cobble 
up an entity with a semblance of regional cooperation albeit without a capacity to intervene in 
member state conflicts. Defence and security related matters remained within the purview of the 
unofficial Inter State Defence and Security Committee which was a sub structure of the FLS. 
Historically the League of Nations (LONs) was an early attempt at third party intervention in 
international conflicts which proved to be too weak because important states didn’t join it, limiting 
its ability to function. After WWII, the United Nations was formed, although it was better than the 
LONs its effectiveness was limited by the Cold War for many years. It also faced the challenge of 
the contradiction in its charter where on the one hand it supports national sovereignty and self-
determination while on the other it expected to and indeed does get involved in the internal 
conflicts of other nations.9 For instance, chapter VI of the UN charter gives the UN a number of 
mechanisms for facilitating conflict resolution, namely fact-finding, good offices, conciliation, 
                                                 
8 Khulekani Moyo, Towards a Supranational Order for Southern Africa: A discussion of the Key Institutions of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Oslo, 2008 
9 Brahm, Op.Cit. 2005,Pg.1 
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mediation and negotiation. Additionally, Chapter VII provides the basis for the use of coercion 
and force to maintain peace and security. Finally, Chapter VII encourages activism on the part of 
regional organisations in bringing about peace. The UN also has many agencies with a mandate to 
address various aspects of conflict and humanitarian situations.10 
In the Post-Cold War period the UN has assumed new roles in response to the changing nature of 
security challenges which has seen regional organisations rise to prominence in aid of the UN. 
Intervention by regional organisations has also met its own challenges and disadvantages, for 
instance; 
i) At the regional level, politics can lead to them favouring one side over another. This 
perception creates reluctance on the part of combatants to accept outside intrusion. 
ii) Regional hegemons are also better able to manipulate more localized organisations. 
iii) Most regional organisations are even more resource poor than the UN 
iv) Most regional organisations often lack the political will power to act11 
Due to the capacity constraints of the UN, regional organisations have increasingly taken on 
military functions as the UN has taken on more civilian policing roles. Regional organisations have 
also had a prominent role on the civilian side of peace operations, providing election or human 
monitors in cooperation with the UN. However, the ability of regional organisations to respond to 
conflict varies a great deal, they have thus tended to coordinate their activities and develop 
mediation, conflict management and early warning capabilities.12 
                                                 
10 Brahm, Op. Cit. 2005, Pg. 2 
11 Brahm, Op. Cit. 2005, Pg. 7 
12 Ibid 
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In 1992 SADCC metamorphosed into a more institutionalised and fully fledged regional 
community which centralised most of the activities of the regional body to the secretariat, a 
departure from the more decentralised SADCC structure. This shift was marked by the signing of 
the Windhoek Declaration on the 17th August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. The shift was driven 
by Namibia’s independence on 21st March 1990, the approaching demise of apartheid in South 
Africa (which attained independence in 1994), the prospects of peace in Angola and Mozambique, 
the need to reform the region’s economic policies and international trends of regional economic 
cooperation and integration blocks.13 
As shown above, all efforts at regional integration in Southern Africa have historically been 
spurred on by the need to oppose minority white domination in the region. It is thus little wonder 
that the apartheid South African regime had a key role to play in the formation of the Frontline 
States which was one of the earliest efforts at cooperation in the area of security at regional level. 
Chipasula and Miti (1989), attribute the birth of the Frontline states to an initiative of former 
Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda and former South African Prime Minister, Vorster which 
“culminated in a joint document titled “Towards the summit: An approach to a peaceful change in 
Southern Africa”.14  The Frontline States had been formed in 1975 to advance the liberation 
struggles of Southern Africa and had as early as then created a security sub structure called the 
Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) which met regularly at both ministerial and 
official levels.15 The forerunner to the Frontline States was the Mulungushi Club formed by 
                                                 
13 Khulekani Moyo, Towards a Supranational Order for Southern Africa Op. Cit. 
14 Chipasula, James and Miti, Kataboro, “Botswana in Southern Africa: The Strategy for Regional Co-Existence”, Pula: 
Botswana Journal of African Studies Vol. 6, No. 1, 1989, Pg. 123  
15 Van nieuwkerk Anthoni, “Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS compared”, African Security 
Review Vol. 10 No. 2,  2001, Pg. 5 
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Zambia, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda. As the struggle for political independence gained 
momentum the Frontline States grouping was formed with Tanzania and Zambia as its core 
founding members. They were joined by Botswana, Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and 
Zimbabwe in 1980.16 
The first formal step to the formation of SADCC is however seen as “the resolution by the 
Frontline States’ Foreign Minister’s meeting in Gaborone in May 1979 urging for an assessment 
of the possibilities of establishing an economic grouping. This was followed by the decision of the 
Heads of the Frontline states in Arusha in July 1979. SADCC was then officially inaugurated in 
Lusaka in 1980”.17 The main goals of SADCC at inception were: to reduce economic dependence, 
particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa; to promote cooperation between states 
in the region; to mobilize resources in order to carry out national, regional and international 
projects; and to act in concert vis-à-vis aid organizations in order to acquire finance and technical 
assistance.18 
 
 
  
                                                 
16 Comberbach, Stuart. Power Point Presentation: History of SADC and Situating SADC within the Broader African 
Development Context Op. Cit. 
17 Chipasula  and Miti, Botswana in Southern Africa, Op. Cit. 
18 Ibid 
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From the FRONT LINE STATES to SADCC 
 
Photograph 1: Presidents of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe after adopting the Lusaka Declaration forming the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) on 1st April 1980 
Source: Comberbach, 201219 
A water shed event in Southern Africa which dramatically changed the course of events and ended 
the Cold War proxy wars that had been fought in the region was the signing of the Brazaville 
Protocol. The historic agreement was signed in the capital of the Republic of Congo, Brazaville 
by Cuba, Angola and South Africa on the 11th December 1988.20 The agreement facilitated the 
withdrawal of the approximately 50 000 Cuban troops then based in Angola ending the Angolan 
civil war. It also provided for the hosting of free elections a year later in Namibia which had been 
                                                 
19Comberbach, Stuart. “Power Point Presentation: History of SADC and Situating SADC within the Broader African 
Development Context, Op. Cit. 
20 Fred Khumalo, Angola’s Ollivier: He Sold cereals, then he Sold Peace, Mail & Guardian, 21 February 2014, 
available at: www.mg.co.za/article/2014-02-20-he-sold-cereals-then-he-sold-peace [accessed on: 10-04-14] 
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ruled by South Africa for 73 years. It provided an agreement for the implementation of the UNSC 
Resolution 435 and the UN plan for Namibia which hadn’t been invoked since it was passed in 
1978. Under the plan South Africa was to withdraw its estimated 35 000 troops from Namibia until 
UN supervised elections on November 1 1989.21 The Brazzaville protocol paved the way for the 
release of Nelson Mandela, the end of apartheid and the birth of a new South Africa in 1994. 
From SADCC to SADC 
 
Photograph 2: SADC leaders at the signing of Treaty Establishing the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) on 17th August 1992 in Windhoek Namibia  
Source: Comberbach, 201222 
 
                                                 
21 Scott Kraft, Pact for Angola Pullout, Namibia Freedom Signed, Los Angeles Times, December 14 1988, available 
at: www.articles.latimes.com/1988-12-14/news/mn-343_1_south-africa [accessed on: 10-04-14] 
22 Comberbach, Stuart. “Power Point Presentation: History of SADC and Situating SADC within the Broader 
African Development Context”, Op. Cit. 
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As the winds of liberation swept through the region, in 1992, SADCC was transformed into the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its treaty had already anticipated the 
creation of some sort of security framework. It identifies in its articles, “solidarity, peace and 
security” as the community’s guiding principles; the “promotion and defence of peace and security” 
as one of its objectives; and cooperation in the area of “politics, diplomacy, international relations, 
peace and security” as obligatory. 23  The region’s peace and security structures were revived 
resulting in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) – proposed in 1996 being adopted 
at a SADC extraordinary summit in 2001 to counter the institutional weakness and coordination 
problems previously experienced and in part out of a realization that peace and security are a 
precondition of the economic objectives of the community deserving of attention.24 Put differently, 
the SADC leaders had recognised ‘the interconnectedness of peace, security and development’.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 SADC Treaty in Van Nieuwkerk , 2001, Pg. 6 
24 Ibid 
25 Hendricks C. and Musavengana T. (Eds), “Introduction” in “The Security Sector in Southern Africa”, Monograph 
174, Institute for Security Studies, 2010 
14 
 
 
Figure 1: SADC’s Conflict Transformation Capacity Timeline 
 
Efforts to enhance SADC’s security cooperation and regional integration were highlighted by the 
signing of an agreement amending the original SADC treaty of 1992 on the 14th August 2001. The 
agreement also amended the protocol on politics, defence and security among others as shown in 
figure 1 above. The amendment was part of a greater plan to review and rationalise the SADC 
programme of action and to transform SADC institutions to facilitate deeper integration through 
an unequivocal commitment to supranationalism. This required member states to cede some of 
their sovereignty to SADC, the ensuing reforms thus resulted in the strengthening of the SADC 
secretariat and the subsumption of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security into the SADC 
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institutional structure. The reforms also put emphasis on more participation of non-state actors in 
the regional integration project.26 SADC member states are bound by the following principles: 
-Sovereign equality of all member states 
-Solidarity, peace and security 
-Human Rights, democracy and the rule of law 
-Equality, balance and mutual benefit 
-Peaceful settlement of disputes.27 
It is against the above backdrop that this study undertook an assessment of SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity as its organs charged with security mandates have been at the forefront of 
the organisation’s conflict transformation efforts. 
1.3 Summary of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter Two 
Chapter Two conducts an assessment of SADC’s Conflict Transformation capacity at the systemic 
level. It considers the systemic, structural, environmental and intangible factors that have a bearing 
on SADC’s conflict transformation capacity considering the context within which the organization 
operates. The chapter identifies these as; the legacy of the Cold War and Apartheid era proxy wars 
fought in the region; forces of globalization and capitalism; the nature and history of SADC 
member states; the causes and drivers of conflicts in the region; South Africa’s membership of 
SADC; SADC’s relationship with donor and International Cooperating Partners, member state’s 
experiences with democracy; member states’ multiple concurrent membership of other Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs); regime types of member states and SADC’s relationship with the 
UN and the AU. The chapter discusses the above factors and assesses whether they positively or 
                                                 
26 Oosthuizen quoted in Khulekani Moyo, Towards a Supranational Order for Southern Africa, Op. Cit. 
27 Hendricks C. and Musavengana T. (Eds), “Introduction” in “The Security Sector in Southern Africa”, Monograph 
174, Institute for Security Studies, 2010 
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negatively affect SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. Overall the chapter concludes that each 
of these have in various ways impeded SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
Chapter Three  
Chapter Three assesses SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the institutional level. It 
identifies and outlines the policy framework and institutional structure which supports SADC’s 
conflict transformation capacity with a view to establishing how these have variously impeded or 
enhanced the organisation’s capacity to transform conflicts. The identified policy framework is 
made up of the SADC Treaty, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the Strategic Indicative Plan of the 
Organ (SIPO), the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP), the African Union Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), the MoU signed between SADC and the SADC Council of Non- 
Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections. The chapter explains the principles of Subsidiarity and Complementarity as 
well as the Troika System which undergird SADC’s decision making process particularly in the 
area of peace and conflict transformation. The institutional infrastructure identified and assessed 
is made up of the Summit of Heads of State and Government (SOHSG), the SADC Secretariat, 
Organ and Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security, the Regional Early Warning System 
(REWS), the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC), the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), the 
Panel of Elders (POE), the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), the SADC Standby 
Brigade (SADCBRIG). SADC Tribunal, SADC Parliamentary Forum and the SADC Council of 
Non- Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO). 
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Chapter Four 
Chapter Four conducts an assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the national 
level. It commences with an assessment of the SADC National Committees created to replace the 
Sector coordination Units following the 2001 restructuring exercise. It traces the functionality and 
utility of the SNCs in relation to conflict transformation and considers the various factors which 
impede or aid the conflict transformation capacity of SADC member states at national level. These 
include an assessment of member state’s ability to enforce and implement commitments made at 
regional level, divergent foreign policy positions of member states and the implications of South 
Africa’s membership of SADC for its conflict transformation capacity. Chapter Four further 
considers three mini case studies of the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho all of which SADC has 
previously intervened in. It looks at the impact of SADC’s intervention in these countries in an 
effort to assess SADC’s conflict transformation capacity.  
Chapter Five 
In Chapter Five an assessment of the Human Security aspects of SADC’s conflict transformation 
capacity is carried out. The chapter assesses SADC’s capacity to meet the human security needs 
of its citizens during peace time as well as at the various stages of a conflict. It identifies and 
explains the various human security challenges confronting SADC and explains how they impede 
its conflict transformation capacity. The chapter looks at the Social Protection regimes of SADC 
and its member states assessing the extent to which they are broad enough to ensure the provision 
of social services to citizens and in the process prevent protests which may translate into violent 
conflicts and even loss of life due to poverty and starvation. The chapter assesses SADC’s policy 
and institutional framework in support of human security and the extent to which it aids SADC’s 
capacity to transform the context of conflicts in the region.  
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Chapter Six 
Chapter Six attempts to deepen the search for an effective and self-sustainable Regional 
Infrastructure for peace (RI4P) considering the findings of the previous chapters which identified 
the major limitations in SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. It as such proposes the 
formulation of a (RI4P) framework as a remedy to the multifaceted and complex problems 
identified in previous chapters as impediments to SADC’s capacity to transform conflicts. The 
chapter adopts some key conflict transformation principles as analytical points to anchor its 
argument. It argues that conflict transformation has not traditionally nor deliberately been adopted 
nor applied by SADC in its peacebuilding work. It thus proposes the creation of an effective and 
self-sustainable (RI4P) in SADC to deal with conflict producing problems at their source in an 
effective and durable way. It argues for a key role to be reserved for “non-state” actors who are 
usually better accepted as mediators than states in the RI4P to create community institutions that 
promote dialogue, consultation, prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence 
occurs in a society. The proposed RI4P ought to be made up of stakeholders at all levels, the 
national, district and local to allow for conflicts to be solved internally as well as to nurture the 
development of mechanisms, structures and capacities as witnessed in Kenya, Ghana and South 
Africa where similar structure have previously been implemented. The core components of an 
RI4P include local peace councils, national peace platforms, a government bureau, department or 
Ministry of Peace as well as efforts to expand existing capacities of national peacebuilding 
institutions and civil society organisations undergirded by local ownership. 
Chapter Seven 
Chapter Seven provides a summary of the major conclusions of the research as well as the 
researchers’ recommendations. It further provides suggestions for future research to be carried out. 
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1.4 A Review of the Relevant Literature  
This section provides an exploration of the literature to reflect the state of thinking and research in 
the field of conflict transformation and the related fields of regional integration, regionalism, 
security cooperation and security community. The latter thus provides a contextual backdrop for 
the theoretical discussion of conflict transformation as applied in the case of SADC in this study. 
The literature review commences with an exploration and explanation of the broader theoretical 
debates and concepts as listed above and at the end explains the Conflict Transformation theory 
which underpins this research. This is to illustrate how the conflict transformation theory fits into 
what has come before and to ground and anchor this research on previous work in the field. 
1.4.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework Understanding Theory and the need for a Conceptual and 
Theoretical Framework 
Although running the risk of banality, this section is dedicated to explaining the role of theory and 
a theoretical and conceptual framework to an academic research project of this magnitude. It is 
insufficient to merely accept that theory is necessary without first concerning yourself with the 
need and relevance of theory to research. Various definitions of theory have been advanced, 
according to Kerlinger, a theory is; 
 …a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), and propositions that presents a systematic 
view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of 
explaining and predicting phenomena.28  
Goode and Hart’s definition of theory focusses on how theory helps to organize and order facts; 
 …the relationship between facts or to the ordering of them in some meaningful way, 
where fact means empirically verifiable observation.29  
                                                 
28 Obasi, 1999, Pg. 38 
29 Obasi, 1999, Pg. 39 
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While for Singer, what stands out in a theory is its, descriptive, predictive and explanatory 
power; 
A body of internally consistent empirical generalizations of descriptive, predictive and 
explanatory power.30 
Ultimately, a much simplified definition is that offered by Buchanan of; “a set of systemic, 
related concepts”.31 
To complete the above offered definitions of theory, Selltiz neatly outlines the role and function 
of a theory in research; 
a) Theory summarizes existing knowledge; 
b) Provides an explanation for observed events and relationships; 
c) Helps to predict the occurrence of unobserved events and relationships on the basis of 
explanatory principles embodied in the theory; 
d) It increases the fruitfulness of research by providing significant leads for inquiry; 
e) By directing research, it further contributes directly to the development and 
organization of knowledge.32  
 
In summary a theory gathers together all the isolated bits of empirical data into a coherent 
conceptual framework of wider applicability.33 The major role of a theory is to organize, describe, 
explain and predict facts. It is an important instrument for the discovery and advancement of 
knowledge. It serves as an intellectual shorthand that makes knowledge seeking a manageable and 
less cumbersome enterprise.34 It is against this background and understanding that we now turn 
our attention to the role and utility of a theoretical framework which forms the basis of this study 
                                                 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid 
32 Obasi, 1999, Pg. 41 
33 Cohen and Manion: Ibid 
34 Obasi, 1999, Pg. 41 -42 
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and which will appear consistently throughout the discourse and give alignment, rigour and 
validity to the discussions in this research. 
1.4.2 Theoretical Framework 
In line with the requirements of academic research, this study has adopted Conflict Transformation 
theory as its theoretical framework. A theoretical framework is: 
…a device or scheme for adopting or applying the assumptions, postulations and 
principles of a theory in the description and analysis of a research problem. It is a way of 
describing, analysing, interpreting and predicting phenomena. It involves linking the 
problem under investigation to the assumptions, postulations, and principles of a theory. It 
enhances the internal logical consistency of a research activity. A theoretical framework 
has an inbuilt bias in the sense that it restricts the researcher to a choice of concepts and 
methods associated with particular theories.35 
 
 It is for this reason that this chapter considers related theories of Regionalism, Sovereignty and 
Security Communities although the chosen theoretical framework for this research is Conflict 
Transformation. According to Obasi, theoretical frameworks ‘involve the use of theoretical 
postulations in an analysis. These postulations may be contained in just one theory or in associated 
theories called paradigms, schools or perspectives’.36 
1.4.3 Conceptual Framework 
The use of a theoretical framework provides an investigator with relevant conceptual tools with 
which to carry out a research. A conceptual framework therefore derives from a theoretical 
framework. While theory serves as a source of knowledge, concepts are vehicles for transmitting 
this knowledge.37 
                                                 
35 Obasi, 1999, Pg. 44 
36 Obasi, 1999, Pg. 45 
37 Obasi, 1999, Pg. 43 
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1.4.4 The Conflict Transformation Approach 
In the period before the 1990s, wars were predominantly fought between states, in the Post- Cold 
War period the nature of wars increasingly became internal with a rise in the number of civil 
wars.38 Trends in civil wars have seen men more likely being killed, disappearing or being forced 
to partake in war while women and children have mostly been displaced and turned into refugees.  
The nature and causes of conflicts have not entirely been violent; in the Post-Cold War era, the 
collapse of Soviet Socialism has seen an unrestrained growth in Globalization, Capitalism and the 
influence of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) with their agenda of economic 
liberalization.39 The latter has often fuelled conflicts through the unintended consequences of 
prescriptive policies such as the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) whose failed 
implementation has often led to economic failure, its attendant grievances, rising corruption and 
inequalities and a host of other social and political problems. A combination of the above factors 
has in some cases resulted in state implosion and in extreme cases even state failure. Weakened 
and failed states have created fertile ground for new patterns of trans-national organized crimes, a 
spill-over of conflicts beyond the control of individual countries.  
In Africa the above trends have often culminated in the emergence of militias, rebel movements, 
War-Lordism, political corruption and criminal economies revolving around the plundering of 
minerals and natural resources. As seen in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in one country has at times been perpetrated by other 
states. The above picture shows that the end of the Cold War in a way opened the flood gates for 
                                                 
38 See Kaldor, M. (1998), New & Old Wars; Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press 
39 Fisher, S. et al (2000), Working with Conflict; Skills & Strategies for Action, Responding to Conflict (RTC), Zed 
Books, UK 
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many global tensions which had been forcibly repressed40. It is in response to the above challenges 
that there has been an upsurge in research activities in the field of peace and conflict studies as 
well as a rise in the number of international organisations aimed at reducing the impact of conflicts. 
In efforts to understand both the sources of conflict and their complex and far reaching 
consequences, there has been wide disagreement as new terminologies, labels and approaches have 
emerged. 
Conflict and Violence 
As widely appreciated at the base of the thesis of the father of Peace Studies Johan Galtung is the 
notion that conflicts do not imply the use of violence and that it is more than a physical clash 
between two or more groups with opposing goals or ideologies. Conflict is rather a divergence of 
values or the pursuit of real or perceived incompatible goals by different groups. Conflict occurs 
between states in the form of war, but can also occur at the smallest inter-personal level. Common 
elements found in every conflict situation are that conflict involves a) attitudes, b) behaviours and 
c) contradictions.41 Each conflict situation has its own complexities despite the universal elements 
that most conflicts share. In his 2004 work Transcend & Transform: An Introduction to Conflict 
Work, Galtung gives a typology of conflicts in terms of their levels; micro, meso and macro. Micro 
conflicts can be exemplified by a disagreement between a man and a woman or between two 
neighbours over mostly matters of a domestic or personal nature. Meso conflicts are said to occur 
within institutions or cultures of a particular society. These may involve clashes over educational 
systems, foreign and defence policies or the proper roles for men and women. Macro conflicts on 
                                                 
40 Ibid 
41 Galtung, 2000 
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the other hand occur between states or international actors and are more readily identifiable. The 
point is therefore made that conflict does not simply entail violence and warfare, rather that there 
has to be a negative interaction of attitudes, behaviours and contradictions.42  
According to Galtung, violence occurs when a conflict exists and measures to curb the conflict fail, 
it is the failure to transform conflicts that leads to violence.43 He further outlines three elements of 
violence being; cultural, structural and direct. Cultural violence is described as the invisible 
element of violence, albeit one with significant weight in the minds of individuals. This stems from 
clashes in norms and values systems of different cultures which give individuals the distinction 
between right and wrong, good and evil or acceptable or unacceptable. Structural violence occurs 
when the structures within a society are geared in a certain rigid inflexible manner, like cultural 
violence it is also invisible. The third element direct violence is perhaps the most understood. It is 
as its name suggests, direct, wilfully harmful and intends to harm, injure or kill. As such it is the 
most destructive and irreversible form of violence. 
Fisher et al, agree that there is no universally accepted typology of the steps taken in addressing 
conflicts. They however suggest that the steps should be viewed as a process where each step taken 
includes measures in the previous one (e.g conflict settlement includes measures for conflict 
prevention). They propose the use of the term Conflict Transformation as an overarching term to 
describe the field as a whole. In their typology; 
 CONFLICT PREVENTION: aims to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. 
 CONFLICT SETTLEMENT: aims to end violent behaviour by reaching a peace 
agreement. 
                                                 
42 Galtung, 2004 
43 Galtung, 2000 
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 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: aims to limit and avoid future violence by 
promoting positive behavioural changes in the parties involved. 
 CONFLICT RESOLUTION: addresses the causes of conflict and seeks to build 
new and lasting relationships between hostile groups. 
 CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: addresses the wider social and political 
sources of a conflict and seeks to transform the negative energy of war into positive 
social and political change.44 
 
They illustrate the strategies adopted to address conflicts at their various stages in the figure below: 
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Figure 2: Responses to conflicts: through the maze of terminology 
Source: Fisher et al, (2000, pg.7) 
The purpose of Figure 2 above is not to explain when to do what but rather to clarify the terms. 
For instance, Conflict Prevention refers to the strategies that address conflict when it is still latent, 
in the hope of preventing an escalation into violence. Conflict Resolution on the other hand refers 
to strategies that address open conflict in the hope of finding not only an agreement to end the 
violence (Conflict Settlement), but also a resolution of some of the incompatible goals underlying 
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it. While Conflict Transformation is the most thorough and far-reaching strategy, it is also the one 
that needs the longest and most wide-ranging commitment.45 
In the following table adopted from Reimann and modified for this study, the three main levels 
between and within which processes of Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management and Conflict 
Transformation take place are shown within the conflict resolution schema of the different tracks 
of diplomacy.46 
Table 1: Conflict transformation schema 
 Track One  Track Two Track Three 
Actors 
involved 
Political and 
military leaders as 
mediators and / or 
representatives of 
conflict parties 
From private individuals, 
academics / professionals 
to international and local 
non-governmental 
organisations involved in 
conflict transformation 
From local grassroots 
organisations to local and 
international development 
agencies, human rights 
organisations and 
humanitarian assistance 
Emphasis 
Conflict 
Management 
  
Conflict Resolution Conflict Resolution  
Conflict Transformation 
Source: Hattotuwa, 2004, pg. 43-44) 
 
Hattotuwa argues that “while conflict management has an emphasis on the Track One level to 
transform violent conflict, and conflict resolution expands the theatre to processes on both Track 
One and Track Two, both conflict resolution and conflict management ignore Track Three actors, 
and under-estimate the value of a holistic outlook towards peacebuilding that encompasses track 
one to Three”.47 Based on this understanding, Conflict Transformation has been defined as  
                                                 
45 Fisher, S. et al, 2000, Pg. 8 
46 Reimann quoted in Hattotuwa, 2004, Pg. 43 
47 Hattotuwa, 2004, Pg. 44 
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…a process of engaging with and transforming relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, 
the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.48 
 
 Miall proposes five types of transformations (transformers) that if given adequate impetus and 
sustainable momentum can creatively address or mitigate violent conflict in peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation efforts; 
Table 2: Five types of transformation. 
Context transformations 
Changes in the context of conflict that may radically alter each 
party’s perception of the conflict situation, as well as their 
motives. 
Structural transformations 
Changes in the basic structure of the conflict, that is to the set 
of actors, issues and incompatible goals, conflicting beliefs or 
relationships, or to the society, economy or state within which 
the conflict is embedded. 
Actor transformations 
Decisions on the part of actors to change their goals or alter 
their general approach to conflict. 
Issue transformations 
Changes in positions that parties take on key issues at the heart 
of the conflict as well as the way in which parties redefine or 
reframe those positions in order to reach compromises or 
resolutions. 
Personal / elite 
transformations 
Personal changes of heart or mind within individual leaders or 
small groups with decision making power at crucial moments. 
Source: Miall; Hattotuwa, 2004, Pg.46) 
 
                                                 
48 Miall quoted in Hattatotuwa, 2004, pg.44 
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Figure 3: Analysis of the Underlying Structural sources of Conflict 
Source: (Hattotuwa, 2004, Pg. 42) 
Conflict Transformation 
Conflict Resolution theorists claim ownership of this concept, they say the following about it; 
“Conflict Transformation is a term which for some analysts is a significant step beyond conflict 
resolution, but which in our view represents its deepest level…it implies a deep transformation in 
the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves 
and their relationships. It corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and cultural 
peacebuilding. Where this becomes manifest across global cultures, linking the personal, societal, 
global and ecological spheres, we call this cosmopolitan conflict resolution”.49 A review of the 
literature reveals that this is largely a contested theory as it is a reconceptualization of other theories 
such as conflict management and conflict resolution to align itself with contemporary conflicts. 
                                                 
49 Ramsbotham, Op. Cit. 2008, Pg. 31 
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Miall does a good job in identifying the key framers of this theory. In his explanation, a 
reconceptualization of previous theories of conflict has been necessitated by the fact that most 
contemporary conflicts are violent and asymmetric, marked by inequalities of power and status. 
Secondly, many contemporary conflicts are protracted, crossing repeatedly into and out of violence 
and thus defying cyclical or bell shaped models of conflict phases. Thirdly, protracted conflicts 
warp the societies, economies and regions in which they are situated, creating complex 
emergencies fuelled on the one hand by local struggles and on the other by global factors such as 
the arms trade and support for regimes or rebels by outside states.50 
Due to the above complexities traditional conflict resolution models which mediate between two 
parties have been rendered inadequate, Miall offers this typology of the terms to make a distinction 
of their objectives; Conflict Resolution theorists: are preoccupied with how to transcend conflicts 
by getting parties to the conflict to reframe their positions. It emphasizes intervention by skilled 
but powerless third parties working unofficially with parties towards new thinking and new 
relationships. They aim to identify the root causes of the conflict with a view to devising creative 
solutions that conflict parties may have missed in their commitment to entrenched positions. The 
focus is on how parties can move from zero-sum destructive patterns to positive – sum constructive 
outcomes. Conflict Management theorists: on the other hand see conflicts as a result of 
unavoidable clashes of values and interests of conflict parties. Resolving these conflicts is seen as 
unrealistic and at best managing and containing these conflicts to reach a compromise is seen as 
                                                 
50 Miall, 2004, Pg. 2 
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the most viable way to end violence. Powerful actors with power and resources often put pressure 
on the parties to induce them to settle.51 
Galtung (1996) is credited with laying the bed rock for the theory of Conflict Transformation, in 
the work it is argued that;  
…conflicts have both life-affirming and life destroying aspects. They form from 
contradictions in the structure of society. They then become manifest in attitudes and 
behaviour. Once formed, conflicts undergo a variety of transformational processes: 
articulation or disarticulation, conscientisation or de – conscientisation, complexification 
or simplification, polarization or depolarization, escalation or de-escalation. The 
incompatibility which arises between parties may be eliminated by transcending the 
contradiction, by compromise, by deepening or widening the conflict structure, and by 
associating or dissociating the actors. Galtung, Krippendorf and others also emphasise the 
relationship between conflicts and larger conflicts embedded in the structure of world 
society and the world economy.52   
The above rings true for SADC as a regional and multilateral organization with a membership of 
14 countries which vary in size, economy, resource endowment, vegetation, political maturity, 
history, levels of infrastructure and development and on numerous other levels. The number and 
types of conflicts that SADC has and continues to experience are also a mixed bag requiring a 
suitable theoretical lens which acknowledges their asymmetrical nature. Out of a recognition that 
the very structure of parties and relationships in a conflict may be embedded in a pattern of 
conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict, Miall offers the 
following definition of Conflict Transformation theory; 
Conflict transformation is therefore a process of engaging with and transforming the 
relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that 
supports the continuation of violent conflict. Constructive conflict is seen as a vital agent 
or catalysts for change. People within the conflict parties, within the society or region 
affected, and outsiders with relevant human and material resources all have complementary 
roles to play in the long term process of peacebuilding. This suggests a comprehensive and 
                                                 
51 Miall, 2004, Pg. 3 
52 Galtung quoted in Miall, 2004, Pg. 4 
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wide ranging approach, emphasizing support for groups within the society in conflict rather 
than for the mediation of outsiders. It also recognizes that conflicts are transformed 
gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes as well as specific steps by means 
of which a variety of actors may play important roles.53 
For Lederach, the ultimate goal of conflict transformation is to include, respect, and promote the 
human and cultural resources from within a given setting by desisting from viewing the setting 
and the people as the problem and the outsider as the answer but rather to validate and build on 
people and resources within the setting.54 According to Fisher et al, Conflict Transformation 
Theory assumes that conflict is caused by real problems of inequality and injustice expressed by 
competing social, cultural and economic frameworks. The goals of work based on the theory are: 
-to change structures and frameworks that cause inequality and injustice, including 
economic redistribution 
-to improve longer-term relationships and attitudes among the conflicting parties 
-to develop processes and systems that promote empowerment, justice, peace, forgiveness, 
reconciliation, recognition.55 
 
1.4.5 The need for Regional Integration through Security Cooperation 
Efforts of regional organizations to cooperate in the area of Conflict Transformation have gained 
direction from Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, article 52 of the charter “supports regional 
arrangements and agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and in a manner consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the UN”. 56  According to the UN Capstone doctrine, one of the 
considerations made in deciding on whether or not to deploy a UN Peace Keeping Operation is 
                                                 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
55 Fisher et al, 2000, Pg. 8-9 
56 Nathan, 2012, Pg. 2 
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“whether regional or sub regional organisations and arrangements exist in resolving the 
situation”.57 Historically this view was expressed in the UN’s seminal report ‘An Agenda for Peace’ 
presented in 1992 by then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali who recognized the 
important role of regional organisations since the UN’s peace keeping and peacemaking capacity 
had increasingly been over stretched.58  
According to the UN, regional organisations are suited to assist because;  
…they have a good understanding of the historical background of local conflicts; they are 
familiar with the actors and issues involved in these conflicts; they can build trust through 
the frequency of interaction among their member states; and they can develop and uphold 
appropriate norms on conflict prevention and governance.59 
 
The UN has subsequently published a number of reports and resolutions as well as held a number 
of key meetings with heads of regional organizations as a sign of the seriousness they attach to the 
issue60. Article 16 of the African Union charter declares that the African Union regards “other 
regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution on the continent as an 
integral part of its security architecture”. The clause thus enjoins the AU’s Peace and Security 
Council and the Chairperson of the AU Commission to “work closely with regional bodies and 
ensure that there are strong partnerships between them and the Council in promoting and 
maintaining peace, security and stability”.61 
                                                 
57 UN Capstone Doctrine, Pg. 47 
58 Agenda For Peace quoted in Nathan, 2012 
59 Nathan, 2012, Pg. 2 
60 Ibid 
61 Nathan 2012, Pg. 2-3 
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Theories of regional integration in the area of security proceed from the logic of a merger of states 
into a larger political community as a means of promoting peaceful cooperation and reducing 
conflict between them.62 The preoccupation of many scholars and students of regional integration 
has been a desire to “explain the tendency towards a voluntary or non-coercive creation of larger 
political units, each of which self-consciously abstained from the use of force in the relations 
between the participating units and groups.63 Below is a brief summary of four of the major 
approaches to the study of regional integration; 
1. The Federalist Approach: takes peace and security as its dominant values and 
considers war to be the inevitable product of a multi-state system and the perennial 
struggle for power thus arguing in favour of an integrated state and the fragmentation 
of power.64 The approach concerns itself with institutions and institution building, 
including the division of powers between federal, national and local authorities as well 
as checks and balances between organs of government.65  
2. The Functionalist Approach: functionalists subscribe to the community model of 
integration. In their view, society is based on a complex, interwoven network of 
international organisations implementing the welfare functions, which were 
traditionally a domain of the nation state, while rendering war impossible at the same 
time).66 They are mainly concerned with the development of a working peace system. 
                                                 
62 Hodges; Sebek, 2001, Pg. 6 
63 Haas; Sebek, 2001, Pg. 7 
64 Pentland; Sebek, 2001, Pg. 9 
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In their view, nation states are unable to preserve peace or to improve the social and 
economic wellbeing of their citizens.67  
3. Neo-Functionalism: is a critique and elaboration of the functionalist approach which 
aspires to reconcile the functionalist concern with economics and welfare with a theory 
of political conflict and choice. Neo-Functionalists do not perceive the nation-state as 
a monolithic actor; rather, the state is viewed as a complex of interests and issue areas, 
some of which have more integrative implications than others.68  
4. The Transactionalist Approach: also known as the pluralist or communications 
approach, it concerns itself largely with the problem of the malfunctioning of the multi-
state system and with the development of peaceful relations among nations. It has as 
its goal the attainment of peace and security in the international system as well as the 
formation of a community of states.69 This community cannot exist if its members are 
not interdependent and assured of mutual responsiveness so that the resolution of 
conflicts through violence is inconceivable in the near future. It is premised on the 
thinking that an increase in transaction flows between political units in a given region 
is the result of a learning process in which actors become accustomed to using new 
common procedures, and to developing a structure of common values.70  
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1.4.6 Regionalism. Regionalisation and Regional Security Cooperation 
Shinoda surmises that “regionalism is a key factor in many cases of peacebuilding, since regional 
organizations play significant roles in implementing peacebuilding activities. Yet it is also true 
that regionalism could disrupt sensitive handling of reconstructing a nation-state.71 To support this 
position, Shinoda argues that regionalism is one of the traditionally recognized causes of war 
because of the history of the Second World War as well as its role in the conflict in the middle east 
which has revolved around emotional bonds shared by the people of the region where Palestine is 
seen as a problem of the whole region. Regional identity is also a hotbed of conflict in areas like 
the Caucasus where European and Russian influences have to be balanced as well as the region 
oriented influence of Australia in Timor-Leste.  
The basic logic of Regionalism as a peacebuilding tool proceeds from the logic that, when a nation 
lacks the capacity to maintain peace by itself it naturally asks countries in the region to mobilise 
resources to assist. Many regional organisations serving this purpose have emerged the world over, 
these include; the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and in Africa, the African Union and its sub regional organisations such as 
SADC and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Regionalism is especially 
indispensable when an armed conflict arises with a regional political background, a case in point 
is the pattern of conflicts in the Great Lakes region involving, Rwanda, Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It would be counter- productive to view the conflict in 
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each country separately as in order to fully appreciate the dynamics of each conflict one ought to 
analyse them from the perspective of the entire region.72 
Increased attention by International Relations and Security Studies scholars to activities of states 
at the regional level is often traced back to English scholar Barry Buzan.73 Movement in this 
direction arose out of the realization of the potential for finding solutions to problems from regional 
governance structures. A key proponent of regionalism, Bjorn Hettne argues this cogently when 
he observes, “the regional is just ‘right’ because the nation state solution is ‘obsolete’ and the 
global is ‘premature’.74 In the words of another key proponent of regionalism, Frederik Soderbaum,  
…a world order based on regions rather nation states would represent a more stable and 
less hierarchical world order. The regions are better equipped to deal with regional 
characteristics, cultures and interests, and it would facilitate a better multilateralism: a 
regional multilateralism…75  
 
Soderbaum goes on to highlight the difference between the often confused concepts of regionalism, 
regionness and regionalization, in his words;  
…regionalism refers to the cognitive ideas and policy that are aimed at enhancing 
cooperation, integration or coordination within a regional space. It is usually associated 
with a regional programme, and often leads to institution-building. Regionalisation refers 
to the process of cooperation and integration creating a regional space, and to the ‘outcome’. 
At its most basic it means a concentration of activity on the regional level, which may give 
rise to the formation of regions, regional networks and actors, or regional organizations.76  
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This conceptual clarity is important for a consideration of how the regional project has been 
conceived and undertaken in the context of Southern Africa. 
Van Nieuwkerk quotes Cawthra as identifying two types of sub regional security cooperation, 
these being collective security and collective defence. Collective security is defined as a situation 
where member states seek to prevent conflict between each other, while Collective defence is 
where states ally with each other and put in place arrangements for joint defence against external 
threat. Cawthra suggests the former for third world countries as it can contribute to stability 
between and within states and create conditions for economic growth.77 
For Ngoma, sustainable peace, security and order in Africa can only be realised through the 
establishment of a security community. He quotes Karl Deutsch (a leading authority on the concept 
of security community) as defining it as a group of people, which has become “integrated”. By 
integrated we mean the attainment within a territory, of a “sense of security” and of institutions 
and practices strong and widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations of “peaceful 
change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief…that common social 
problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”. 78  Ngoma sees the 
evolvement of SADC structures notably from SADCC to SADC as having been spurred on by this 
realization. 
The roots of regional security communities are traced back to the 1950s and 60s, Acharya surmises 
that they are virtually non-existent in the developing world although several exist in the west, most 
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notably the European Union. He proffers this definition for the concept; “a security community 
comes into existence when a regional group develops institutions and practices that are strong and 
stable enough to assure stable expectations of peaceful change within its population in the long-
term. They are characterised by mutual interdependence between diverse political units; mutual 
responsiveness of political units; and the renunciation of the use of force among political units.”79 
Van Nieuwkerk asks the all-important question of whether the European idea of regional 
integration can be transplanted easily onto the African context. 
“The UN Charter allows member states to form subordinate groupings in order to assist with the 
maintenance of peace and security. As stated in article 52 (1) of the UN Charter, ‘[n]othing in the 
present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such 
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for 
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with 
the purposes and Principles of the United Nations”.80 Article 53 of the charter states a requirement 
for the Security Council authorization before enforcement action can be taken by regional bodies. 
On the other hand, Article 6(4) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) states that the African 
Union and the UN Security Council need to be notified soon after a military response by member 
states. This contradiction is seen as a legal tension that may impede the future rapid deployment 
of the SADCBRIG.81 
SADC has been described as a “regional community in the making” as it is fraught with risks of 
political succession violence, food insecurity, energy crisis; trans-border issues (including light 
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weapons flows, migration, trans-border crime, drug trade and management of natural disasters.82 
As it evolves and develops as a region, SADC in its recently revised Strategic Indicative Plan of 
the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SIPO II) outlines as objective 2 of its political sector, 
the promotion of 
…political cooperation among member states; evolution of common political values and 
institutions with the expected outcome of; enhanced political cooperation, effective 
interaction between the organ and civil society, and the coordination of foreign policies.83 
 
This reflects the will of SADC to engender some common values to underpin their activities in the 
political sector which is an encouraging development, objective 5 which aims to “observe and 
implement international treaty obligations (UN and AU)” has as its expected outcome: “member 
states governed by the same international legal regime; harmonization of positions and approaches 
on international issues of mutual interest.”84 
1.4.7 Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (RP2) and Sovereignty with Responsibility 
A key issue that has impeded SADC’s efforts at reigning in some of its wayward member states is 
sensitivity towards their sovereignty. Being careful not to interfere or even be seen to be meddling 
in the internal affairs of member states has gone on despite the abuses suffered by ordinary citizens 
in the member states. The heads of state have tended to protect each other as evidenced by their 
limiting of the powers and jurisdiction of the SADC tribunal which is a regional court which had 
power to hear complaints of ordinary citizens of member states against abuses by member states. 
After some Zimbabwean white farmers had successfully brought a case of unfair grabbing and 
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redistribution of their farms before the court, the heads of states summit which is SADC’s highest 
decision making body decided to limit the mandate of the court not to hear cases or appeals from 
ordinary citizens. This move largely supported by other heads of state was seen as a strategic step 
to cover their own backs in case they too were in future dragged before the court and embarrassed 
by their own citizens. The concept of sovereignty is thus analysed in this paper within the context 
of international norms governing its application such as the Responsibility to Protect (RP2) and 
how it can be applied in the case of SADC to enhance Conflict Transformation in the region. 
According to Shinoda, when dealing with failed states, international efforts are mostly geared 
towards re-establishing a sovereign state which is also the ultimate aim of peacebuilding. This is 
based on the logic that:  
…governmental power may sometimes be unwilling or unable to protect citizens, or it may not 
be willing and capable enough to protect citizens properly. That is the case of a failed state. 
Under such circumstances, some kind of peacebuilding activities, or even humanitarian 
intervention could be justified.85  
 
The idea of the Responsibility to protect is premised on the Liberal theory of sovereignty, the  
theory implies that not all interventions in a state violate its sovereignty. The reasoning here is 
that:  
…if governmental power was abused, the constitutional order of the state would be destroyed 
then a revolutionary action would be required and justified to replace the governmental power 
holder in the name of the supreme power of the people. This is a typical logic of justification 
for contemporary humanitarian intervention…which is also the logic used to justify 
peacebuilding activities as well.86  
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The argument of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is contained in the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report published in 2001 by the Canadian 
government together with other members of a formation called the Human Security network. The 
“Responsibility to Protect” is based on two basic principles:  
a) State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection 
of its people lies with the state itself. 
b) Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert 
it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.87 
The foundations of the responsibility to protect revolve around the concept of sovereignty and 
duties of the international community and institutions including regional bodies to intervene. 
According to Shinoda, the principles derive from; 
i) Obligation inherent in the concept of sovereignty; 
ii) The responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the 
maintenance of international peace and security; 
iii) Specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, 
covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law; and  
iv) The developing practice of states, regional organisations and the Security Council 
itself.88 
 
According to Shinoda, the ICISS proclaims that “The Responsibility to Protect” embraces three 
specific responsibilities; 
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal 
conflict and other man made crises putting populations at risk. 
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with 
appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and 
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. 
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C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full 
assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the 
harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.89 
All the above constitute important considerations for an assessment of SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity especially since the organisation is made up of member states who tend to 
jealously guard their sovereignty. 
1.4.8 Measuring Conflict Transformation Capacity in an “Evolving” or “Nascent” Security 
Community: SADC under the microscope 
The major debates on SADC’s capabilities to transform conflicts have in large part been informed 
by the theory of Security Community. In one of the most important studies of the concept to date, 
Nathan (2012) in his book “Community of Insecurity” mulls over the question of the extent to 
which SADC could be said to be a security community. He offers a scathing critique of those 
arguing that SADC is an “emerging, nascent or embryonic” security community. This is based on 
the reasoning that all entities that lay claim to being security communities ought to have as their 
hall mark, dependable expectations of peaceful change among each other were conflict to occur. 
He makes the compelling argument that since there is no timeline or reliable guarantee of when 
and how SADC will ultimately reach a point where it can be called a security community, it is 
unproductive to dwell on descriptions such as an ‘evolving’ security community since the 
possibility of conflict among its member states is not sufficiently precluded in the organization in 
its current form. 
A Security Community is defined as; 
a group of people that has become integrated; where integration is understood as the 
attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices 
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strong and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of 
peaceful change among the population.90  
Table 3: Security Communities and other frameworks of security Cooperation 
Security 
Regime: 
 
-Principles, rules and norms that restrain the behaviour of states on a reciprocal 
basis 
-Competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning usually continue 
within the regime, although specific regimes might be created to limit the spread 
of weapons and military capabilities. 
-The absence of war within the community may be due to short term factors and 
considerations such as the economic and political weakness of actors otherwise 
prone to violence or to the existence of a balance of power or mutual deterrence 
situation. In either case, the interests of the actors in peace are not fundamental, 
unambiguous or long term in nature. 
Security 
Community: 
-Strict and observed norms concerning non use of force; no competitive arms 
acquisitions and contingency planning against each other within the grouping 
-Institutions and processes (formal or informal) for the pacific settlement of 
disputes 
-Long term prospects for war avoidance 
-Significant functional cooperation and integration 
-A sense of collective identity 
Collective 
Defence: 
-Common perception of external threat(s) among or by the members of the 
community; such a threat might be another state or states within the region or 
an extra-regional power, but not from a member. 
-An exclusionary arrangement of like-minded states 
-Reciprocal obligations of assistance during military contingencies 
-Significant military interoperability and integration 
-The conditions of a security community may or may not exist among the 
members 
Collective 
Security: 
-Prior agreement on the willingness of all parties to participate in the collective 
punishment of aggression against any member state 
-No prior identification of enemy or threat 
-No expectation of and requirement for economic or other functional 
cooperation 
-A collective physical capacity to punish aggression 
Source: Acharya (2009, Pg. 20) 
Deutsch distinguishes two types of Security Community, the amalgamated (the formal merger of 
two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common 
government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal) and the 
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pluralistic (one that retains the legal independence of separate governments, its defining feature 
being its desire to see an increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political 
units or the emerging pluralistic security community, as perceived by their governments, elites and 
populations).91 To assist us in confronting the definitional and conceptual challenge, Acharya 
(2009) makes the distinction between the concepts of security regime, security community, 
collective defence and collective security in table 3 by highlighting their key attributes. 
1.4.9 Security Complex Theory 
The Security Complex theory is premised on; 
…the logic of security regions which sees international security as a relational matter which 
is mostly about how human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threats and 
vulnerabilities, although sometimes it addresses the ways such collectivities relate to 
threats from the natural environment92  
The theory offers an analytical framework for regional subsystems with a focus on the state as a 
key unit of analysis as well as its political and military components. It highlights the autonomy of 
regional security relations within the context of the state and system levels.  A security complex is 
defined as; 
…a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that 
their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another.93 
 
The security complexes are seen as a normal and expected feature of an anarchical international 
system whose absence ought to be questioned. Due to the fact that SADC is made up mostly of 
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developing countries struggling with post-colonial challenges of state building, their security 
challenges are interlinked in important ways. However, their ability to effectively cooperate to 
contain and transform conflicts as envisaged in a security community is still at its formative stages. 
1.4.10 The linkages between Peacebuilding, Regionalism and Conflict Transformation in SADC 
The end of the Cold War did not unfortunately result in an end to conflicts within and between 
states as many had hoped. Instead new forms of conflict and threats to peace and security emerged 
which require innovative solutions and responses. Various approaches and studies have thus 
emerged revolving around the best way to respond to and prevent conflicts from occurring and 
recurring. One such is an influential field of study and theory called peacebuilding which emerged 
in the early 1990s. Historically traced to the famous UN Agenda for peace report, Peacebuilding 
has been defined as actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. In this conception, efforts to rebuild peace 
are conceived of in the context of the aftermath of conflict as captured in Boutros Ghali’s famous 
“Agenda for Peace” report which captured the mood and thinking in the immediate Post Cold War 
era.94 According to the UN Secretary General’s policy committee, “peacebuilding involves a range 
of measures targeted at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening 
national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable 
peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific 
needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully 
prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the 
above objectives” (UN PBSO, Peacebuilding Orientation: 5).  
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According to the UN Capstone Doctrine, ‘Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of 
creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep rooted, 
structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address 
core issues that affect the functioning of society and the state and seek to enhance the capacity of 
the state to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions’.95 The above in large part 
rhymes with the agenda of Conflict Transformation, Clements writes that peacebuilding activities 
‘have a strong preventive character and are aimed at meeting basic needs for security and order, 
shelter, food and clothing and for recognition of identity and worth.96In his view, peacebuilding is 
‘what civilized societies do spontaneously to develop effective national and international rule 
making regimes, dispute resolution mechanisms and cooperative arrangements to meet basic 
economic, social, cultural and humanitarian needs and to facilitate effective global citizenship”. 
These attributes of peacebuilding form the foundational base of conflict transformation as they 
occur at all levels, in the home, in the community, nationally and internationally. They also include 
in-country initiatives that are aimed at reducing gaps between the rich and the poor, extending 
basic human rights between all peoples and building sustainable development processes. It is this 
aspect of conflict transformation that is seen as being key to all the rest.97 
Below is an explanation by Clements of some of the essential ingredients of Conflict 
Transformation which highlight its relationship to Peacebuilding: 
1) It should be aimed at channelling the energy generated by conflict in constructive, non 
–violent rather than destructive and violent directions. Its aim is not to eliminate 
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conflict but to utilize conflictual processes for generative and positive change (which 
may be relatively spontaneous or directed). 
2) Conflict Transformation occurs when violent conflict ceases and or is expressed in non-
violent ways and when the original structural sources (economic, social, political, 
military and cultural) of the conflict have been changed in some way or other. 
3) Conflicts can be transformed by normal socio-political processes (incremental changes 
through time) by the parties acting alone, by expert third party interveners and parties 
acting together and or by judicious advocacy and political intervention. Conflict 
Transformation should incorporate a wide cross-section of political decision-makers, 
citizens, aid and development agencies, religious organisations and social movements. 
Too often, in the past, conflict transformation has been conceptualized largely as a 
political problem. It has to be cast as a social and economic problem as well if 
sustainable structural change is to occur. 
4) Such conflict transformation can take place at any stage of the escalatory cycle. If 
preventive peacebuilding does not take place at the first sign of trouble and problems 
remain unaddressed, then transformational processes, in the early stages of an evolving 
conflict may take the form of early warning and the application of suitable preventive 
measures. As the conflict escalates (especially if it turns violent), transformation may 
depend on some kind of crisis management or intervention and later it may require 
conciliation, mediation, negotiation, arbitration and collaborative problem solving 
processes. Finally of course conflict transformation involves reconstruction and 
reconciliation.98 
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1.4.11 International Impetus for Conflict transformation and the Creation and Strengthening of a 
Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P) in SADC 
What is a RI4P? 
In an effort to explore ways of strengthening SADC’s conflict transformation capacity, this section 
considers the idea of a regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P). A RI4P can be thought of as a 
“complex assemblage” of actors, both international and local acting through political contestation 
to form peace. According to Oliver Richmond, It is a “dynamic, locally owned, formal or informal 
and contextual approach”. The advantage of this approach is that it results in a peace that reflects 
the interests, identities, and needs of all actors, state and non-state through mutual accommodation 
and social justice.99  
There have been international calls by the UN, World Bank, IMF, donors and local actors alike for 
greater participation by civil society and non-state actors in peacebuilding. The thinking is that 
such an approach confers both international and local legitimacy on the form of peace achieved. 
The forms of peace achieved in various parts of the world are influenced by “local patterns of 
politics based on contextual, social, cultural and historical norms, identities, natural resources and 
international norms”.100 The latter have been labelled “Hybrid” forms of peace which represent a 
synthesis of conflict management, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and conflict transformation 
approaches. Hybrid forms of peace which characterize peace processes worldwide also transcend 
these typologies. The approach draws on a need long identified by Lederach to incorporate local 
actors into peace processes to lessen dependence on elite driven negotiations.101  
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The creation of a RI4P obtains within the framework of Peacebuilding, Conflict Transformation 
by extension is a strategy for deepening the search for a self-sustainable peace. The creation of an 
Infrastructure for peace is an implementation tool of such a strategy which has a bias towards 
building the capacities of local actors in a conflict affected society. The goals of peacebuilding are 
to “prevent, reduce, transform and help people recover from structural and other forms of violence. 
It empowers people to foster relationships at all levels that sustain them and their environment...it 
seeks to break cycles of violence by taking a series of interrelated, connected and coherent actions. 
It is a systematic process that facilitates the establishment of sustainable peace and tries to prevent 
the reoccurrence of violence by addressing the root causes and effects of conflict”102. The goals of 
peacebuilding are attained through “conflict prevention, conflict transformation, relationship 
building, promoting social cohesion, institution building and political transformation, facilitating 
economic transformation and strengthening civil society. Overall, peacebuilding is a long term 
process that occurs before, during and after conflict has slowed or abated”.103  
The UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, in close cooperation with the UN 
Department of Political Affairs, currently supports the establishment of I4Ps and had by 2011 
conducted dialogue leading to the development of peace infrastructures in approximately 30 
countries104. This notwithstanding, little is known about the local dynamics, institutions, processes 
and agencies involved in forming peace locally. Research trends present evidence from more than 
12 post conflict countries around the world from Afghanistan to Kenya or Nepal where informal 
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or formal local peace committees and other institutional frameworks have been formed. These 
peace formations which in some cases have included full-fledged official ministries of peace, have 
been termed infrastructures for peace. This is testimony to the fact that a truly comprehensive 
peace process can only be achieved beyond formal spaces and institutions.105 
1.5 Problem Statement  
The record of international organisations on the African continent has been less than glamorous, 
the African Union (AU), New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC have in some quarters been described 
as ‘per diem watering holes than competent agencies’106 due to their talk shop style of business 
and frequent meetings which seldom ever come up with tangible and effective solutions to the 
continent’s security vulnerabilities. According to Van Nieuwkerk (2007), this is because SADC 
member states’ positions and approaches are driven by national interests (which are a must have) 
rather than regional interests (which are nice to have).  
1.5.1 Why the SADC region? 
Over half the conflicts in Africa in the new millennium have been linked to neighbouring states 
through, political, socio-economic, and cultural factors that have deep roots in the history of the 
region. In most conflicts, the main protagonists also tend to operate across borders, this renders 
any efforts to build sustainable peace futile if they fail to take the cross border dynamics of 
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conflicts into account. These regional dynamics affect national contexts in what is called “regional 
conflict complexes or formations”, these are transnational conflicts that form mutually re-
enforcing linkages across boundaries.107   
Other dynamics which complicate regional conflicts are refugee flows, narcotic and criminal 
networks, illicit trade in minerals such as blood diamonds, small arms smuggling and the 
emergence of nomadic armed groups such as the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). A key challenge 
for regional organisations in addressing the above is that they have often found it easier to agree 
on hard rather than soft security solutions. A disadvantage of this approach is that it addresses the 
symptoms and not the causes of the conflict. For a just and long lasting peace, regional 
organisations ought to focus on addressing the root causes of the conflict through the involvement 
of all the affected in finding the solution. International policy has been dominated by state-building 
as a response to conflict, neglecting the ‘trickle up response’. The problem here is that state-
building is seen as being synonymous with peacebuilding. Rather than focus on mere security 
cooperation, a peacebuilding approach advocates for the linking of regional civil society and 
business networks with regional diplomacy. This approach “connects supra- and sub – state 
peacebuilding strategies that can tackle cross – border conflict dynamics at both their ‘branches’ 
and their ‘roots’.108  
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1.5.2 Challenges facing SADC’s Conflict Transformation capacity 
The main problem that this research recognizes in SADC is the plethora of multifaceted and 
constantly changing nature of threats to regional peace and security which SADC is consciously 
reforming itself to contain. Driven by a desire to devise African solutions to African problems, 
SADC is engaged in developing its capacity to remain equal to the task of transforming conflicts 
from violence to non- violence and attaining lasting and durable peace and security in the region. 
Unlike its counterparts in other parts of the continent as well as other international organizations, 
SADC’s energies appear to be geared towards promoting locally brewed solutions to conflicts in 
the region, respecting the role of local actors with a minimum of external intervention. Judging by 
the creation and strengthening of other units within the OPDS such as the Politics and Diplomacy 
unit, the Mediation unit and the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC), Public Safety unit 
and Policing Unit as well as roping in civilian functions into its peace support operations, it is 
evident that SADC would not like to be known as just being preoccupied with peacekeeping and 
solving conflict through military means only.  
Despite the restructuring of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS), the SADC unit 
charged with peace and security functions as well as its reforms including the revision of its five 
year roadmap the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) to SIPO II for the next five years, 
it is still not clear what technical strengths it has to transform conflicts. This research is driven by 
this need to establish the extent to which SADC has the technical wherewithal to transform 
conflicts from violence to durable peace and stability. It does this by assessing the current 
infrastructure developed, whether it is equal to the task as well as by identifying limitations it is 
faced with. A key area of interest for research is to investigate the extent to which SADC has 
transformed itself into an organization that respects local parties to a conflict and not merely views 
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them as the problem while viewing external interveners as the solution. At another level, a key 
research question is how SADC has built capacity and transformed conflicts in the region, 
respecting the role of local actors and respecting the sensitivities of sovereignty in the region. 
This research acknowledges that SADC was formed with a primary mandate of reducing economic 
dependence on the then apartheid South African regime through its predecessors, The Frontline 
States and the SADCC which also had some limited and informal security functions. The regional 
body has however since taken on some formal responsibilities to ensure the maintenance of peace 
and security in the region, it is as such the desire of this research to investigate and assess how 
SADC has carried out these functions as well as outlining and assessing the various security policy 
instruments at the body’s disposal and their effectiveness. This research takes place against the 
back drop of the recent review of the SIPO I, which was replaced by SIPO II which was approved 
by the SADC summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia in August 
2010.  
This development presents an opportunity for researchers to assess the timeliness and 
appropriateness of this review exercise as well as to ascertain the extent to which the new SIPO II 
is equal to the challenge of containing SADC’s security and peacebuilding challenges. Based on 
the foregoing it is important to point out that the above described activities and historical processes 
provide evidence that SADC does have some capacity to deal with conflicts and build peace in the 
region. This research however more specifically aims to investigate the suitability of the conflict 
transformation approach to peacebuilding efforts in SADC; simply put, this means establishing 
the extent to which and whether conflict transformation can offer the appropriate vehicle to 
transform various types of conflicts occurring in its member states from a state of violence to non 
-violence as well as from negative to positive peace with a view to establishing long lasting and 
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durable peace in the region. The conflict transformation approach focusses on transforming the 
context, structure, issues, actors and rules of the conflict. It advocates for a greater role to be given 
to local actors in transforming the conflict and building peace. 
1.5.3 SADC’s Achievements in the areas of Peace and Security to date 
It is instructive to flag some of SADC’s most notable achievements in its efforts to contain conflict 
and build peace in the region in order to give a context to situate the core problem of this research. 
The recently launched SIPO II document for instance identifies milestones in cooperation among 
member states in the areas of politics, defence and security which have bolstered regional 
integration and served as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Member states have for 
instance; shared information in those areas more extensively, exchanged visits, shared training 
institutions (The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre – RPTC being a case in point), conducted 
joint peacekeeping exercises, and supported each other during emergencies and political 
challenges. Significantly, SADC has also signed some important agreements and established key 
institutions indispensable for their peace and security mandate.  
Key among these are the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, establishing the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security housed at the secretariat and the Mutual Defence Pact 
(MDP) which deems an attack on one member state as a threat to regional peace and security.   
SADC has also successfully launched the SADC Standby Force in line with the requirements of 
the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), equipping the region with a 
collective approach to defence, security and stability. Furthermore, it has successfully integrated 
the Southern African Regional Police Chief’s Cooperating Organisation (SARPCCO) into the Inter 
State Defence and Security Council (ISDSC) bolstering regional integration and cooperation in 
the area of policing in the region. Other milestones include the establishment of some key 
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institutions. These are the Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) for conflict prevention and 
management, the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) and the SADC Mediation Unit 
(SMU).109 Notwithstanding these remarkable achievements, SADC is still gripped by a myriad of 
challenges, conflicts and peace and security deficits. This is due to the intermittent, fluid and 
constantly changing nature of threats to peace and security in the region.  Detailed below are the 
challenges; it is the preoccupation of this research to assess SADC’s capacity to address, contain 
and manage these challenges which have manifested themselves in the guise of various types, 
levels and stages of conflicts.  
1.5.4 The varied nature of threats to peace and security in the SADC region 
Despite the current peace dividend that prevails in the SADC region, the region is fraught with 
many challenges which include but are not limited to; political and electoral violence in member 
states, poverty, economic inequality, food insecurity, energy shortages, trans-border crimes such 
as light weapons smuggling, transnational organized crime, drug smuggling, refugees and other 
migrants and the management of natural disasters. Others include; climate change, economic 
recession, and unconstitutional changes of government, vulnerability of national borders, money 
laundering, illicit mining and maritime piracy.110 This research will thusly assess the extent to 
which the concept of human security has been featured on SADC’s security agenda as well as 
investigate how the organization has moved to address the above mentioned challenges.  
  
                                                 
109 SADC, Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ, SIPO II, 2012, Pg. 14-15 
110 SADC, Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ II, 2012, Pg. 16 
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1.5.5 Systemic and Institutional Weaknesses and Challenges 
Some of the challenges confronting SADC’s OPDS are of an institutional nature, these include; 
poor infrastructure for the implementation of regional integration, low political will displayed by 
member states, a secretariat not strong enough to implement collective policy resolutions, 
problems with most donors and International Cooperating Partners (ICPs), excessive secrecy, poor 
engagement with civil society, lack of knowledge about SADC by ordinary citizens of member 
states, difficult working relationship with the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Department 
(PSD), fixation of member states on sovereignty, highly politicized security sectors in member 
states, unconstitutional changes of government, dictatorial regimes among members, violations of 
SADC’s electoral code by member states, fragmented approach to crisis management by member 
states, poor governance, poor capacity to implement resolutions, concentration of decision making 
powers in the heads of state and ministerial committees, lack of a civilian component in the SADC 
standby force which robs SADC of an opportunity to fully address human security challenges, no 
clear policy framework on post conflict reconstruction and security sector reform.111  
1.5.6 At National / Member State level: Ignorance of Ordinary citizens in member states about the 
mandate of SADC 
Many ordinary citizens of SADC know very little about the organisation, its objectives as well as 
its activities except for in places like Lesotho where the organization has prominently intervened 
in the 1994, 1998 and 2007 electoral disputes in that country. Even then, it would appear that the 
citizens are only familiar with the organization within the confines and extent of its intervention 
in that country. This state of affairs is problematic since for an organization such as SADC, success 
                                                 
111 International Crisis Group, 2012 
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or its lack thereof is in large part a product of the perceptions of the ordinary citizens of its member 
states. This is because the ordinary citizens are the supposed beneficiaries of the lofty and noble 
objectives as outlined in the organisation’s regional integration agenda. For all its milestones and 
achievements in the area of regional integration, the diversity of SADC’s member states has 
presented it with some major challenges. The weak, under developed and in some cases absence 
of SADC National Committees at member state level as well as the inefficient SADC national 
contact point are all factors that may serve to weaken SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
1.5.7 Divisions among member states 
Camps and divisions amongst the leaders of its member states have emerged mainly driven by the 
problematic assumption of a shared historical experience. The problem here has been the strong 
ties and patterns of alliance between those member states who fought liberation wars on the one 
hand and those who did not. The credibility and loyalty of the latter member states has often been 
brought into question particularly where they have broken ranks with the position of other member 
states on a point of principle.  The position taken by member states such as Botswana particularly 
with regards to Zimbabwe where the country’s leadership publicly criticized the Mugabe regime 
for election related irregularities and its democratic deficits is a case in point. Anthoni van 
Nieuwkerk aptly captures this impasse when he rightly observes; 
Few ordinary southern Africans seem willing to identify with rulers and bureaucrats who 
romanticize the past, fear the future, and suffer from policy implementation paralysis.112 
                                                 
112  Van Nieuwkerk, Organizational Dimensions of Security Cooperation in the Southern African Development 
Community, in Kaunda M.J (Ed), Proceedings of the 2006 FOPRISA Annual Conference, Report 3, Botswana 
Institute for Development Policy Analysis, 2007, Pg. 100 
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1.5.8 Absence of a Codified Common Regional Peace and Security Policy (CRPSP) Framework 
This research is in part motivated by the fact that the SADC region does not have a clear, codified 
overarching framework in the mould of a Common Regional Peace and Security Policy (CRPSP) 
which outlines the region’s peacebuilding objectives and acts as a point of confluence for the 
region’s conflict transformation and peacebuilding efforts. This absence has robbed the region of 
the clear articulation of a peace policy, a regional security concept, and norms and values which 
will underpin all regional peace and security activities and can be cascaded to each individual 
member state to guide their individual National Security Policies (NSP). Though this research 
recognizes existing structures and instruments in SADC’s security policy landscape, it would 
appear that these have largely been disjointed leading to past security and conflict transformation 
decisions being taken in a policy vacuum in an ad-hoc and insufficiently coordinated manner. 
Another problem is that SADC has also prioritized conflict management through mediation over 
efforts at building and deepening peace.   
1.5.9 Difficult relationship with Donors and International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) 
A key challenge for the regional body is that it has had a difficult relationship with donors or 
International Cooperating Partners (ICPs). This has been a result of SADC leaders’ insistence on 
maintaining their autonomy especially in their reluctance to reign in on leaders among their fold 
such as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe who have been accused of human rights violations. Donors 
have in turn reacted to this by starving SADC of essential aid which constitutes a large chunk of 
the regional bodies’ budget.  
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1.5.10 Inconsistent Security Policy Decision Making in Member states’ Conflicts 
SADC has acted swiftly and decisively to the unconstitutional change of power in Madagascar in 
2009 by condemning it publicly, suspending its membership and threatening sanctions. This is one 
critical area that this research addresses with a view to coming up with viable solutions to the 
impasse as well as to establishing why the body has reacted differently to crisis within the region. 
This also presents questions of whether collective regional norms prevail within SADC and the 
extent to which they are adhered to. Accompanying the soft handling of colleagues guilty of human 
rights abuses, SADC leaders have also often failed to implement decisions reached collectively at 
official fora. This has weakened the regional body’s capacity to enforce some of its commitments. 
It is the desire of this research to explore possible avenues that may be employed as a solution. In 
the past SADC member states have failed to act as one in the long running conflict in Angola (1975 
– 2000), Lesotho (1994, ‘98, ‘07), the DRC (1998 -2001), Zimbabwe, (2000) – present and 
Madagascar (2009). The reasons for this inconsistency is also investigated in this research and 
suggestions made as to how this trend can be averted in the future. Having outlined the above it 
should be sufficiently clear that there are myriad reasons within SADC peace and security 
architecture that would warrant a research of this magnitude.  
1.6 Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to assess SADC’s conflict transformation capacity with a view to 
identifying gaps, challenges and areas that may require improvement. The research thus judges 
such situations against international best practice and trends and accordingly makes policy 
recommendations for the required reforms. 
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1.7 Research Questions 
1. Does SADC have the capacity to transform conflicts from a state of violence to durable 
and self-sustainable peace in the region by addressing their root causes and transforming 
factors that perpetuate violent conflict such as; context, structures, issues, rules and 
attitudes of actors in regional conflicts? 
2. How has SADC transformed itself to develop this capacity to transform the above aspects 
of conflicts? 
3. What are the constraints it has encountered in its efforts to transform conflicts? 
4. How has it overcome these constraints? 
 
1.8 Research Methodology 
1.8.1 Research Strategy  
The core work of this research is to assess the conflict transformation capacity of SADC. As shown 
in previous chapters, conflict transformation is a tool of peacebuilding which focuses on attaining 
durable peace by allowing local actors to play a central role in efforts to bring about peace in 
conflict situations. It has a preoccupation with addressing imbalances in power relations and 
situations of disproportionate distribution and access to social justice, which are usually at the 
heart of the discontent that leads to conflict and violence. It is also concerned with engendering 
and fostering a culture that rejects violent conflict in societies. Its preoccupation with local parties 
to a conflict is informed by the fact that they possess a deeper understanding of the dynamics that 
brought the conflict to the point where it is in the first place and as such cannot be excluded or side 
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lined in efforts to bring about a peace that will hold and last.113 More importantly they are the ones 
who will remain and live in that particular society in the period long after the violent conflict has 
ended. They are therefore best placed to identify the needs and long term interests of the most 
marginalized and vulnerable in complex political emergencies and conflict affected areas.114 The 
conflict transformation approach has five areas of focus in a conflict situation; actors, issues, 
context, rules and structures.  
1. Actors: it is concerned with modifying the actors’ goals and the approach they adopt in the 
pursuance of those goals. 
2. Context: it challenges the meaning and perceptions of the conflict itself, particularly the 
respective attitudes and understandings of specific actors in the conflict towards one 
another. 
3. Issues: It endeavours to redefine the issues that are central to the prevailing conflict, and to 
reformulate the position of key actors on those very issues. 
4. Rules: The concern here is to change the norms and rules governing decision making at all 
levels in order to ensure that conflicts are dealt with constructively through institutional 
channels. 
5. Structures: It strives to adjust the prevailing structure of relationships, power distributions 
and socio-economic conditions that are embedded in and inform the conflict, thereby 
affecting the very fabric of interaction between previously incompatible actors, issues and 
goals.115 
It is against this backdrop that SADC’s capacity to implement an elaborate conflict transformation 
Infrastructure which this research calls a Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P), reaching the 
lowest levels and actors in the region is brought under the microscope. Its scrutiny it is hoped will 
point at gaps in current efforts, as well as identify suitable remedies that will transform not only 
the nature of conflicts in the region but also transform their latent and deep seated causes in a 
                                                 
113 Lederach, Miall, Smith, Kumar, GPPAC, Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation 
114 Grant J, Can global development and local peacebuilding work together?, Insight on Conflict, November 18, 
2013, Peace Direct 
115 Trans Conflict, Collaborative Conflict Transformation, available at: 
www.transconflict.com/2014/01/collaborative-conflict-transformation-091/ accessed on: 09-01-14  
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thorough, comprehensive and effective manner that will guarantee durable peace. Conflict 
Transformation “requires that there are standing internal capacities for managing recurring 
tensions at national and local levels so that new conflicts are transformed into opportunities for 
greater reform and inclusion rather than violence”.116  
1.8.2 Research Design 
Conflict Transformation and the Quest for a Self-Sustaining Peace 
In conducting the assessment the research probes, gauges and gives an account of the current state 
of conflict transformation in SADC. From the onset two caveats are made, one is that although the 
theory of conflict transformation is still in its formative stages and is gradually evolving, building 
blocks have consciously or unconsciously been made in SADC to prepare the ground for the 
application of the approach. It is these building blocks which this research concerns itself with 
identifying, determining the extent of their formation as well as ascertaining the extent to which 
the ground and environment within SADC supports their formation and development as corner 
stones of a durable and self-sustaining peace in the region. Secondly, the research acknowledges 
that there is a contradiction inherent in this approach where for one, the attainment of a sustainable 
peace is expected to emerge from within, “from the local, from the inside and from the bottom 
up”.117  
On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that there is room for international and regional 
organisations such as SADC to play a role despite that they are also at times seen as external 
                                                 
116 Kumar C and De la Haye J, Hybrid Peacemaking: Building National “Infrastructures for Peace”, Global 
Governance, 18, 2011, Pg. 13  
117 de Coning, C 2013, Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local, Stability, 2 (1): 6, Pg. 1-6 DOI: http: 
//dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.as 
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interveners in conflict situations. Thusly no effort should be spared in improving their capacity 
and ability to design and manage coherent, multi-stakeholder peace missions in their areas of 
jurisdiction. They should also be helped to achieve coherent and comprehensive interventions. The 
thinking here is that coherence will result in effective peace missions and more sustainable and 
peaceful outcomes.118 
International peacebuilding interventions should stimulate, facilitate and create the space 
for the emergence of robust and resilient self-organized systems. International 
peacebuilding interventions shouldn’t interfere in the local social process with the goal of 
engineering specific outcomes, such as trying to produce a neo-liberal state.119  
 
For the above reason, it is important to capacitate conflict affected societies in such a way that they 
are able to develop a self-organizing capacity which can withstand pressures that risk a relapse 
into conflict. As indicated above, this lies at the heart of conflict transformation and it is the 
concern of this research to assess how SADC is performing this role with a view to identifying its 
shortcomings and challenges in order to devise solutions and remedies. The above approach was 
also informed by the argument advanced by (Nathan, 2012) critiquing researchers who write on 
the lack of effectiveness of SADC or those who praise its success without saying exactly what they 
mean by effectiveness. He holds that this results in imprecise and unsatisfactory conclusions, since 
it was not made clear what criteria they employed to measure effectiveness. As such this research 
uses the theoretical framework provided by conflict transformation and I4P theorists to assess 
SADC’s capacity.  
  
                                                 
118 de Coning, 2013, Pg. 3 
119 de Coning, 2013, Pg. 6 
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Capacity Assessment Method and Approach  
Capacity has been described as the ability of individuals, groups and organisations to perform their 
functions and achieve the desired results over time. 120  The research undertook a qualitative 
analysis of major issues, perceptions, and suggestions from various stakeholders, research outputs, 
technical and official reports and documents as well as interviews with officials at the SADC 
secretariat and some SADC member states.121 An assessment of SADC’s capacity for conflict 
transformation through the creation or strengthening of a Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P) 
lies at the heart of this research. The assessment undertook to identify current capacity levels, 
capacity needs; whether basic, average or self-sustaining which enabled the research to identify 
the required capacity development interventions once the capacity gaps were clarified. Capacity 
assessment was undertaken at both the multilateral / regional and the national member state levels. 
The research undertook the capacity assessment for three reasons: 
1. As a situational analysis to provide the basis for the identification of future capacity needs 
2. To provide a framework within which governments and donors can coordinate the 
formulation and implementation of capacity building programmes. 
3. To evaluate past experiences in order to better guide the implementation of future capacity 
development exercises for monitoring and evaluation and ultimately redesigning of 
policies, programmes and projects.122  
                                                 
120 SADC’s Regional Capacity Building Strategy for Education Management and Information Systems (EMIS) of 
March 2009 commissioned by the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) Working group 
on Education Policy Support for the SADC Secretariat, 2009, Pg. 16 
121 Approach adapted from Rohdewohld R, Capacity-Building Needs Assessment for Local Governments in 
Indonesia in Capacity.org, Advancing the policy and practice of capacity building in international development 
cooperation: Tools of the trade: capacity assessment, Issue 8, January 2001 available at: www.capacity.org accessed 
on: (09-01-14), Pg. 5 
122 Capacity.org, Advancing the policy and practice of capacity building in international development cooperation: 
Tools of the trade: capacity assessment, Issue 8, January 2001 available at: www.capacity.org accessed on: (09-01-
14)  
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As an assessment tool, the research has probed and conducted an assessment of conflict 
transformation capacity in SADC at three levels of analysis namely the: 
1. Systemic 
2. Institutional 
3. National / member state levels123 
 
Figure 4: What is to be transformed? 
As seen in figure 4 above, the assessment was conducted to determine the extent to which SADC 
has the capacity to transform the context, structure, content, rules, issues and actors in conflict 
situations in the region. The research adopted this approach as a heuristic device in an effort to 
deepen current peacebuilding and conflict transformation efforts in SADC. The approach was also 
                                                 
123 A similar approach was employed in the research for SADC’s Regional Capacity Building Strategy for Education 
Management and Information Systems (EMIS) of March 2009 commissioned by the Association for the 
Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) Working group on Education Policy Support for the SADC Secretariat  
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guided by a modified and adapted interpretation of the UNDP’s conceptual approach to capacity 
building which holds that capacity should be analysed at the systems (i.e the regulatory framework 
enabling national and regional policies), the entity level (i.e. an individual organisation’s 
structures and working mechanisms, its relationships with other relevant organisations, its working 
culture, its resources), and the individual level (i.e the skills and competencies of staff, and work 
ethics).124  
The UNDP Capacity assessment practice note of 2008 sees the point of entry for any capacity 
assessment exercise as being to recognise that capacity resides on three levels – the enabling 
environment, the organizational and the individual. It identifies four core issues commonly 
encountered across sectors: i) institutional arrangements; ii) leadership; iii) knowledge and iv) 
accountability which can be amended based on the case and the situation. It lists the following 
functional organizational capacities as prerequisites of functional and technical capacities 
necessary for creating and managing policies, legislation, strategies and programmes: 1) 
engagement with stakeholders; 2) assessment of a situation and the definition of a vision and 
mandate; 3) formulation of policies and strategies; 4) budgeting, management and implementation; 
and 5) Evaluation. The UNDP further suggests a three step process in the conduct of a capacity 
assessment:  
a) To mobilise and engage with stakeholders to create a capacity assessment design. The 
capacity assessment design ought to be guided by these questions: ‘capacity for why?’, 
‘capacity for whom?’, ‘capacity for what?’ 
b) To conduct the capacity assessment, data and information on the desired and existing 
capacity are collected 
                                                 
124 Capacity.org, Advancing the policy and practice of capacity building in international development cooperation: 
Tools of the trade: capacity assessment, Issue 8, January 2001 available at: www.capacity.org accessed on: (09-01-
14) 
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c) The results of the assessment are then summarized and interpreted where a comparison is 
done between desired capacities and existing capacities to determine the capacity 
development action needed to bridge the gap.125  
According to the USAID Centre for Development Information and Evaluation, in selecting a 
measurement instrument it is important to clearly identify what needs to be measured, i.e whether 
the objective of the intervention is to strengthen the entire organization or only a specific function 
or component of the organization. As such the most useful measurement should capture only the 
information relevant to the intervention. Informed by the conception of an organization as a system 
of related components that work together to achieve an agreed upon mission, it suggests the 
following components as key parts of a framework for measuring institutional capacity: 
1. Administrative and Support Functions 
- Administrative procedures and management systems 
- Financial management (budgeting, accounting, fundraising, sustainability) 
- Human resource management (staff recruitment, placement, support) 
- Management of other resources (information, equipment, infrastructure) 
2. Technical / Program Functions 
- Service delivery system 
- Program planning 
- Program monitoring and evaluation  
- Use and management of technical knowledge and skills 
3. Structure and Culture 
- Organisational identity and culture 
- Vision and purpose 
- Leadership capacity and style 
- Organisational values 
- Governance approach 
- External relations  
4. Resources 
- Human 
- Financial and Others.126 
                                                 
125 UNDP, Capacity Assessment Practice Note, October 2008 available at: www.capacity.undp.org accessed on: (09-
01-14) 
126 USAID, Recent Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS: Measuring Institutional Capacity, Centre for 
Development Information and Evaluation, 2000, Number 15 available at: 
www.chain.net.cn/document/20070820170226248687.pdf accessed on: (04-01-14) 
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The significance of assessing the conflict transformation capacity of SADC is that it provides an 
opportunity to expose the impact, outputs and outcomes of past interventions in the process 
providing a deeper understanding of what the obstacles to regional peace are.127 A major finding 
in the research has been that peacebuilding has not been given the centre stage in SADC’s 
responses to conflict and instability as evidenced by its glaring absence in SADC’s lexicon and 
nomenclature.128 The literature and research on peace and security related subjects in the region 
has also been framed from the angle of security regionalism, probing the extent to which SADC 
meets the requirements of a security community. The latest examples of this are two seminal 
publications; Laurie Nathan’s 2012 book titled: “Community of Insecurity, SADC’s struggle for 
Peace and Security in Southern Africa” another edited by Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi Dzinesa and 
Dawn Nagar titled: “Region-Building in Southern Africa, Progress, Problems and Prospects” also 
published in 2012. While they are both comprehensive in scope and robust in content, they pay 
scant to no attention to the specific subject of peacebuilding and by extension conflict 
transformation, which is another lost opportunity for deepening the search for peace consolidation 
and a formula for a self-sustainable and durable peace in the region.  
Elsewhere the literature analyses SADC’s Conflict Resolution, Mediation and Peace Keeping 
architecture in a rather piece meal, disjointed and ad-hoc fashion, an approach which runs the 
danger of addressing only the symptoms of the regions’ security vulnerabilities without entirely 
deepening the search for peace by focusing on the root causes of violent conflicts as per the 
peacebuilding approach. Efforts have also not been exhausted to streamline SADC’s current 
                                                 
127 Maina G, and Razia W, 2012, Pg. 23  
128 There is a glaring absence of the explicit use of the term peacebuilding, not to mention conflict transformation in 
a majority of SADC treaties, protocols, declarations and the literature generally.  
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achievements in developing a conflict transformation infrastructure informed by a peacebuilding 
framework. This presents the risk that most conflicts previously doused and mollified through the 
existing infrastructure may recur in the future as previous SADC interventions were only 
tantamount to wrapping a bandage around a wound without treating it with its requisite medicine 
for full, faster and real recovery. 
Qualitative Research Methods 
This study utilized qualitative research methods, data was collected from both primary and 
secondary sources. Primary data was collected through elite interviews with experts and 
practitioners in Southern Africa working for or closely with SADC. For this purpose the researcher 
undertook two field trips to Africa in 2012 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to the African Union Head 
Quarters, South Africa to various think tanks on peace and security and Botswana to the SADC 
Secretariat) and in 2013 (Botswana, South Africa and Lesotho). A number of interviews were 
conducted during these trips with scholars and practitioners working on peace and security in 
Southern Africa. Further data was collected from academic journals, books, technical reports, 
official reports of both governments and international organisations, newspapers and other internet 
sources.  
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Personal Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 3: Personal interviews conducted during field study 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Photograph 3a: Interview with 
Professor Kataboro Miti, SADC 
specialist, Department of Political 
Science, University of Pretoria 
(September 04, 2013) 
Photograph 3b: Interview with Arch 
Bishop Lerotholi – Arch Bishop of 
Maseru & Lead Civil Society Mediator 
in Post 2007 Peace Talks, Maseru 
(August 30, 2013) 
 
Photograph 3c: Interview with 
Professor Mafa Sejanamane – Provost 
Chancellor, National University of 
Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho (August 28, 
2013) 
Photograph 3c: In the office of Colonel 
Phillip Lebele, Botswana’s Defence 
Attache to the African Union. At 
Embassy of Botswana, Addis Ababa 
Ethiopia (September 12, 2012) 
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Elite Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 4: Elite interviews conducted during field study 
  
       
 
 
 
 
      
Photograph 4a: Interview with Mr 
Leshele Thoahlane, Former Chairman 
Independent Electoral Commission of 
Lesotho, Maseru Lesotho (August 30, 
2013) 
 
Photograph 4b: : Interview with The 
Right Honourable Lesao Lehoohla, 
Former Deputy Prime Minister of the 
Kingdom of Leotho and Government 
Lead Negotiator, Mafeteng, Lesotho 
(August 31, 2013) 
Photograph 4c: Interview with His 
Excellency Sir QKJ Masire – Former 
President of the Republic of Botswana 
(1980-1998) & SADC Eminent Person 
to Lesotho, Gaborone, Botswana 
(August 2, 2013) 
Photograph 4c: Interview with Mr 
Sekhonyana Bereng – Special Advisor 
to the Prime Minister – Kingdom of 
Lesotho, Maseru (September 1, 2013) 
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Data Analysis 
The process of analysing the data entailed separating the data into categories informed by the 
identified problem in the research and the research questions asked. Emerging themes were then 
identified and discussed through a process of triangulation of sources where the veracity of the 
findings was tested against the position articulated in the theoretical framework and the subject 
matter literature. The themes were further analysed and assessed to determine the extent to which 
they provided answers for the posed research questions. 
Ethical Considerations 
Measures were taken to ensure that this study is compliant with best practices and standards of 
ethical research as well as the ethical research policy of Hiroshima University. The researcher was 
mindful not to compromise the confidentiality of sources by requesting all interview sources to fill 
out the consent form appended to this study. Permission was thus sought prior to usage of any of 
the findings from the interviews and other official and technical reports and materials with 
restricted circulation.  
1.9 Significance of the Study 
In its own small way the study hopes to serve as an academic reference point on Conflict 
Transformation in the SADC region. It will serve as a guide on what the region should avoid and 
what ought to be done to improve policy formulation, conflict transformation and peacebuilding 
in the SADC region. The research is timely as it takes place at a time when the Strategic Indicative 
Plan of the Organ (SIPO I) has recently been revised and SIPO II introduced. As well as at a time 
when there are ongoing preparations for the establishment of a Mediation unit at the SADC 
secretariat. It will as such serve as a good resource for students, academics and policy makers in 
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ministries of defence and the security sector within the SADC region as well as at the SADC and 
African Union secretariats. 
1.10 Limitations of the Study 
The scope of research was restricted to conducting an assessment of SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity. Given the nature, size and significance of the organization which is made 
up of fifteen member states, this task could not be achieved by limiting the assessment to the 
institutional level only. As such the research undertook to identify the various SADC bodies with 
tasks involving conflict transformation as well as other factors which may aid or impede the 
transformation of conflicts in the region. As such the research confined itself to assessing how and 
whether or not SADC has the capacity to transform the context, structure, rules, attitudes of actors 
towards the contents of the conflict as well as the major issues at the heart of the conflicts. This 
was done with a view of determining whether SADC had the capacity to transform the factors in 
which perpetuate conflicts in the region and if not identifying impediments to such capacity. The 
assessment was conducted at three levels, the systemic, institutional and national / member state 
level in SADC. In light of the above the researcher was unable to travel to all SADC member states 
as well as to interview all key actors in SADC’s conflict transformation machinery due to the sheer 
magnitude of the task as well as resource limitations.  
1.11 Conclusion 
Chapter one has introduced the main task and aims of this study providing a contextual and 
historical background to the core issues being researched in this study. It provided a review of the 
key literature relevant to a study of this nature as well as outlining the research methodology 
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employed in this study. It outlined the main research problem at the heart of the study as well as 
the core research questions that the study undertakes to answer. 
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CHAPTER 2 
An Assessment of SADC’s Conflict Transformation Capacity at the 
Systemic level 
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter two undertakes an assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity with a special 
focus on the systemic factors that impede or aid the organisation’s capacity to transform conflicts 
in the region. Recognising that SADC is nothing more than the sum of its member states, it looks 
at the political culture dominant in SADC, the colonial legacy that its member states have had to 
grapple with, its acrimonious relationship with donors as well as its relationship with the United 
Nations and the African Union and how they affect its conflict transformation capacity. The 
chapter also identifies the types of conflicts in the SADC region and discusses how SADC has 
dealt with them. 
2.2 Contextual basis of an assessment of Conflict Transformation Capacity at the 
systemic level in SADC  
The prevailing situation in Southern Africa was ushered in by the end of the Cold War and the 
attainment of black majority rule in South Africa at the beginning of the 1990s. In the period before 
these two watershed events the preoccupation of most states neighbouring South Africa was to 
ward off domination; economic, political and military from the then rogue, minority apartheid 
regime which was used as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in the region by the USA. 
Most states in the region at the time used the external military threats posed by the minority white 
regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) as a pretext for militarizing domestic 
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politics in their countries. In some of the states with one party state regimes, the military was often 
used to crush domestic dissent although the threat of external attack was often used as a pretext 
for its growth and funding.129 The above and many other systemic factors militating against 
SADC’s ability to fulfil its objectives to end conflicts and bring about a self-sustaining peace in 
the region will be considered in this section.  
The end of apartheid in 1994 saw Southern Africa’s most powerful member state, South Africa 
joining the ranks of SADC, almost over-night, South Africa led by one of Africa’s political icons 
Nelson Mandela had a polarizing effect on SADC member states. Many had not fully prepared 
themselves regarding how to welcome and embrace a former foe turned colleague into their ranks. 
They as such viewed South Africa with suspicion with memories of the atrocities of the apartheid 
South African regime lingering fresh in their minds.  
An example of this was when South Africa led an intervention into Lesotho’s post-election crisis 
through a controversial SADC mandate. For some the emergence of a clear hegemon who 
embraced democratic values provided hope that the country would take a leadership role and guide 
other member states towards the realization of SADC’s ambitious goals. When South Africa joined 
SADC it immediately challenged Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe’s status as the region’s 
foremost regional leader. This had the effect of dividing SADC as the two countries; South Africa 
and Zimbabwe pursued divergent foreign policies and were not equally committed to the 
democratic agenda.130  
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At the first instance, one of the most glaring capacity constraints confronting SADC at the systemic 
level which has been encountered in this research and which has also been uncovered by other 
researchers131, is the inaccessibility of SADC official communications in the area of peace and 
security. There are a number of difficulties to be overcome in doing research on SADC, for one, 
the Communiques issued at the end of SADC meetings discussing peace and security matters are 
made deliberately uninformative. Another factor is that the Heads of State and Government 
themselves have remained extremely secretive about defence and security matters in an effort to 
conceal their divisions. This has robbed ordinary citizens in the region of a chance to closely follow 
debates and developments in the realm of high politics in the region.132  
Another limiting factor for SADC’s conflict transformation capacity is the multiple concurrent 
membership of other RECs by SADC member states, this has been a concern for more than three 
decades now, having troubled even the nascent SADCC in its early days.133  This calls their 
commitment to SADC into question as they have torn loyalties and responsibilities since they have 
to abide by the different rules of more than one REC. It is also a duplication of efforts and a waste 
of resources which complicates harmonization and coordination among member states. It further 
“muddies the goals of integration leading to counterproductive competition among countries and 
institutions” since they often cite political and strategic national interests as reasons for their 
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multiple membership of RECs.134  This phenomenon of multiple and over lapping memberships 
of RECs has been described as; “a spaghetti bowl that hinders regional integration by creating a 
complex entanglement of political commitments and institutional requirements”.135 This section 
of the research attempts to unpack the possible reasons for the above by exploring the hidden 
systemic and structural forces which have a bearing on SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
2.3 The Post-Colonial State and structural causes of conflict in Southern Africa 
The main challenge for SADC lies in the nature of its member states most of which are no different 
from the average state elsewhere in Africa today. The state in Africa is in a state of flux which is 
different from the state as defined in International Relations theory. Most conflicts in Africa result 
from the failure of the post-colonial state which has become a nonviable entity due to the 
preoccupation of leaders with regime survival rather than serving the people. Internal contests 
revolving around the latter are the leading causes of state failure and collapse on the continent 
which has robbed citizens of the enjoyment of basic rights and services.136 As a results of long 
liberation wars and post-independence civil wars, the security sector in most SADC member states 
is ‘partisan, secretive, state centric and prone to human rights abuses’. 137  The evolution of 
theoretical approaches to security which has been mostly western driven, has tended to conceive 
of threats to national security in a traditional militaristic / state centric way, where security meant 
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protection from threats of an external nature emanating from other states. As such this was the 
driving force behind regional and collective security arrangements in the west.  
Threats to the state in Africa on the other hand have tended to emanate from within with a near 
implosion of internal challenges such as civil wars, secession, ethnicity, social exclusion, greed, 
corruption, repression, dictatorship etc. Against this back drop and experience, regional security 
cooperation in Africa was based on a weak foundation because the primary unit driving the process 
(the African state) was itself weak, still grappling with first order post-independence challenges of 
state formation and consolidation. The state in Africa instead of using its monopoly over the use 
of its means of coercion against external attack, directed its wrath on its own people where the 
state became an instrument of fear against its people as argued by Barry Buzan. It is therefore too 
much to expect that any regional security cooperation efforts such as those of SADC would yield 
the same results as seen in the west and elsewhere. Theoretical readings of what constitutes security 
in the context of Africa have thus been less than accurate. A correct reading of these has revealed 
that the state has been a source of insecurity for its people rather than being a guarantor of 
security.138 This can best be explained by the evolution of the state in Africa as shown above as 
well as the accompanying political culture that holds sway. 
2.4 Types of regimes and Experiments with Democracy in SADC 
The concept of democracy provides a useful entry point for a discussion of conflict transformation 
in SADC, this is for the simple reason that states formed on the basis of a democratic model are 
seen in the literature as being less disposed to conflicts. They are portrayed as sensible states 
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accountable to their publics on any use of resources as compared to dictatorships for instance who 
may wage war or provoke conflict with other states at will without fear of reprisals from their 
citizens. As such, liberal democracies have emerged as the desirable model of state building which 
states have aspired to have on the world stage as increasingly seen as well on the African continent 
especially in the Post-Cold war era. Proponents of this thinking labelled “The Democratic peace 
theory” in the Political Science literature further argue that this is the desirable state model as 
Democracies are less likely to go to war with each other.139  
It is on this pretext that they argue that a world populated by states of the liberal democratic variety 
would be a peaceful one. This line of thinking has seen many western states led by the United 
States, some Western European states and International Financial Institutions pushing for 
emerging states in the developing world to embrace Democracy and good governance to secure 
their prosperity and viability as states. The winds of democratization in the SADC region began 
with the defeat of the ruling party of one of the region’s founding fathers, Kenneth Kaunda of 
Zambia in 1991, the tone for others in the neighbourhood was set by Namibia in 1990 followed by 
South Africa soon afterwards who graduated to majority rule in 1994 after fighting extended 
liberation wars.140  
It is important to situate this discussion within the context of Democracy since all post conflict, 
Post-Cold War and Post-apartheid state building efforts in Southern Africa took place within a 
new type of state, a newly democratized state. It is instructive to note this point since the discussion 
at hand revolves around establishing the conflict transformation capacity of SADC both at the 
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regional and member state level. Citizens of democratic states lay certain expectations on the state 
to provide services and opportunities which will better the quality of their lives. As such 
Democracy requires development in order to have relevance for the lives of the people and to 
prevent it from being viewed as a game aimed at the circulation of elites for control over state 
power only. A Democratic dispensation is thus important for successful conflict transformation 
which requires equality, social justice and social relations based on fairness and mutual respect 
between the leaders and the led. 
A key challenge in Southern Africa is however that democracy in most of the states is reduced to 
a preoccupation with the holding of regular elections with little emphasis on the establishment of 
a strong culture and institutions that support both democracy and development in between.141 This 
can perhaps be explained by the immediate post-independence experience of most Southern 
African states which was dominated by one party state regimes. A typology of democracies in the 
region since the onset of independence in the 1960s all the way to the 1980s reveals a variation of 
dictatorships and one person and one party ruled states; One person rule (Malawi: 1963-1994), 
military dictatorship (Lesotho: 1986-93), de facto one-party rule (Lesotho: 1970-86), de jure one-
party rule (Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) and dynastic rule (Swaziland). 
The only two exceptions to this trend have historically been Botswana and Mauritius who later 
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welcomed Namibia and South Africa to the fold of liberal democracies at the beginning of the 
1990s as part of what Samuel P. Huntington terms ‘the third wave of democratization’.142 
Table 4: A Typology of regimes in SADC 
Type of Regime Democracy Characteristics Examples of countries 
Liberal Democracy 
Stable and consolidating 
democratic frameworks 
Botswana, South Africa, 
Mauritius and Namibia  
Electoral democracies 
Holding of regular elections 
while in between and beyond 
elections they suffer 
enormous democratic deficits 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia 
Grey Zone Democracy / 
ambiguous democracy / 
pseudo-democracy / illiberal 
democracy / virtual 
democracy 
Countries which have 
embraced the political culture 
of regular multiparty 
elections. However the 
credibility of the elections is 
always questionable and 
election outcomes are always 
contested. Elections are thus a 
façade hiding the authoritarian 
regime. 
Zimbabwe 
Dictatorship / 
Authoritarianism / Closed 
authoritarianism / 
Unreformed autocracy 
Countries that have not yet 
undergone political transitions 
to multiparty democracy. 
Angola (although elections 
were held in 2013 where 
opposition also took part) and 
Swaziland 
Source: Matlosa, 2007, Pg. 62 
As seen in Table 4 above, the only countries that are classified as liberal democracies in the SADC 
region are, South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius and Botswana. A majority of SADC member states 
fall under the category of electoral democracies where elections are held regularly but are fraught 
with democratic deficits, cited examples include; Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Zambia, 
Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Zimbabwe occupies a special category of an 
                                                 
142 Matlosa, K., Democracy and Development in Southern Africa: Strange Bedfellows in Matlosa, and others, 
Challenges of Conflict, Democracy and Development in Africa, Johannesburg: EISA, 2007 
 
83 
 
‘illiberal democracy’ or a ‘virtual democracy’ where elections are held regularly and leaders are 
elected albeit in an atmosphere where the outcome is always contested.  
The above table out-rightly singles out two authoritarian regimes in the region, these are Angola 
and Swaziland, the former having been led by the same leader since 1975 while the latter remains 
Africa’s last absolute monarchy with executive powers. In both countries there have been reports 
of skewed development, Angola has never really recovered from its decades-long civil war which 
devastated all the infrastructure that had been built by the colonial Portuguese regime without 
which the country cannot optimally provide social services to its citizens. Angola is however the 
only country in SADC which has the potential of challenging South Africa’s hegemony. 
 Once occupied by the apartheid South African army in the 1980s, Angola is rich in diamonds and 
is one of Africa’s largest oil producers with reserves of 4 billion barrels. It also has a strong, battle-
hardened army which has previously successfully intervened in DRC and Congo-Brazzaville.143   
In Swaziland the country has in the past few years experienced economic hardships and 
unprecedented levels of poverty despite the lavish lifestyle of the King, coupled with having to 
manage one of the highest HIV infection rates in the world, the leadership in the country has 
constantly been on a collision course with opposition parties who advocate for a more plural 
dispensation.  The above climate provides fertile ground for protests which may result in conflict, 
structural violence and human insecurity. 
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2.5 Political Culture in SADC 
Relations amongst SADC member states have since the inception of the community been marred 
by latent divisions which SADC leaders are loathe to admit publicly. Since meetings of the 
leadership of SADC are usually a very private affair, the public is denied the chance of witnessing 
the camps and divisions among member states during critical debates. However close SADC 
observers have identified two camps within the ranks of member states; the militarists (Zimbabwe, 
DRC, Angola and Namibia) and the pacifists (South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana). The 
militarists are those member states with a foreign policy preference for military action to resolve 
conflicts while the pacifists are those with a foreign policy preference for diplomatic forms of 
resolving conflicts. This disjuncture was manifested before the formal integration of the Organ 
into official SADC structures where the militarist bloc led by Zimbabwe insisted on maintaining 
the status quo of an autonomous Organ. The pacifist bloc led by South Africa on the other hand 
insisted that it be integrated formally into SADC structures. The stand-off resulted in an 
unprecedented situation where SADC had two separate entities at heads of state level responsible 
for dealing with intra and inter-state conflict.144  
This phenomenon could be explained by the political culture prevalent in SADC both within and 
among member states as well as the dominant values embraced by member states.   Political culture 
has been defined as ‘a concept that denotes a broad array of norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and 
traditions that shape systems, institutions and processes of governance’. Political culture shapes 
society’s perceptions about whether or not their government is legitimate. Citizen’s negative 
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perceptions about the legitimacy of their government may lead to widespread dissent which in 
extreme cases may result in violent conflict.145   
Researchers on SADC have been challenged to desist from merely crediting and heaping praises 
on SADC for forming formalistic institutional structures without looking at the values and 
dynamics underlying them. According to the argument, what matters more is what the organization 
has done to ensure the prevention and resolution of violent conflict. Researchers are challenged to 
think about what the situation would have been like if SADC had not been created. To drive the 
point home, an example is given of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) which is described as a failure as it has made no difference in reducing, ending or 
resolving conflicts in South Asia. As such, viewed in this way, in as much as SADC may be flawed, 
things could have been much worse without its creation. The SADC led mediation of the crisis in 
Zimbabwe which resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the 
conflicting parties is cited as an example of the organisation’s success even if limited.146  
The above grim picture of the state of Democracy in Southern Africa has resulted in the leaders of 
most member states of SADC pursuing what Soderbaum describes as “Regime-boosting 
regionalism” where regional cooperation in many areas including peace and security has only 
served to benefit the narrow interests of the leaders to the exclusion of the majority of their publics. 
Political leaders are seen here engaged in;  
…strengthening the status, legitimacy and the general interests of the political regime 
rather than the nation-state per se…they engage in discursive activities, whereby they 
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praise the goals of regionalism and regional organization, sign cooperation agreements, 
and take part in ‘summitry regionalism’, but without giving a commitment to or bearing 
the costs of policy implementation147  
 
SADC has historically pursued inconsistent conflict resolution approaches, this is partly owing to 
an unwritten rule marked by an aversion to interfering in the domestic affairs of other member 
states. This could be explained in the historical African socio-cultural norm of wanting to avoid 
‘washing one’s dirty linen in public’. As such the unspoken sentiment in SADC appears to be that 
public criticism of leaders such as Mugabe would set a bad precedent for other leaders who 
themselves have unflattering human rights records.148  In Soderbaum’s explanation this is the 
pervasive culture that underlies regional cooperation in SADC, this state of affairs only serves to 
antagonise the goals of conflict transformation since the political leaders don’t serve the broader 
societal and national interests but their own. 
…Regional cooperation is instead used as an image-boosting instrument whereby leaders 
can show support and loyalty for each other, which enables them to raise the profile, status, 
formal sovereignty and image of their often authoritarian regimes without ensuring 
implementation of agreed policies.149 
In fact a major cause of conflicts in the region revolves around concerns with legitimacy or the 
loss of popular legitimacy by governments due to their unwillingness or inability to meet the 
expectations of their citizens.150  By extension, this has seen a prevalence of norms of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other member states within SADC where leaders behave 
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like they are in an old boy’s club looking out for one another. A case in point was the policy of 
silent diplomacy pursued by most member states towards the political crisis in Zimbabwe, most 
notably Botswana and South Africa who share a long border with Zimbabwe and were thus on the 
frontline and at the receiving end of the spill-over of the political and humanitarian crisis in the 
country. Despite the costs they had to incur due to hosting unprecedented numbers of economic 
and political refugees and by having to bear the brunt of the stresses of a neighbour in crisis, both 
countries refrained from speaking out publicly against the regime in Zimbabwe. The silence was 
only broken in 2008 by the ascendance of President Lt. Gen (Rtd) Seretse Khama Ian Khama in 
Botswana who mostly criticized the controversial manner in which the 2008 elections in 
Zimbabwe were handled.151  
SADC’s past failures in peacemaking have been attributed to the absence of common values 
among its member states which has “inhibited the development of trust, institutional cohesion, 
common policies and unified responses to crisis”.152 This has been shown by member states’ 
reluctance to surrender sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules and 
decision-making,153 a further blow to SADC’s ambitions of attaining true supranational status. A 
report published in 2013 by the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-
CNGO) which sought to examine the core values of SADC and how they have been embraced by 
both the citizens of member states and the leaders themselves, has concluded that the pace at which 
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they are taking root and being implemented is slow. This is despite the strides made in regional 
integration and interactive trade in the region. Another key finding of the report is that “too strong 
and fresh are feelings and values of national independence and sovereignty” in most SADC 
member states who are relatively young.154  
This has led to the emergence of varying degrees of enabling environments for the facilitation of 
regional integration within and among member states. The report thus calls upon the leaders of 
SADC member states to jointly show a strong political commitment to embracing the popular 
values of their citizens which don’t always match the ones that they want to see prevailing in the 
region. With evidence from the most successful countries in the world showing that success is best 
achieved by regional integration based on shared values, the report suggests that SADC leaders 
should adopt a new development paradigm based on shared and common values and the 
pragmatism and openness to accept the political and cultural changes of their citizens.155 
2.6 A Typology of conflicts and current Conflict Transformation responses in SADC 
The end of the Cold War and the interventions that took place in previously protracted conflicts 
internationally provide a backdrop for this study’s analysis. In the SADC region such interventions 
were seen in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). The DRC and Angolan conflicts are described as the most costly and complex of the 
                                                 
154 SADC-CNGO, The SADC We Need: Towards Values – Based Regional Integration and Development, Report 
Published with the support of GIZ, 2013 
155 Ibid 
89 
 
conflicts found in the SADC region.156 The attainment of peace in the above countries as elsewhere 
also saw key questions taking centre stage, these revolved around what is to be done once the 
humanitarian emergency was over.157 This was met with the reinterpretation of the patterns of 
international conflicts led by Cousens (1998) whose core message centred around the finding that 
in the 1990s Post Cold War world era, most conflicts were intrastate in nature and as such required 
the parties to the conflict to live together once the violence had ended. This therefore meant that 
intervention efforts in this period focused on rebuilding states destroyed by the war, restoring the 
rights of citizens and on post violence peacebuilding.158  
It is important to acknowledge that conflict is an important part of social change in all societies, 
as such it isn’t necessarily a negative phenomenon. The problem arises when conflicts become 
destructive, violent and counter-productive. For the SADC region the problem in this regard is the 
absence of an effective conflict management system at regional level. In the past there have only 
been ad-hoc responses to crises and the pervasive pattern in most member states is that there are 
no basic institutions to resolve conflicts internally and prevent them from turning violent159.  
The above notwithstanding, the SADC region however currently enjoys relative peace compared 
to during the Cold War and Apartheid eras where there were a number of ideologically fuelled 
violent conflicts in the region, now only sporadic violent conflicts can be found in a few member 
states which are mostly about access to resources and services. Most member states although free 
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of violent conflict are still grappling with challenges of building peace and setting their countries 
on a development path that would ensure the accessibility of equal opportunities and social 
services to all.  
Over the years the SADC region has experienced quite a few conflicts emanating from disputed 
election results due to questions over the extent to which they were free and fair. The trend has 
seen those member states using the Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system having 
rather stable elections while those countries using the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system 
have experienced considerable instability at election time. Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Tanzania are 
some countries which have since the decade beginning in 2000 experienced electoral conflicts of 
one form or the other.160 
A list of violent conflicts which have occurred in SADC since 1992 are “the long running civil 
war in Angola which ended in 2002; election disputes; a mutiny and an external military 
intervention in Lesotho in 1998; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the DRC 
which began in 1998 and has continued to flare up periodically leading to massive displacements 
of people, state repression, violence; undemocratic elections in Zimbabwe since 2000; violent 
protests and an unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar in 2009”.161 The table below 
provides data about the types of conflicts found in SADC, their duration, the actors involved as 
well their intensity. 
As shown in table 5 presenting the data for 2012 on conflicts in Southern Africa, the Hedelberg 
Research Centre only identifies incidences of full war and limited war at level 5 and 4 of intensity 
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to have taken place in the DRC. These were probably precipitated by the formation of the M23 
rebel group and its attacks in eastern DRC, the veracity of this categorization was confirmed by 
the UN Security Council resolution to send in a peace enforcement mission to pacify the rebels in 
conjunction with SADC and the ICGLR. According to the data, most other conflicts in the region 
are identified in Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland and South Africa which have been 
pegged at level 3 (crisis). Interestingly, the data categorizes the situation following the coup in 
Madagascar at level 2 (non-violent crisis). The rest of the incidences identified are categorized as 
disputes, mostly of a domestic nature involving opposition forces, interest groups and their 
resistance to perceived government injustices. These have been recorded in, Swaziland, Malawi, 
Angola and Botswana involving a variety of actors and for different reasons.162  
Table 5: Conflicts in the SADC region as at 2012 
Conflict Data 
Name of Conflict Conflict parties Conflict items Start Change Intensity 
Angola (FLEC / 
Cabinda) 
FLEC vs. government 
secession, 
resources 
1975  1 
Angola (UNITA) 
UNITA, CASA vs. 
government 
national power 1975  3 
Angola – DR 
Congo 
Angola vs. DR Congo 
territory, 
resources 
2009  1 
Botswana 
(Basarwa) 
Basarwa vs. 
government 
system/ideology, 
resources 
1997  1 
DR Congo 
(CNDP/M23) 
CNDP/M23 vs. 
government 
subnational 
predominance, 
resources 
2004  5 
DR Congo 
(Enyele) 
Enyele vs. government 
subnational 
predominance 
2010  1 
DR Congo 
(FDLR)  
FDLR vs. government 
subnational 
predominance, 
resources 
1997  4 
DR Congo (FRF) FRF vs. government 
subnational 
predominance, 
resources 
1998  1 
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DR Congo (inter-
militant violence) 
FDLR, Nyatura vs. 
Mayi Mayi Cheka, 
Raia Mutomboki, FDC 
vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-
Mayi Shetani vs. M23 
subnational 
predominance, 
resources 
2011  4 
DR Congo (Ituri 
Militias) 
FRPI, FPJC, Cogai vs. 
government 
subnational 
predominance, 
resources 
1999  3 
DR Congo (Mayi-
Mayi) 
Mayi-Mayi groups vs. 
government 
subnational 
predominance, 
resources 
1997  4  
DR Congo 
(opposition) 
UPDS et al. vs. 
government 
national power 1997  3 
DR Congo – 
Rwanda 
DR Congo vs. Rwanda resources, other 2002  3 
Madagascar (TGV 
–TIM) 
TIM vs. TVG national power 2009  2 
Malawi 
(opposition) 
Opposition vs. 
government 
national power 2011 END 1 
South Africa 
(KwaZulu – Natal) 
IFP vs. ANC vs. NFP 
subnational 
predominance 
1990  3 
South Africa 
(xenophobes-
immigrants) 
Xenophobic gangs vs. 
immigrants in South 
Africa 
Other 2008  3 
 
Swaziland 
(opposition) 
PUDEMO, SNUS, 
SFTU, COSATU vs 
government 
System / 
ideology, 
national power 
1998  3 
Swaziland – South 
Africa 
 Territory 1902  1 
Tanzania (CUF / 
Zanzibar) 
CUF vs. CCM Autonomy 1993  3 
Tanzania 
(Uamsho) 
Uamsho vs government 
Secession, 
system / 
ideology 
2010  3 
Zimbabwe (MDC-
T, MDC-M – 
ZANU-PF)* 
MDC-T, MDC-M vs 
government 
national power 2000  3 
Source: Hedelberg Conflict Barometer 2012 
Key:  = change in intensity compared to previous year 
 = de-escalation by one or more than one level of intensity 
 = No change 
Levels of intensity: 5= war; 4 = limited war; 3 = crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute 
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Violence ought not to be understood in the context of war and crisis only as presented in the above 
data sets, in a more widened reading and conceptualization of conflict and violence, Galtung sees 
violence as anything that produces a gap between the physical and mental potentials of human 
beings and their actual conditions. To him, violence is a factor common to both war and social 
injustice; put differently, it does not matter whether one is killed in war or famine, the result is 
premature death which is a deprivation of one of the human potentials. This is how peace came to 
be defined as the absence of violence rather than war. This conception of violence presupposes 
distributive justice, the theory presupposes an ideal state in which goods and services available are 
distributed equally which makes the issue of structural violence, an issue of social justice as 
well.163 The thinking is that in as much as direct violence is produced by human actors, structural 
violence is produced without any human agency but impairs and reduces the human potentials in 
the forms of poverty and discrimination which are forms of social injustice.164  
SADC has 15 member states which vary in size, economic development, resources, vegetation, 
political maturity, history and levels of conflict. A hallmark of SADC’s conflict transformation 
efforts is that it has assigned mediators from within the region to defuse conflicts in member states. 
This is due to its excessive suspicion of external, especially western intervention in regional affairs; 
a consequence of the region being the last to be liberated on the continent. These mediation efforts 
were preceded by two sets of controversial military interventions by two sets of countries in 
Lesotho and DRC in 1998.  
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Examples of SADC’s mediation efforts include the Inter Congolese Dialogue (2000 – 2003) where 
former president of Botswana Sir Ketumile Masire was appointed the lead mediator, as well as in 
Lesotho in 2007, although in the latter case the mediation process was completed by civil society 
groups in Lesotho. Other mediation efforts in the region include the appointment of former 
Mozambican President, Joachim Chissano as lead mediator in Madagascar after the coup of 2009. 
In the case of Zimbabwe where SADC appointed South Africa to mediate, the regional grouping 
jealously guarded the case from western interference signalling the sad reality that the region has 
not fully recovered from its colonial past and hurt.  The impact of a REC’s intervention may be 
blurred if or when it is accompanied by the UN or other powerful states165. A case in point is the 
military intervention in the DRC which was a combined effort of the United Nations, SADC and 
the ICGLR. Although the intervention successfully uprooted the M23 rebels, credit cannot be 
easily given to one party. 
Human Security ought to be considered a vital part of conflict transformation in SADC since; 
Human Security in its broadest sense embraces far more than absence of violence. It 
encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and 
ensuring each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential166  
 
The SADC NGO Coalition focused on, Angola, DRC, Swaziland, Madagascar and Zimbabwe in 
its ‘Hot Spots tracker’ study of 2010. The study identified areas experiencing conflict in the region 
and makes recommendations of what ought to be done from a civil society perspective. 
Marginalisation of certain groups, rapid urbanization, rising unemployment, poverty and 
underdevelopment are singled out as the most pressing human security challenges in Southern 
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Africa. Factors affecting societal security and triggers to conflict are listed as; politicized ethnicity, 
xenophobia, large scale economic migration, transnational crime syndication, droughts and 
flooding (which threaten large scale displacement of people), food shortages, natural disasters and 
the spread of diseases. All these are compounded by water stress, with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Namibia projected to be water stressed by the year 2025. Poverty, over-stocking, 
unsustainable land use, soil erosion and water stress are also said to be structural factors requiring 
sustained attention to avert deepening food shortages in the region.  
These challenges have manifested in high levels of inequality, jobless economic growth and 
unemployment of levels between (30-50% as at 2008) in countries like Botswana, South Africa, 
Mauritius and Namibia often viewed as better performing economies in the region. As a result, 
increased levels of criminality through poaching and illegal mining have been recorded in the DRC 
and Zimbabwe.167 Countries such as Botswana have even deployed their armies into their anti-
poaching programmes reflecting the gravity of the situation. The above scenario paints a picture 
of the constraints confronting the provision of social services in the region. The SADC-CNGO 
study on land reform, conflict and poverty eradication in the region identifies landlessness as an 
acute problem in the former colonial settler territories of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
where historically fertile farming land was the preserve of the white minority at the expense of the 
majority black populations who languished in the fringes. As a result of this legacy, access to land 
is still a major challenge in these countries as shown also by Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform 
programme. This is an issue needing urgent attention as it has implications for food security and 
the general well-being of the citizen.  
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The 2012 Global Peace Index in (Fig. 2) below records a general improvement of peacefulness in 
Sub Saharan Africa, in the SADC region, six countries; Angola (95), DRC (154), Madagascar (99), 
South Africa (127), Swaziland (85) and Zimbabwe (140) got scores higher than half of the 158 
surveyed countries. DRC led the pack as the 154th least peaceful country in the world followed 
closely behind by Zimbabwe at number 140 and South Africa at 127th position. The study sees 
Mauritius as the most peaceful country in the region at number 21 followed by Botswana at number 
31, both of which are ahead of some developed countries such as, France (40), South Korea (42), 
and the United States (88). The 2012 publication reports that the world was a more peaceful place 
for the first time than it was in 2009, in its methodology, it ranks 158 countries around the world 
according to their levels of absence of violence. It uses an index which takes into account, levels 
of military expenditure, relations with neighbouring states and percentage of prison population. 
Other determinants include, levels of democracy and transparency, education and national 
wellbeing.168 
2.7 The role of External actors and their impact on SADC’s Conflict Transformation 
capacity  
2.7.1 The United Nations and SADC 
The relationship between SADC and the UN in the areas of peacekeeping and conflict 
transformation has been described as complex and sometimes tense.169 On 21st December 1982 the 
UN General Assembly passed a resolution titled: Cooperation between the UN and the Southern 
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African Development Coordination Conference (General Assembly Resolution 37/248). Through 
the resolution the UN formally recognised SADCC as a sub-regional organisation whose work is 
consistent with the objectives and principles of the UN. This was followed by another UN General 
Assembly resolution on 15th December 1983 (Resolution 38/160) which urged the international 
community and UN agencies to forge links and cooperation agreements with SADCC.170 Apart 
from Chapter 8 of the UN charter which recognises a role for regional organisations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security the above laid the official foundation for UN / 
SADCC cooperation. A highlight of SADC/UN interaction in the area of conflict transformation 
was when SADC Ambassadors at the UN mounted a diplomatic offensive and secured the 
involvement of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in facilitating a peaceful resolution to the DRC 
crisis in 2000. The intervention and stabilisation role of SADC member states, Zimbabwe, Angola 
and Namibia in the DRC in 1998 is in fact credited for making it possible for later UN deployment 
of MONUC in 2000.171 
More recently, the reformed SADC and the UN signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the 
21st September 2010, the MoU provides a framework between the two organisations particularly 
aimed at strengthening cooperation in the field of peace and security. The UN Department of 
Political Affairs has opened an office in Gaborone, Botswana where the SADC Secretariat is based 
for this purpose. UN / SADC cooperation has however historically not been the best. This is despite 
the recent success of the UN/SADC collaborative Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which 
successfully defeated the M23 rebels in the Democratic republic of Congo. The difficulty of the 
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UN/SADC relationship can be traced to the suspicions that SADC leaders harbour against the west. 
Since the echelons of the UN’s decision making body the UN Security Council is made up 
predominantly of western countries, SADC has not allowed the UN as much access to its 
operations to preclude the possibility of the UN being used as a neo imperialist tool. Another 
explanation is that there is a legal tension and lacunae that exists regarding the applicability of the 
principles of subsidiarity and complementarity which give regional organisations the prerogative 
to defuse conflicts in their areas of jurisdiction. The UN Charter grants the UN ultimate 
responsibility for world peace and at the same time through its chapter eight assigns a role to 
regional organisations as described above. It is however nowhere clearly specified on how regional 
organisations ought to deploy in fulfilment of the principle of subsidiarity. This lacunae in 
international law is a major impediment which limits SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
2.7.2 The African Union and SADC 
SADC is one of the eight African Union Regional Economic Communities (RECs). As such in the 
area of peacebuilding and conflict transformation it forms part of the AU’s African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Standby Force (ASF). It is one of the more effective 
RECs in this regard as evidenced by its creation of the SADC Brigade in compliance with the 
requirements of the APSA. The AU has also recently collaborated with SADC to host a continental 
peacekeeping exercise dubbed Exercise AMANI Africa II hosted by Lesotho on behalf of SADC 
in June 2014. According to the Annual Report of the SADC Executive Secretary for 2011-2012, 
SADC has attended all the annual AU statutory body meetings which include the Executive 
Council, Assembly meetings, the African Union Commission and the RECs strategic partners 
meetings. SADC’s role and commitment to AU activities was demonstrated by SADC’s lobbying 
as a bloc for the election of the current Chairperson of the AU Commission Dr Nkosazana Dlamini 
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Zuma of South Africa. SADC’s efforts were a success and Dr Dlamini Zuma became the first 
Southern African to hold the position as well as being the first women to hold the position. In the 
area of peace and security the same difficulties dogging the UN/SADC relationship in the area of 
peace and security are valid for the AU/SADC relationship.  
The constitutive Act of the AU maintains that the AU has the primary responsibility for peace and 
security on the continent but does not reconcile that with a clear explanation of how its APSA 
made up of RECs should be deployed. This serves as a limitation on SADC’s capacity as such 
legal tensions may serve to delay deployment. Charles Mwaura – AU Early Warning Officer, 
identifies another strain on their relationship as being the fact that SADC insists on using closed 
source intelligence (state intelligence) for its early warning which is incompatible with the AU’s 
open source intelligence for the continental early warning system (CEWS), this serves to delay 
information sharing for conflict prevention and early warning at the AU level as information from 
SADC can only be accessed by senior official with a high security clearance. 
 As such the AU may be impeded in timeously aiding SADC to transform its conflicts even where 
it had the ability to do so. This important link between the AU’s CEWS and SADC’s REWS is 
frustrated by the fact that SADC does not allow for direct exchange of information and analysis 
with the AU. In SADC strategic intelligence and early warning reports are disseminated through 
the office of the president who chairs the SADC OPDS who then transmits them to the AU. For 
similar reasons, Elizabeth Choge, AU, Peace and Security Department REC Liaison officer 
surmises that SADC is the most difficult REC to deal with as it is extremely secretive and 
uncooperative. 
Article 7 of the MOU signed by SADC member states in the creation of the SADCBRIG stipulates 
that the SADCBRIG can only be deployed by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and 
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Government (SoHSG). However since SADCBRIG is a part of the AU-ASF, it stands to reason 
that the AU Peace and Security Council should be the only one that can mandate the deployment 
of forces. This point of disjuncture creates potential for contention as the SADCBRIG shouldn’t 
be seen to be deploying itself.172 The above legal tensions and lacunae if not cleared greatly limit 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
2.8 SADC’s Cooperation with Donors in the Areas of Peacebuilding and Conflict 
Transformation 
2.8.1 Liberal Peacebuilding 
The liberal peace thesis is based on the idea that liberalization is a remedy for violent conflict and 
is attributed to former U.S President Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy at the end of World War 
I.173 It holds that democratic forms of government are more peaceful – both in their internal politics 
and in their international relations – than other forms of government such that the world can only 
be made safe through democracy. According to Richmond, the demise of the Cold War saw the 
UN, humanitarian and donor agencies not only striving to terminate conflict but to reconstruct the 
state in a liberal form as well. Peace-building was conceptualized as being based on 
democratization, the rule of law and human rights which are all elements of a liberal state, meaning 
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that peace-building tends to be seen as state-building; a condition described as the peace-building 
consensus.174  
The liberal peace approach has been critiqued since often times its reforms are accompanied by 
conditionalities of the ilk of the Bretton Woods institutions who have often wrongfully assumed 
that subject states would willingly subject themselves to the advice rendered. Richmond thus 
highlights the importance of recognizing indigenous and informal traditions in addition to formal 
sectors promoted by international peace-builders. In his words; “liberal peace in practice has been 
top-down, and so far in the short and medium term has tended to reproduce empty states in which 
institutions, politicians, and technocrats prosper, but the local populations are marginalized, 
negating the possibility of a progressive form of civil or social peace.” 175  It would thus be 
instructive to consider the experience of SADC in its dealings with donors and International 
Cooperating Partners and how this has affected cooperation in the area of security in the region.  
According to Hull and Derblom, the history of SADC states has made them sensitive to external 
influence in foreign policy related matters, seeking to preserve political self-determination and 
freedom from donors determining their policy direction.176 This has resulted in a situation where 
for instance, SADCBRIG lacks the finances, logistics and strategic airlift to actually deploy any 
available troops, making SADCBRIG effectively un-deployable without such support from 
external partners.177 A characteristic feature of SADC is its policy of not publicly criticizing other 
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member states (silent diplomacy) as they have shown with the case of Zimbabwe.178 As a result of 
this most International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) have responded by reducing funding for 
SADC and opting to provide funding for parallel structures that voice condemnation for the 
Zimbabwe regime. A case in point is the United States Aid for International Development 
(USAID) who stopped funding SADC because US legislation does not allow funding for 
organizations such as SADC who have Zimbabwe as a member since they have imposed sanctions 
on Zimbabwe. This is unfortunate since nearly 60% of the 2006 – 2007) budget of the SADC 
secretariat was provided for by foreign donors.179 Most donors have chosen to channel funds 
through individual member states and civil society groups by passing SADC. This has the potential 
of eroding the legitimacy of SADC in the eyes of the donors.180  
A key challenge for SADC therefore is to balance donor expectations such as those of the United 
States of America who put democracy and human rights as a condition for aid in Zimbabwe, with 
their search for autonomy. Failure to strike this balance would frustrate and ultimately paralyze 
the regions security cooperation efforts due to lack of funding. 181  The CRSP can serve as a 
confidence building measure between donors and SADC as it would set binding terms for member 
states to conform to certain standards and outline the region’s parameters for dealing with donors 
in the area of security cooperation. Van Nieuwkerk, posits that the SIPO I and SIPO II which are 
guided by the SADC Treaty can form the basis for this, he quotes article 5 of the SADC treaty 
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which “…requires member states to ‘promote common political values, systems and other shared 
values which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate, and effective. It 
firmly acknowledges that economic growth and development will not be realized in conditions of 
political intolerance, the absence of the rule of law, corruption, civil strife and war…member states 
are cognisant of the fact that poverty thrives under such conditions, nurturing further political 
instability and conflict.182 ” This divergence has also been evident in the foreign policy position of 
SADC member states such as on Libya where member states like Botswana were adamant in 
support of the NATO led intervention while states like South Africa publicly condemned it. Van 
Nieuwkerk further emphasises the need to advance issues of mutual concern and foreign policy 
concerns collectively as a region although the new revised SIPO II is silent on the extent to which 
SADC is able to project its foreign policy in one voice.183 
2.9 Conclusion 
The chapter did an assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the systemic level. 
It showed that there are a number of factors which impede SADC’s conflict transformation 
capacity such as political culture, the nature and history of SADC member states, the regime types 
and the nature of conflicts that the region has to deal with. Other identified factors include the 
legacy of colonialism, the cold war and apartheid as well as SADC’s difficult relationship with 
other multilateral institutions including the UN, AU and donors. The chapter concludes that all 
these have rendered SADC incapacitated to transform conflicts in various ways, since it does not 
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have the power to influence the actions of other external actors as well as to adequately deal with 
and address the structural problems bedevilling the organization.  
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the systemic level can be improved by a more 
proactive role by South Africa as a hegemonic pivotal state together with a coalition of willing 
democratic states such as Botswana and Mauritius. SADC also ought to seek more innovative and 
self-sustainable ways of funding its peacebuilding and conflict transformation activities since over 
reliance on donor funding is not sustainable and contradicts its position of finding African 
solutions to African problems. The chapter has shown that past SADC interventions were largely 
ad-hoc improvisations and that military force has been the tool of choice in past SADC responses 
to conflicts especially at the early conflict stages. As such with the improved institutional 
architecture it ought to have a better coordinated approach.184  
This should be preceded by exhausting all non-violent responses to conflicts first in line with 
conflict transformation theory. The chapter also showed SADC’s tendency to protect incumbents 
in office and ensure the survival of their regimes through its interventions. This doesn’t augur well 
for conflict transformation in the region, SADC thus needs to develop the ability to be critical of 
heads of state of its member states when the commit abuses of their citizens in order to win the 
trust of the ordinary citizens. Past conflict transformation approaches in SADC have been pursued 
from a reactive mentality as shown by President Mugabe’s famous description of the Organ as a 
‘fire brigade mechanism’.185 This mind set is indicative of SADC’s ad hoc approach to regional 
peace and security issues. This points to a need to underpin its regional security policy with the 
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teachings of conflict transformation which require a well laid out and coordinated strategy to 
transform the root causes of conflicts in a manner that puts the needs of ordinary citizens first. 
  
106 
 
CHAPTER 3 
An Assessment of SADC’s Conflict Transformation capacity at the 
Institutional Level  
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter three conducts an assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the 
institutional level. It identifies the policy framework and institutions set up in SADC with a 
mandate that supports conflict transformation. The chapter assesses the extent to which these 
policy instruments and institutions aid or impede SADC’s ability to transform conflicts in the 
region. 
3.2 Contextual Background of SADC’s Institutional Capacity for Conflict 
Transformation 
The current institutional structure of SADC is the direct result of a transformation process that the 
organization underwent from the SADCC which was a coordinating conference for the regional 
integration agenda underpinned by a decentralized structure. In the SADCC, Member states took 
responsibility for the implementation of decisions from the various sectors which they were 
assigned to coordinate. This structure was based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
signed by member states on 29th July 1981 to facilitate a loose cooperation framework between 
member states. Member states retained discretion to propagate the objectives of SADCC as well 
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as a level of independence and sovereignty. 186  With the transition from a development 
coordination conference to a development community, SADC centralized responsibility for 
regional integration activities across the sectors from the member states to reside at the regional 
level. The SADC Secretariat for instance “was enlarged from just providing links between member 
states and the international community. The Secretariat became the main institution that oversees 
the implementation of the activities of SADC”.187 
An assessment of conflict transformation capacity in SADC should also be understood against the 
historical backdrop of SADC’s organizational restructuring which was approved by the Heads of 
States and Governments Extraordinary Summit of 2001188. The restructuring process started in 
1999 after a meeting of the SADC assembly of Heads of State and Government on 8th August 1999 
in Maputo Mozambique which directed the Council of Ministers to initiate a comprehensive 
review of the operations of SADC institutions. Following a series of consultative meetings 
coordinated by a review committee of the Council of Ministers the report was approved by the 
Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government in Windhoek, Namibia on 9th March 
2001189. The table below show the directorates resulting from the restructuring as well as the 
sectors they coordinate and their mandates. 
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Table 6: SADC Directorates 
Directorate Sectors 
Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Industry and trade; finance and investment; 
mining 
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Crop production, food, agriculture and natural 
resources; agricultural research and training; 
livestock production and animal disease 
control; inland fisheries; marine fisheries and 
resources; forestry; wildlife; environment and 
sustainable development  
Infrastructure and Services 
Transport, communication and meteorology; 
energy; tourism; water 
Social and Human Development and Special 
Programmes 
Combating illicit drug trafficking; human 
resources development; employment and 
labour; culture, information and sport; health; 
HIV & AIDS 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation  
Politics; defence; international relations; 
security; public security 
Source: (Matlosa and Lotshwao, 2010, Pg. 10) 
3.3 The existing Policy Framework which supports Conflict Transformation in SADC 
3.3.1 The 1992 SADC Treaty  
The SADC Treaty of 1992, created the framework and mechanisms necessary for ensuring peace 
and security in the region underpinned by the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. The 
treaty makes a requirement for member states to conclude a protocol on cooperation and 
integration in the area of politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.190 The 
earlier transformation from SADCC to SADC in 1992 and the signing of the SADC Treaty in the 
same year changed the legal character of the organization. The treaty which is defined as “an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international 
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law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever 
its particular designation”191, brought about a change in the legal regime of SADC.  
Explaining the new legal regime, Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula (2010) make the important 
observation that the signing of the treaty created rights and duties on the part of member states to 
uphold the principles and objectives of the SADC treaty. These objectives were now no longer 
optional and non-binding, but rather legal and binding, a breach of which would result in an accrual 
of international responsibility.   The following institutional structures were created by Article 9 of 
the SADC Treaty; the Summit of Heads of State or Governments, the Council of Ministers, 
Commissions, the Standing Committee of Officials, the Secretariat, the Organ on politics, Defence 
and Security Cooperation, the integrated Committee of Ministers, the Tribunal, SADC National 
Committees and other institutions as necessary,192 these will be explored in more detail below. 
 
3.3.2 The Troika System and the concept of Subsidiarity 
Article 9A of the SADC Treaty provides for the implementation of a Troika system in the 
functioning of SADC institutions. The system applies to the Summit; the Organ; the Council, the 
Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) and the Standing Committee of Officials (SCO). The 
troika of each of the above institutions consists of a chair, incoming chair and outgoing chair and 
is responsible for decision making, facilitating implementation of decisions and providing policy 
direction in the period between the meetings of the institutions. The troika is thus the coordinator 
of affairs in these institutions. Although it has the advantage of speeding up decision making, it 
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may also have the unintended effect of serving the narrow interests of a small cabal who make 
decisions.193  
Subsidiarity 
In implementing its programmes, SADC uses subsidiary institutions guided by the principle of 
subsidiarity194 which holds that “all programmes and activities are undertaken at levels where they 
can be best handled”.195 This means that institutions and agencies outside SADC structures, not 
necessarily created by Article 9 of the SADC Treaty, ought to be used more in the implementation 
of SADC regional programmes since they can use their own generated resources. This point forms 
the basis of the argument made in this research for the creation of a Regional Infrastructure for 
Peace (RI4P) building on the existing SADC infrastructure of SADC national committees to allow 
for a bottom up approach in the pursuit of a self-sustaining peace in the region. This will enhance 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity and enable it to embrace and implement the principle of 
subsidiarity in a more effective and meaningful manner. 
 
3.3.3 SADC Protocol on Politics Defence and Security 
In 2001, the SADC heads of State and Government approved the Protocol on Politics, Defence 
and Security Cooperation which outlines the objectives, structures and strategies of the SADC 
organ196. The 1992 SADC treaty had made provision for the adoption of no less than 20 
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protocols in various sectors such as trade, health, wildlife, culture, education, politics, defence 
and security etc. These protocols regulate each sector and place a binding legal obligation on 
member states.197 Article 11.3b of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
provides for the establishment of a regional early warning centre (REWC) to facilitate action to 
prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict. Similar provisions are made in SIPO I for early 
warning capabilities to be established in each member state.198 The functions of the REWC are 
listed as: 
-to implement an early warning mechanism to promote peace, security and stability in the 
region 
-to articulate a holistic approach to anticipating potential conflicts in the region 
-to support regional mechanisms for conflict prevention 
-to strengthen existing national mechanisms to feed into SADC mechanism 
-to establish a database system for early warning in SADC 
-to compile strategic assessment and analyses of data collected at the regional level 
-to conduct research on conflict issues 
-to share information among member states on major issues that threaten the SADC 
security and stability 
-to arrange technical review meetings among relevant institutions to reconsider 
methodologies and operational issues with the view to making early warning mechanisms 
more effective.199 
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3.3.4 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programme (RISDP) 
The SADC Extraordinary Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9th March 2001 approved the 
preparation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) by the Secretariat to 
complement the restructuring and to provide clear direction for SADC policies and programmes 
over a 15 year period. SADC has however encountered challenges in coordinating the formulation 
and implementation of the SIPO and the RISDP.200  
3.3.5 SADC Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ II 
In 2001 SADC formulated a Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (PDSC) as a 
framework to guide member state cooperation in the above areas. The Protocol is underpinned by 
the Strategic Indicative Development Plan of the Organ (SIPO) which serves to operationalize and 
guide the implementation of the protocol over a five year period. In 2002 the SADC Summit 
mandated the OPDSC to prepare the SIPO I which was adopted in 2004 for a five year period. 
SIPO I “lacked clear benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation and contained too many priority 
areas, reducing it to a “wish list” without details on sequencing, implementation and 
responsibilities for relevant SADC structures”.201  After a lengthy review process, the SADC 
Summit of Heads of State or Government in Windhoek, Namibia on 10th August 2010, approved 
SIPO II. It was officially re-launched in November 2012, although by mid-2013 its implementation 
appeared to be stalled.202 Its aim is to promote democracy, the observation of universal human 
rights and conflict prevention. It has been critiqued for being a voluntary political agreement of 
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member states which isn’t legally binding and that large parts of it remain unchanged from SIPO 
I.203 SIPO II has also failed to address the fragile relationship between the organ and International 
Cooperating Partners (ICPs). It has brought policing responsibilities into the functional structures 
of the organ, focusing on rising domestic and cross border crime threats. Although it puts emphasis 
on monitoring and evaluation, it fails to give clear implementation procedures.204  
3.3.6 SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) 
The Mutual Defence pact was signed in 2003 by the SADC heads of state and government, the 
pact outlines the action to be taken in response to an armed attack against a signatory party. Its 
genesis can be traced to two sets of controversial joint military interventions in Lesotho and DRC. 
The first was led by South Africa accompanied by Botswana following an army mutiny and the 
rejection of May 1998 election results by the opposition in Lesotho. This sparked debate about the 
legality of the intervention which was not supported by all member states, especially Zimbabwe 
which had been mediating the political crisis in Lesotho for a decade prior to the intervention. In 
the same year, another set of SADC member states, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola intervened 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of then President Laurent Kabila. Following 
disagreements among SADC member states on the legitimacy and legality of the intervention “the 
Zimbabwe led coalition (together with the DRC) pushed for a protocol to create a SADC pact 
compelling all parties to carry out a collective response in the event of external aggression against 
a member state”205. This was against another group led by South Africa which advocated for a 
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more balanced approach. Article 6 (1) of the MDP states boldly that “an armed attack on any 
member state shall be met with immediate collective action”.206 Although to date this clause has 
not been officially invoked, the involvement of SADC member states in the 2013 UN peace 
enforcement mission drew its roots from considerations of invoking the clause following a request 
by the DRC for SADC to deploy a neutral military force to pacify the M23 rebels207.   
“The UN Charter allows member states to form subordinate groupings in order to assist with the 
maintenance of peace and security. As stated in article 52 (1) of the UN Charter, ‘[n]othing in the 
present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such 
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for 
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with 
the purposes and Principles of the United Nations”.208 Article 53 of the charter states a requirement 
for the Security Council authorization before enforcement action can be taken by regional bodies. 
On the other hand, Article 6(4) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) states that the African 
Union and the UN Security Council need to be notified soon after a military response by member 
states. This contradiction is seen as a legal tension that may impede the future rapid deployment 
of the SADCBRIG.209 
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3.3.7 MoU between SADC and the SADC-Council of Non- Governmental Organisations 
SADC has made limited progress in effectively involving civil society in its integration efforts, 
particularly in the peace and security area. This notwithstanding, some channels of interaction have 
been created through provisions of the SADC Treaty, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
and the SIPO. Perhaps the most pronounced sign of the commitment is the MoU signed between 
SADC and the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC – CNGO).210 
3.4 Analysis of Policy Capacity for conflict transformation 
The above described policy framework has been undermined by the absence of common and 
shared values among the member states as shown earlier in the discussion about the prevalent 
political culture in SADC. Member states are yet to back their endorsement of the democratic 
principles enshrined in the SADC treaty with action, their failure to manifest these in to action was 
evident in SADC’s failure to deal decisively with the crisis in Zimbabwe and its general failure to 
address undemocratic practices in the region. This has also manifested in its failure to adequately 
promote human security, the rule of law and respect for human rights. SADC can thus be labelled 
an emerging security community since even its Protocol on Politics Defence and Security 
Cooperation and Mutual Defence Pact anticipate the possibility of large scale violence within and 
between member states something which does not portray a commitment to dependable 
expectations of peaceful change and conflict transformation. As such, despite the organization 
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transforming itself from a coordinating conference (SADCC) to a development community 
(SADC) in 1992, it is yet to attain the full status of a security community which can guarantee 
dependable expectations of peaceful change and conflict transformation.211 Article 12 of the Organ 
protocol curtails transparency as it insists that deliberations of the organ and its committees should 
maintain strict secrecy.212 This attitude is cascaded down to its member states, with some member 
states using secrecy provisions to conceal the under hand activities of its security forces and abuses 
of state power. 
The ACBF report of the capacity of RECs, on the continent challenges RECs “to demonstrate their 
commitment to the goals and objectives of the AU by going beyond diplomatic niceties and the 
symbolic gesture of  inserting “AU” into their development plans and documents”. 213  It 
recommends that SADC should improve its operationalization of the new structure and its 
recruitment of key staff. 
3.5 The Existing Institutional infrastructure which supports Conflict Transformation 
in SADC 
3.5.1 The Summit of Heads of State or Government 
The SADC summit is made up of all the Heads of State or Governments of SADC member states, 
it is the supreme decision making institution in SADC and it controls and gives policy direction 
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for all SADC institutions and member states. Its headed by a Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson 
elected from members for a one year term on a rotational basis, it meets twice a year and it appoints 
the Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary of the SADC Secretariat. Its roles include 
admitting new members into SADC, and creating committees and institutions when necessary.214 
A key weakness of the Summit is that its decisions are taken by consensus and are not binding, 
despite this weakness it showed its power when it acted decisively to suspend Madagascar under 
the unconstitutional change of government in the country in 2009. This notwithstanding, the way 
summit decisions are implemented is largely left to the discretion of member states which is a 
limiting factor for its capacity. Its status as a supranational body is also undermined by the fact 
that it comprises of Heads of State or Government of member states who most of the times make 
decisions which favour individual member states over the interests of the region. An example of 
this is the summit’s failure to direct Zimbabwe to comply with a decision of the SADC tribunal in 
favour of Mike Campbell, a white Zimbabwean farmer who appealed the Zimbabwean 
government’s controversial take over of his farm. The summit is thus a major enabler and potential 
culprit in efforts to undermine the conflict transformation capacity of SADC215.  
3.5.2 The SADC Secretariat 
As demonstrated previously the SADC’s transition from a development coordinating conference 
to a development community confers more responsibilities on the SADC Secretariat. It “was 
enlarged from just providing links between member states and the international community. The 
Secretariat became the main institution that oversees the implementation of the activities of 
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SADC”.216 Although the SADC secretariat still lacks autonomy and decision making powers, the 
2001 restructuring exercise resulted in the following key features at the SADC secretariat: 
 Centralisation of program coordination and implementation within the secretariat. Twenty 
one sector coordinating units were grouped under four new directorates. 
 The establishment of SADC National Committees in the member states, comprising 
representatives from government, the private sector, and civil society that would mirror the 
role of the Secretariat. 
 Preparation of a business plan for the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP), which was supported by the (GTZ) using “Think Tools” techniques, facilitated 
by Deloitte and Touche. The plan set out the activities to be undertaken based on timelines, 
targets to be achieved and indications of costs.217 
The above strides notwithstanding, the secretariat is still faced with a number of challenges, one 
of which is that most decisions of the secretariat are still tied to the political structure of SADC. 
The secretariat has also not clearly spelled out the coordination arrangements between the 
secretariat and member country departments. Further still there are a number of human resource 
challenges which have undermined the capacity of the secretariat to deliver on its commitments. 
These include; “a mismatch between available staffing, resources, and workloads in the technical 
functions; poor investment in staff development to enhance management capacities; a lack of a 
dedicated system for financial management and reporting activities”.218  
When the restructuring was done, the intention was to allocate more powers and responsibilities 
to the secretariat to enable to implement the RISDP and the SIPO, however in reality it has limited 
decision making and delegated powers to enable it to work efficiently. The ACBF capacity 
assessment report recommends that the SADC capacity needs program should invest heavily in 
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technical human resources. It also recommends the need for SADC to develop capacity in; project 
planning development and management, monitoring and evaluation and ICP financing and 
reporting procedures.219 
3.5.3 SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security  
SADC member states have historically had disagreements on the most appropriate approach to 
collective security, conflict management and transformation. Some member states such as 
Zimbabwe had reservations about institutionalising these capabilities by integrating the Organ on 
Politics Defence and Security into the formal structures of SADC preferring a more informal 
approach akin to that of the FLS. President Mugabe held that the chairmanship of the Organ should 
be held by the longest serving head of state, in this case, himself and thus operationalised the Organ 
with no legal basis before the protocol on politics defence and security was adopted. He thus 
monopolised the Organ for his own security objective without a rotational mechanism in place. 
Other member states led by President Mandela of South Africa wanted the Organ to be formally 
integrated into SADC structures and decision making structures.220  
In 1996 SADC thus set up the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation which was 
charged with promoting peace and security through political, military and security cooperation and 
the peaceful settlement of inter and intra state conflict. The Organ directorate is the main 
implementing institution of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. Although set 
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up in 1996 it remained dysfunctional for some time until the signing of the protocol in 2001 due 
to differences between the leaders of SADC about how the organ should operate and relate with 
other SADC structures. The Organ directorate is based in the SADC secretariat in Gaborone, 
Botswana. It is headed by a director, has four sectors; political, diplomatic affairs, defence, security 
and the Regional Peace Keeping Training Centre (RPTC).221  
New units which have been added to the directorate include a SADC Electoral Advisory Council 
(SEAC), a SADC Mediation Unit (SMU), and an Early Warning capability with a situation room 
in Gaborone. The Organ Directorate is managed by the Organ Troika. The Organ Troika is made 
up of three member states that are not members of the SADC Troika. Key decisions are made 
jointly by the incumbent chair, incoming chair and the outgoing chair. The Chairperson of the 
Organ reports directly to the SADC Heads of State or Government Summit.222 The objectives of 
the organ are to secure the region against political instability, the evolution of common political 
values and institutions, development of common foreign policy and the peaceful resolution of 
inter-and intra-state conflicts. The objectives are summarized in table 7 below.223 The functioning 
of the Organ has been critiqued for being too state centric, its activities have largely concentrated 
on track 1 mediation efforts, election monitoring in member states, establishing a standby military 
force and creating a regional early warning capability.224 
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Table 7: Categorised Objectives of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Military / 
Defence 
Crime 
Prevention 
Intelligence Foreign Policy Human Rights 
Protect against 
instability 
Close 
cooperation to 
deal with cross-
border crime 
Close cooperation 
in the sharing of 
intelligence 
information 
Promote cooperation and 
common political value 
systems and institutions to 
deal with cross-border crime 
Develop democratic 
institutions and 
practices 
Develop 
collective 
security 
capacity 
Promote 
community 
based approach 
Early Warning 
Develop common foreign 
policy 
Encourage 
observance of 
universal human 
rights conventions 
and treaties 
Conclude a 
Mutual Defence 
Pact 
N/A N/A 
Conflict prevention, 
management and resolution 
Early warning 
Develop a 
regional 
peacekeeping 
capacity 
N/A N/A 
Mediate in inter-state and 
intra-state disputes 
 
 
Preventive diplomacy  
Early warning 
Encourage and monitor 
international arms control 
disarmament conventions 
and treaties 
Coordinate participation in 
peace operations 
Address extra-regional 
conflicts which affect the 
region 
Source: Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010: 15 
 
The Functioning of the Organ 
Below is a concise explanation of the roles and functions of the institutions of the Organ. The 
creation of the Organ as a formal SADC structure was a marked improvement from the Front Line 
States which was an informal entity. Its creation has resulted in an improvement in the governance 
of the security sector in member states, reduced chances of contentious deployment of armed 
forces and more transparency in the work of SADC in the area of peace and security.225 
Summit: It consists of heads of state and government and is the supreme policy-
making institution of SADC. It meets twice a year and elects a chairperson and a 
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deputy chairperson on a rotating basis for one year. Summit also elects the 
chairperson and deputy chairperson of the Organ. 
Chairperson of the Organ: The chairperson, in consultation with the Troika, is 
responsible for overall policy direction and for the achievements and objectives of 
the Organ during the one year tenure. 
Troika: The incoming, current and outgoing chairpersons of the Organ form the 
Troika. It functions as a steering committee. 
Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO): It consists of the ministers of 
foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each of the state 
parties. The MCO is responsible for coordinating the work of the Organ and its 
structures. It reports to the chairperson. Ministers from the same country as the 
chairperson chair the MCO, ISPDC and ISDSC for one year on rotation. The 
committee convenes at least once a year. 
Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC): It consists of the 
ministers of foreign affairs from each of the state parties. The ISPDC reports to the 
MCO. It meets atleast once a year. 
Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC): It consists of ministers of 
defence, public security and state security. It deals with the objectives of the Organ 
as they relate to defence and security. It reports to the MCO. It meets at least once 
a year. 
Sub-committees: They consist of senior officials and deal with matters pertaining 
to their sector between ISPDC and ISDSC meetings.226 
 
3.5.4 SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre 
The SADC Regional Peacekeeping training Centre (RPTC) was established in 1995 in Harare, 
Zimbabwe to offer Peacekeeping training to the region. This came after the success of a 
peacekeeping course and another battalion commander’s course organized jointly by the 
governments of the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe in 1995 in Zimbabwe. In 1996 the 
Zimbabwean government was then tasked with coordinating peacekeeping training in SADC by 
the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDC). On 2nd May 2008 a report was published 
resulting from an independent study commissioned by the SADC Directorate on the Organ on 
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Politics Defence and Security (DOPDS) which assessed the work of the RPTC. The terms of 
reference for the study were to find out what assistance the RPTC could provide to SADC in light 
of the increased role and participation of SADC member states in peacekeeping. SADC member 
states have contributed military, civilian police and civilian personnel to UN and AU Peace 
Support Operations (PSOs). In 2005, the government of Zimbabwe officially transferred 
ownership of the RPTC to SADC, in August 2007 the SADC brigade which is part of the African 
Union African Standby Force (ASF) was launched.227 
According to the report, the RPTC trained more than 500 military observers between (1997 – 2001) 
and hosted numerous PSO courses, workshops and seminars. RPTC also participated in the 
running of all the major peacekeeping exercises conducted in the SADC region including; Exercise 
Blue Hungwe (1997), Blue Crane (1999), Tanzanite (2002) and Exercise Thokgamo (2005). RPTC 
training activities were however disrupted by the withdrawal of support to the centre by the 
government of Denmark in 2002. In 2004, the Ministerial Committee of the SADC OPDS 
recommended the mainstreaming of the RPTC under the SADC Secretariat a decision which was 
endorsed by the Summit meeting in August 2004 in Grand Baie, Mauritius. Since May 2005, the 
Organ Directorate of SADC has the responsibility to supervise the day to day supervision of the 
RPTC.228  
SADC funds the post of Commandant, Deputy Commandant, Civilian Senior Finance and 
Administration and Senior Secretary while the government of Zimbabwe provides 29 support staff 
as part of the hosting agreement with SADC. Since 2005 most of the operational costs of the 
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college have been serviced through the SADC budget. The report recommended that the RPTC 
must drop its military identity and adopt a multi-dimensional character in line with international 
trends of PSOs. To do this it recommended that the RPTC must serve the needs of the military, 
police and civilians as per the demands of today’s complex and multidimensional PSOs. This it 
recommended must also be reflected in the staffing of the college which should also include 
civilian police and other civilians. It concluded that the RPTC doesn’t have the capacity to meet 
all SADC’s training needs in the area of multidimensional PSOs and called for a division of labour 
where some of the training needs should be met by the member states themselves. It also 
recommended that training activities in the region should be harmonized and standardized for 
better impact. It also called for quality assurance and monitoring and Evaluation measures to be 
put in place to ensure quality and best practices.   The report also recommended that the RPTC 
should gain membership of international peacekeeping training associations such as the African 
Peace support Trainers Association (APSTA) and the International Association of Peacekeeping 
Training Centres (IAPTC).229  
3.5.5 SADC BRIGADE  
In response to the African Union’s efforts of establishing an African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), SADC has established a standby brigade (SADCBRIG) with a policing 
(SADCPOL) and civilian components.230 The AU took a decision to create capabilities to respond 
to conflicts through the deployment of peacekeeping forces, peace support operations, including; 
preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation, 
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re-integration and humanitarian assistance. This was to be realised through the establishment of 
an African Standby Force consisting of standby brigades from five African sub regions including 
SADC.231 The six scenarios for the deployment of the ASF are;  
 -Military advice to a political mission within 30 days of mandate 
 -Observer mission with UN in 30 days 
 -Stand-alone observer mission in 30 days 
 - Complex emergencies in 30 days for military, 90 days rest 
 -Intervention within 14 days (genocide). 232 
 
The SADCBRIG is intended to have capabilities to rapidly undertake the following types of 
operations; observation missions, peacekeeping and peace-building to complex multidimensional 
peace operations, peace-enforcement, robust peace support operations and humanitarian 
interventions in grave circumstances. To coordinate all these, a permanent planning element 
(PLANELM) has been set up at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana since 2005. To date 
member states have pledged all the required 3500 troops and agreed on a common peace support 
doctrine. The brigade was formally launched on 17th August 2007, has a Regional Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe to support it and has undertaken a number of 
exercises to ensure troop readiness. In one such exercise, SADC member states took part in 
Exercise Golfinho, aimed at testing SADC’s abilities to stage a peacekeeping mission; about 6500 
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troops, police and support staff from 11 SADC member states participated in the exercise, which 
was held in the Northern Cape, South Africa, in September 2009.233  
Such exercises also expose the challenges of interoperability and incompatibility of equipment 
among member states which may impede the deployment of troops in the future. So far the Brigade 
has not yet been deployed on any mission as it was only recently created. SADC is also in the 
process of establishing a regional Early Warning System with a centrally located situation room 
in Botswana.234 According to Hendricks and Musavengana: 
The SADC standby force (SSF) has to comply with the principles, 
procedures and good conduct as specified by the AU and UN, which will 
entail the standardisation of norms, procedures and practices of regional 
peace keepers that could eventually cascade to the security forces at national 
level. For example, peacekeeping training emphasises protection of civilians, 
respect for human rights, mitigation of gender based violence, and awareness 
of diversity through the integration of armed forces from different cultural 
backgrounds.235  
Security in the region is still largely seen in traditional terms, as an exclusive preserve of the 
military, police, and “securocrats” who find it comfortable to do business as usual, as Zacarias 
observes; “The institutional framework needed to formulate policy in line with new security 
thinking in most SADC member states is weak to non-existent. National bodies in charge of 
implementing the new security thinking are still dominated by the military and the police force. 
There has not been a level of institutional reform capable of facilitating the implementation of the 
new security thinking or the involvement of academia in generating policy thinking. Because of 
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these factors, the declared intent of moving from state-centric to people-centred security, risks 
remaining an empty platitude.”236 
Article 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by SADC member states creating the 
SADCBRIG lists its functions as: 
 -Observation and monitoring missions 
 -Other types of peace support operations 
-Intervention in a state party in grave circumstances or at the request of that state party, or 
to restore peace and security 
-Preventive deployment in order to prevent: 
 i) A dispute from escalating 
 ii) An ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states 
 iii) The resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement 
-Peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation 
-Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas 
-Any other functions as may be authorised by the SADC Summit.237 
 
The MoU lists the functions of the civilian component as: 
 
 -Provision of human resources, financial and administrative management 
 -Humanitarian liaison 
 -Provision of legal advice 
 -Protection of human rights including women and children.238 
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The OPDS has failed to prevent or arrest conflicts in the DRC, Lesotho, the Caprivi Strip in 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Its strategic vision on how to address the insecurity facing the region is 
still unclear.239 This has also cast aspersions on the future ability of member states to reach a 
consensus that will enable the rapid deployment of the standby brigade to any conflict situations 
including those involving member states who did not invite such intervention. 240 Baker and 
Maerasera quote Cilliers who identifies the original purpose of the ASF as being to create the 
capacity and ability ‘never to allow another genocide like Rwanda’.241 
3.5.6 SADC Tribunal 
The SADC Tribunal was set up as a SADC dispute settlement mechanism in 1992 through the 
signing of the SADC Treaty, for a short time it served as the region’s only (quasi –supranational 
body) until it was shut down by the SADC Summit because of its rulings against the Zimbabwean 
government. There was minimum objection from SADC member states including from the 
regional hegemon South Africa. Some of the reasons advanced for the establishment of the SADC 
Tribunal were to give SADC a credible dispute resolution mechanism to give it legitimacy in the 
eyes of donors and investors. Concerns were however raised from the onset by member states that 
it would erode their national sovereignties242. Although not established as a human rights court, 
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provisions were made for it to uphold the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law.243  
The functions and jurisdiction of the court are outlined in the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal 
which was signed at the annual meeting of the Summit on the 7th August 2000. The Protocol gives 
recourse to companies and citizens of SADC member states to appeal to it after exhausting 
available channels or if they are unable to proceed through their national courts. Unfortunately this 
does not make it a supranational court. The SADC Summit of Heads of State or Government 
(SHSG) retains full control over the court as the Protocol stipulates that all cases where member 
states fail to comply with the court’s decisions should be reported to the SHSG. Human right issues 
were the culprit that led to the disintegration of the court, in particular the Campell v Republic of 
Zimbabwe case.244  
3.5.7 SADC Parliamentary Forum 
The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) is a regional inter-parliamentary body composed of 
MPs of SADC member states who total over 3500 from all the SADC member states. It was 
established by the SADC Summit on September 8th 1997. It consists of Presiding officers and a 
maximum of 5 representatives elected by the national parliaments of each member state. It’s a 
mechanism designed to support regional integration through parliamentary involvement. The 
objectives of the SADC-PF cover the promotion of human rights, gender equality, good 
governance, democracy and transparency, peace, security and stability and familiarizing citizens 
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with the aims and objectives of SADC. It doesn’t have a reporting relationship to the Summit and 
other SADC institutions although it works with them on matters of common interest.245 
SADC PF was formed to strengthen SADC by involving MPs in the work of SADC by facilitating 
the effective implementation of SADC policies and projects as well as the promotion of human 
rights and democracy in the region. Its other role is to encourage good governance, transparency 
and accountability in SADC. Although its functions are quasi legislative, SADC PF has no 
legislative powers, limiting its capacity to legislate on innovative responses to conflict such as 
conflict transformation.246 
 This is a lost opportunity as it could act as an accountability and oversight mechanism for the 
OPDS. What is worse is that in its first ten years of existence the SADC PF has not been able to 
exercise the above legislative powers. Its work has largely revolved around election observation, 
setting election standards and enhancing women’s participation in SADC member state’s 
parliaments. Its constitution envisages that the SADC PF will evolve into a future legislative 
assembly with supranational powers.247 As presently constituted, the SADC PF is not a formal 
structure of SADC and plays no role in its policy formulation. It is therefore sensitive not to 
infringe on the sovereignty of parliaments of its member states. This begs the question of why a 
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regional parliament should be established if it lacks supranational authority and it is going to 
remain subordinate to the national laws and constitutions of member states.248 
There have been calls to equip SADC with legislative powers through the creation of a full-fledged 
regional SADC parliament. This it is believed would further democratize SADC, improve its 
governance and accountability by taking SADC to the people which would ensure ownership by 
citizens of the region whom they represent. A regional parliament is also seen as a conduit for civil 
society’s representations through portfolio committees to strengthen regional integration and 
development. It will also provide feedback and ensure accountability on policies and programmes. 
The SADC –CNGO has made calls for a referendum in all SADC member states to petition the 
decision of the SADC Council of ministers against the formation of a regional parliament. They 
have engaged in efforts to lobby parliamentarians in member states to draw up motions calling for 
the formation of a regional legislature.249 
3.5.8 Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) 
 
The Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) was formed 
in 1995. Head quartered in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1997, SARPCCO was ‘adopted by Interpol to 
become its Regional Bureau for Southern Africa. Initially operating independently, SARPCCO 
was formally integrated into the SADC Organ in 2009. The objectives of SARPCCO are: 
-To promote, strengthen and perpetuate cooperation and foster joint strategies for the 
management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications 
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-To prepare and disseminate information on criminal activities as may be necessary to 
benefit members in their attempts to contain crime in the region 
-To carry out regular reviews of joint crime management strategies in the light of 
changing national and regional needs and priorities 
-To ensure the efficient operation and management of criminal records and the efficient 
monitoring of cross-border crime, taking full advantage of the facilities available through 
Interpol 
-To make recommendations to governments of member countries in relation to matters 
affecting effective policing in the Southern Africa region 
-To formulate systematic regional police training policies and strategies, taking into 
account the needs and performance requirements of the regional police services or forces 
-To carry out any relevant and appropriate acts and strategies for purposes of promoting 
regional police co-operation and collaboration as dictated by regional circumstances.250 
 
The following constitutes challenges and priority crimes that SARPCCO contends with; 
‘smuggling and illegal importation of goods and counterfeit commodities; drug trafficking; 
smuggling stolen motor vehicles; armed robberies; smuggling endangered species and rare 
resources; financial crime; money laundering; illegal migration, people smuggling and human 
trafficking; terrorism; stock theft and corruption…which impacts negatively on the detection, 
investigation and prosecution of crime’.251 Other challenges include collusion between customs 
and police officials who ought to be gate keepers and criminal elements. SARPCCO also 
coordinates regional training and capacity building to harmonise legal disparities across the region. 
Its focus areas for capacity building are; personnel adequacy; forensic support services; access to 
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appropriate technology; mobility; and financial resources. The organization also has to keep up 
with new forms of crime and countering criminal innovation in cyber-crime and tax evasion.252  
SADC thus needs to do more to improve the capacity of SARPCCO in the above areas especially 
since they have the potential to trigger or exacerbate ongoing conflicts. Criminal elements are 
interested in perpetuating conflicts since they best operate with impunity in anarchical conflict 
zones. Institutional tensions also exist regarding the reporting lines of SARPCCO and the SADC 
Summit of Heads of State and Government (SOHSG). Since SARPCCO’s integration into SADC, 
the relationship of the Council of Police Chiefs (CPC) which is the highest decision making body 
in SARPCCO and the SOHSG has remained unclear.253 
SARPCCO has organized a number of joint exercises between intelligence agencies of member 
states. These were aimed at enhancing their capacities to combat crimes such as motor vehicle 
theft, drug cultivation and trafficking, firearms trafficking, fugitives from justice, diamond 
smuggling and illegal migration. The following are some of the joint exercises involving clusters 
of member states: 
-Operation V4, February – March 1997, covering Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
-Operation Atlantic, July 1998, covering Botswana, South Africa and Namibia 
-Operation Midas, June 1998, covering Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland 
-Operation Stone, April 1998, covering Angola, Botswana and Namibia 
-Operation Sesani, April 1999, covering Botswana, Tanzania, Malawi, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe 
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-Operation Makhulu, July – August 2000, covering Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.254 
 
The above efforts of SARPCCO and its formal integration into SADC are welcome developments 
as they have laid the building blocks for enhancing SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
Police and intelligence capabilities are critical to the maintenance of law and order within 
communities in member states. They also operate at the lowest grass roots level where conflicts 
start and ought to end. SADC’s conflict transformation capacity can thus be enhanced by fostering 
cordial ties between communities and their police services based on amity and mutual 
understanding. This nature of collaboration ought to be encouraged through structures such as 
neighbourhood watch, crime prevention and local peace committees. If such initiatives are 
encouraged through policy at SADC level they can go a long way in transforming conflicts as 
relationships between communities and their security agencies will be healthy. 
3.5.9 SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGOs) 
Civil Society formations in Southern Africa are characterised by the following features;  
-Unequal levels of social and political sophistication 
-High concentration in urban areas 
-Considerable preoccupation with the welfare aspects of members  
-Predominance of ethnic and cultural groups that tend to have more of a local than a 
national or regional focus 
-Low levels of management, negotiation, and lobbying skills 
-Low command of resources and high dependence on state and other external support.255 
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The SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGOs) is the lead body of 
NGOs in SADC countries. Its membership is drawn from the 15 SADC member states. The SADC 
– CNGO has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the SADC Secretariat, its mandate is 
to facilitate engagement of the people of region with SADC at regional level, and Member States 
at national level.256  Article 16A and 23 of the SADC Treaty, together with Article 4 of the SADC 
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security outline the relationship between SADC and civil society. 
The Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ also mentions the need for SADC to engage civil society 
in its work.257 It appears as if there is still a lot to be done to translate these paper commitment into 
tangible results as at member state level SADC member states who have established SADC 
National Committees seldom invite representatives of civil society organisations to their 
meetings.258  
In 2008, the SADC CNGO negotiated for more space and engagement with the Organ, this resulted 
in the adoption of a Joint Programmme of Action. There has however been little coordinated civil 
society interaction with the Organ since then. Civil society has frequently decried the state centric 
nature of SADC’s security structures. SADC has also adopted an elitist approach of only engaging 
expert civil society organisations who maintain a working relationship with the Organ through 
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offering training, capacity building and technical support. An encouraging sign which also signals 
improving relations was however the participation of the SADC CNGO in Exercise Golfinho in 
2009, more engagement of this nature will go a long way in ensuring healthy relations between 
SADC and its citizens represented by civil society.259 
Van nieuwkerk (2001) suggests that in pursuit of the human security agenda in the SADC and 
ECOWAS regions, the non-state sector needs to be roped in. He identifies, civil society groups, 
non-governmental organizations, business interests and organized labour as stakeholders who 
ought to be involved in collaborative regional peacemaking efforts to avoid a stalemate or 
failure.260 Some progress has been made in this regard with the formation of the SADC Coalition 
of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) which is made up of NGO mother bodies 
from 15 SADC member states. It was formed in 1998 and has as its aims; the coordination of civil 
society engagement with SADC at regional and national levels, awareness raising through 
advocacy and campaigns, placing human security on the regional agenda of SADC and civil 
society organizations, influencing policy, exerting pressure, monitoring SADC’s implementation 
and adherence to protocols and declarations on human security issues as well as monitoring 
integration.261  
Molutsi recommends the following measures to improve the impact of civil society in Southern 
Africa; better coordination of efforts, closer collaboration with governments and regional 
organizations; creation of information databases accessible to all involved; creation of a network 
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at the country level of conflict management chapters bringing together human rights groups, 
academics, the media and the church.262 For successful conflict transformation he prescribes the 
following roles for the various actors and sector in civil society: 
Labour / trade unions: Mediation, protest, policy advocacy, and material support to those 
in conflict. 
Religious groups: Mediation, reconciliation, advocacy, and welfare for the needy. 
Women’s and youth groups: Peacebuilding, democracy promotion, policy reform, and 
support to communities in conflict. 
Human rights groups / the media: Monitoring conflict and post conflict situations, 
advocacy, and raising issues related to acquisition of military hardware and so forth 
Academic / professional groups: Monitoring, generating information, and providing 
platforms for debates.263 
 
3.6 Analysis of Institutional Capacity 
As seen in the drawn out process that preceded the creation of the Organ, the historical experience 
may say a lot about current attitudes of member states towards the organ. Before its creation, 
member states had differing views on the structure and the functioning of the Organ. Other points 
of disjuncture were their differing political cultures and threat perceptions.264 A key impediment 
to the smooth functioning and implementation of SADC’s institutional machinery for conflict 
transformation has thus been the competing national interests of its member states. Although they 
have found agreement on the need for a common security regime to pursue their collective national 
interests, they have failed to agree on the appropriate strategic orientation of the regime. This 
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disagreement is the result of the conflicting values of some of the member states. Since national 
values which are informed by an individual nation’s historical experiences underpin their national 
interests, they thus pursue their interests in a subjective manner, which results in clashes with the 
national values and interests of other member states.265  
 SADC’s Regional Early Warning Centre (REWS) which was launched in July 2010 after lengthy 
delays, has been critiqued for being largely state intelligence driven, which is incompatible with 
the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which uses open intelligence 
sources. This important link between the AU’s CEWS and SADC’s REWS is frustrated by the fact 
that SADC does not allow for direct exchange of information and analysis with the AU. In SADC 
strategic intelligence and early warning reports are disseminated through the office of the president 
who chairs the SADC OPDS who then transmits them to the AU. This approach limits the flow of 
information and the timely identification of crisis and response time to conflicts, thus limiting 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity.266 It is therefore recommended that the SADC REWS 
should create an alternative information sharing and processing hub which includes early warning 
from civil society. This will also increase information sharing between the Organ and other 
directorates within SADC which have human security related mandates.267 
An explanation for the disjuncture between SADC’s policy and practice is the fact that ‘the 
organization is averse to popular consultation and its security architecture is overly statist and 
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militaristic in outlook’.268 As such this erodes SADC’s conflict transformation capacity which also 
explains its minimalist OPDSC secretariat characterized by a small and weak administrative 
infrastructure, insufficient financial and human capacities and divergent security agendas of 
member states.269 
With the above criticisms of the current state centric nature of the SADC Organ, it would be 
instructive for the capacity of the SADC PF to be strengthened to enable it to perform an oversight 
role over the OPDS and to be more involved in its activities. The SADC PF ought to also be 
transformed into a regional legislature with oversight, law making and budgeting powers like the 
East African Legislative Assembly.270 The Organ has evidently opened up space for civil society 
involvement in its activities through its agreement of a common programme of action with the 
SADC-CNGO. DDR activities in countries like Mozambique and DRC have allowed space for 
civil society involvement, however once these programmes are complete the space closes again. 
The onus should thus also be shared by the regional civil society grouping to constructively engage 
with the Organ for involvement in such grassroots peacebuilding activities.271 This will strengthen 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity and reach. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
It has been established in chapter three that SADC has made efforts to establish a policy framework 
as well as an institutional infrastructure that supports conflict transformation. A key finding is that 
despite the existence of these SADC has major constraints in implementing the institutional 
framework as well as enforcing and adhering to the policies and treaties agreed upon at regional 
level in its individual member states. This is due to the fact that decisions in SADC are reached by 
consensus through the SADC SOHSG and are not legally binding. The SADC Secretariat also 
remains weak and under resourced without decision making autonomy especially in the area of 
peace and security which is the preserve of the heads of state through the OPDS and the SOHSG. 
The chapter has also identified the lack of in-house mediation capacity as another constraint on 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity.  
SADC is however in the process of setting up a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) which will remedy 
the situation. It identified the launch of the SADC Standby Brigade as a milestone in enhancing 
the organisation’s conflict transformation capacity. Further the findings of the chapter identify a 
need for the SADC-PF and the SADC Tribunal to be empowered with legislative and judicial 
dispute settlement respectively as a means of ensuring democracy and social justice in the region 
which lie at the heart of conflict transformation. Ultimately the findings of the chapter point to the 
fact that SADC has limited capacity to transform regional conflicts at the institutional level. 
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CHAPTER 4 
An Assessment of SADC’s Conflict Transformation Capacity at the 
National level 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter conducts an assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the national 
level. It explores the framework through which SADC member states are expected to implement 
SADC activities at national level particularly through the SADC National Committees with a view 
to ascertaining their capacity for conflict transformation at the member state level. The second part 
of the chapter examines three mini case studies of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Zimbabwe and Lesotho, conducting a mapping of the conflicts in the country followed by an 
analysis of SADC’s intervention in each case, concluding with an explanation of the implications 
of the intervention for SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
4.2 Contextual Background of SADC’s Conflict Transformation capacity at the 
national level 
Following the restructuring exercise which began in 1999,272 SADC member states were expected 
to establish SADC National Committees (SNCs) which were tasked with national level 
coordination and implementation of SADC programmes. The roles and functions of SNCs were 
inter alia listed as; 
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 Provide input into the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and programme of action 
 Coordinate and oversee the implementation of the SADC programme of action 
 Promote and broaden stakeholder participation in SADC affairs in member states; 
 Facilitate information flows and communication between member states and the SADC 
Secretariat 
 Coordinate the provision of inputs for the development of the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan and monitor its implementation.273  
 
Member states were expected to establish national steering committees comprised of; a 
chairperson of the SNC, chairperson of the sub-committees and technical committees. The latter 
are required to involve stakeholders like social, economic partners, NGOs, civil society, and 
workers’ and employee organisations. The SADC secretariat has however been overwhelmed by 
the responsibility of establishing and operationalizing the SADC National Committees in the 
member states. This is compounded by the in excess of 400 ongoing projects under the SADC 
Program of Action (SPA) which were approved prior to the formulation of the RISDP.274  
Although the SNCs are multi-stakeholder forums for participatory decision making aimed at 
involving citizens in member states in regional policy processes, the reality has been that most of 
them operate in difficult political contexts within SADC member states. A key finding in this 
research is that SNCs in some member states are virtually non-existent or where they have been 
established they are poorly constituted, managed, resourced and capacitated. Another criticism of 
the SNCs is that there is a lack of clarity on how the Organ relates to the RISDP and its 
implementation frameworks such as the SNCs. This is a lost opportunity since the national level 
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is where the locus of SADC policy is implemented.  A major weakness of the SNCs is that Article 
16A of the SADC Treaty allocates the responsibility of funding and administering SNCs to 
member states. This state of affairs would be remedied if the SADC Secretariat was assigned a 
greater role to play in providing seed money and technical assistance for the creation of SNCs. 
Another important factor is political will from the leadership of SADC member states.275  
According to Isaksen, SNCs were envisaged to fill the temporary vacuum left by the phasing out 
of the Sector Coordinating Units (SCUs) from member states to the secretariat. Although they 
were expected to make SADC more widely known and visible in member states when they were 
formed, in most member states, “only a small group of people directly concerned with SADC 
appeared to have information on the existence of the SNCs…in general there is little or no activity 
taking place in the committees”.276  
In their comprehensive report on the state of SADC SNCs, Nzewi and Zakwe (2009) recommend 
that the criteria for SNC membership at member state level should be reviewed and standards and 
a justifiable criteria set for membership of SNCs especially by civil society groups. They further 
propose that SNCs should be turned into semi-autonomous structures as their ineffectiveness may 
partially result from the fact that they are based within governments. They propose more 
innovative ways of funding the work of SNCs, one such being encouraging greater participation 
by private sector and business organisations who may ultimately provide additional funding upon 
seeing the benefits of SNCs. This problem of capacity and finance is compounded by the fact that 
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the SADC secretariat is itself financed by already meagre donor funds and member state 
contributions.277 
An important structural flaw of SNCs has been identified as the fact that the lines of 
communication and authority between the SNCs, the secretariat and other SADC structures are 
not clear. One such is the Organ on Politics Defence and Security where issues falling under the 
organ have conspicuously been excluded from the tasks of the SNCs. This is a serious omission 
since conflicts start from within member states and are ultimately resolved there. Another omission 
is of the relationship of SNCs and national parliaments and how they can play an oversight role 
over them.  This represents lost opportunities for ordinary citizens within member states to make 
inputs into SADC policies like the RISDP as well as in improving the visibility and sense of 
ownership of SADC by the public in member states.278  
SNCs are a potentially good forum for conflict transformation initiatives to be pursued given the 
variety of representatives from civil society, business and government who form part of the 
committees. A key finding of this research is that there is a need to deepen conflict transformation 
efforts in SADC. One way of doing that would be through reforming and decentralizing the SNCs 
to provide for wider representation to include communities outside the capital cities. This can be 
done as proposed in chapter 6 of this research through the creation of an elaborate Regional 
Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P) constituted by national Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps) established 
in each member state. This initiative can be dovetailed into the framework of the SNCs only this 
time with a deeper reach cascading down to the ward, village, district, regional and national levels.  
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4.3 Analysis of the Capacity of the existing SADC Conflict Transformation 
Infrastructure at the National level 
4.3.1 Conflicts start and occur within Member States 
Although the prevailing atmosphere at the regional level in SADC may be characterized by an 
absence of large scale violence, some individual member states still experience large scale internal 
violence.279 With the ever existing threat of over spills of violence, conflict transformation capacity 
at regional level faces the threat of being eroded from within each individual member state. This 
thus underscores the need to address any deficiencies in conflict transformation capacity at the 
member state level to preclude an over flow and spread of conflicts throughout the region. SADC 
has not proactively and seriously focused on addressing the internal sources of conflict emanating 
from within its member states. Most member states lack internal cohesion and legitimacy due to 
poor governance, political oppression, inequalities, marginalization, poor democratic culture, 
human rights violations and a disregard for the rule of law. Any chance of addressing these is 
curtailed by the fact that old notions of sovereignty stand in the way.280  
These internal challenges of member states have weakened the region’s conflict transformation 
capacity since weak states make weak regions. Nathan, 2012 makes the correct observation that, 
“SADC is nothing but a formation of states, it won’t do anything that its member states won’t 
permit it to do”. The main inhibiting factor to SADC’s conflict transformation capacity is therefore 
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the capacity constraints and orientation of its member states. The capacity constraints of the SADC 
secretariat have as much to do with the conviction of its member states than a lack of funds. 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity can best be enhanced through the support of an energetic 
group of core democratic states who are willing to devote resources to the cause.281  
4.3.2 Member State’s ability to Speak out against Human Rights Violations 
The late former Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa was one of the first SADC heads of state to 
publicly speak out against the worsening situation in Zimbabwe, until then a taboo subject, at one 
point describing the country as a “sinking titanic”. Further manifestations of a commitment to the 
democratic values espoused in the SADC Treaty were displayed by the frequent public criticisms 
of the undemocratic manner in which Zimbabwean elections were conducted by Botswana’s 
President Ian Khama from 2008 - 2013.  
Unfortunately, these voices of reason and moderation have been too few and far between. Rather 
than going it solo, if Botswana was to use its moral clout to lobby other democracies in the region 
in order to form a united front with a stronger voice to safeguard the democratic values that 
underlie SADC, then there would be hope for a deepening of other member states’ commitment to 
democracy. It would be trite to assume that this would happen readily, the only thing that could 
bring about such a state of affairs is if some legally binding punitive measures and sanctions were 
to be adopted to be enforced by the organization against those member states who contravene the 
democratic principles which they have all commonly agreed to.   
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4.3.3 Failure of member states to domesticate and implement regional agreements as a capacity 
constraint in SADC  
Giving his vote of thanks speech at a SADC summit in Mauritius in August 2004, Botswana’s 
former President, Festus Mogae chastised SADC for being “the weakest at getting things done”.282 
This was in recognition of the commendable protocols and declarations on a wide range of fields 
from the environment to human rights that SADC has adopted over the years but which remain 
paper tigers gathering dust on the shelves without any legal muscle binding member states to 
domesticate or enforce them. Related to this, a major finding of this research has been that SADC’s 
capacity in many areas including conflict transformation is grossly undermined by this failure to 
implement and operationalize its very own agreements and polices no matter how well intentioned. 
Another weakness of SADC is that non-compliance and failure to implement collective 
agreements has not attracted any stringent sanctions unlike what obtains in the European Union 
which is often seen as a model of successful regional integration. Membership in SADC is not 
conditional on a member state’s record of good governance or implementing democratic reforms, 
it would in fact appear as if the organization has been unwilling or unable to enforce such standards 
and sanctions on its members.283  
4.3.4 State Centric Conception of security by member states 
Matters relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution in the SADC region have 
historically remained the sole preserve of the state because the highest decision making bodies on 
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peace and security are ministerial forums and heads of state summits. Member states represented 
by their governments regard peace and security as sensitive areas since their very own power to 
govern is vested in their monopoly over the use of force.284 A failing of SADC at the member state 
level is a trend where most member states have failed to domesticate regionally adopted and 
ratified protocols. So bad is the situation that even the older democracies within its ranks such as 
Botswana and Mauritius have failed to domesticate progressive agreements like the SADC gender 
protocol on the weak grounds that the language used in the text of the protocol is too instructive 
for member states.  
4.3.5 Mediation as the medium of choice for Conflict Transformation in SADC 
A regularly employed tool in conflict transformation efforts within SADC is mediation. SADC has 
previously appointed eminent persons such as former Presidents to mediate conflicts in 
Madagascar, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC. Mediators or “Eminent Persons” as they are often 
called in SADC are appointed on an ad-hoc basis in the absence of an elaborate mediation 
infrastructure which SADC is only in the process of setting up now.285 Although not covered under 
the cases in this chapter, the Madagascar case is often cited as another SADC mediation success. 
Through the good offices of SADC appointed mediator and former Mozambican President, 
Joachim Chissano, a roadmap was drawn up and signed on 16th September 2011, which 
notwithstanding some challenges culminated in the 20th December 2013 elections which installed 
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a democratically elected government to replace President Rajoelina’s government which came to 
power through a military backed coup in 2009.  
Despite the ultimate success of the mediation process, some structural flaws in SADC’s mediation 
machinery were revealed. One such was the fact that the mediator and former Mozambican 
President, Joachim Chissano was appointed by a SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ 
(MCO - Troika) reporting to the chair of the Troika of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security 
who is more junior to him. Another challenge is the rotational nature of both the chairmanship of 
SADC and the organ. In the Madagascar case, the SADC liaison office was headed by a South 
African since the country was chairing the SADC Organ Troika at the time. Based on this 
precedent, there is a feeling that the head of the liaison office should’ve made way for a new head 
appointed by Tanzania, the country that took over the chairmanship of the Organ Troika after 
South Africa.286 
Underlying this sentiment is the fact that upon taking over the chairmanship of the Organ Troika, 
President Chissano was side lined by the liaison office and his role unofficially performed by South 
Africa’s Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Marius Fransman. This may 
be an indication that at times some SADC initiatives are hamstrung by acts of expediency on the 
part of certain member states.287 Although in its nascent stages, SADC’s mediation capacity is 
steadily growing. A Panel of Elders (POE) similar to the AU’s Panel of the Wise (POW) forms 
part of SADC’s mediation unit. Its made up of eminent persons who have mostly been retired 
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Presidents from SADC member states. Notwithstanding the success registered by most of the elder 
statesmen in their mediation work, a need has been identified for SADC to move away from the 
practice of hastily assembling a mediation team each time a conflict breaks out. A persuasive 
argument has been made by a number of respondents in this study for the need to strengthen in-
house technical expertise within the Organ. Such a capability should include full time mediation 
and conflict resolution experts who in close cooperation with the Early Warning unit and through 
research are constantly in the loop about the internal dynamics and nuances of conflict situations 
in the region.288  
4.3.6 The Dynamics of Membership of SADC 
A disconnect lies at the very nature of SADC which exists as an Intergovernmental organization 
rather than a supranational organization such as the European Union or the United Nations. 
Member states only tend to bring to SADC issues that they are willing to forgo while jealously 
guarding their sovereignty, member states are thus mostly self-serving in their motives when 
dealing with SADC. A deafening silence accompanies SADC’s views regarding the position 
adopted by particular member states on divisive issues such as the location of the US Africa 
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Command (AFRICOM). Despite having cautioned member states to be wary of the advances of 
the US in the search for a host of the AFRICOM base, member states such as Botswana have 
proceeded with bilateral discussions with the US without being reprimanded by SADC. Despite 
being bound by collective responsibility, member states such as Zimbabwe have on a number of 
occasions publicly condemned being monitored by SADC to the chagrin of other member states.289 
Brigadier Mahao views South Africa’s unilateral involvement in peacekeeping missions in the 
DRC and Sudan in dim light. He argues for a collective intervention in conflict situations under 
the auspices of the SADC Standby Brigade should the need arise rather than the practice of 
individual countries signing MoUs with the UN as was the case with South Africa.  
A look at the composition of SADC member states shows that the majority are republics with 
varying degrees of democratic maturity. Within the ranks of member states are also two 
monarchies, one executive (Swaziland) and the other ceremonious (Lesotho). This has led many 
to cast aspersions on SADC’s collective commitment to Democracy and the protection of human 
rights. A case in point is Swaziland which has remained a taboo subject on the agenda of the SADC 
summit of the heads of state and government despite the numerous affronts on human rights meted 
out by the monarchy against political opponents. Accompanying this is the deteriorating economic 
situation in the country which occurs against the backdrop of impoverishment and the loss of 
economic opportunities for the majority of the population especially the rural poor.290 
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Another dynamic as shown in chapter two is South Africa’s membership of SADC which has been 
both contentious and at the same time inspiring hope. Integration efforts particularly in the 
economic arena in SADC have in a practical sense mostly been led by South Africa as seen by the 
franchises and chain stores it has set up in SADC member states and beyond. This is good for 
catalysing regional integration and development which is a precondition of peace, at the same time 
South Africa ought to recognize that peace is also conversely a prerequisite of development. As 
such South Africa should step out of the shadow of reluctance that its currently basking under and 
proactively perform its role as the regional leader and hegemon with the most economic, political, 
institutional and military power.  
It can enhance SADC’s conflict transformation capacity by leading a campaign together with a 
coalition of progressive and like- minded states to shift SADC from its traditional to a more 
progressive conceptualization of sovereignty. This should be under girded by the idea of popular 
sovereignty which emphasizes the rights of citizens and recognizes the state’s responsibility to 
guarantee the safety and welfare of its citizens. This will see the norms of democracy and human 
rights taking the centre stage in SADC. The coalition could include potential norm entrepreneurs 
from SADC such as Botswana, Mauritius, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania. South Africa can use its 
soft power to achieve a human rights based order by using its economic leverage to tie its aid to 
democracy and human rights.291 
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4.4 An Assessment of SADC’s Conflict Transformation capacity in select member 
states 
This section sets out to map conflicts in three SADC member states namely Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Zimbabwe and Lesotho with the aid of Conflict Resolution tools as outlined by 
Ramsbotham et al (2011).292 The remit and terrain of navigation in this section is guided entirely 
by the framework set out by the authors. According to Ramsbotham et al, the purpose of mapping 
a conflict is “to give both the intervener and parties to the conflict a clearer understanding of the 
origins, nature, dynamics & possibilities for resolution of the conflict”.293 Mapping is described as 
a method to provide a structured analysis of a conflict at a particular moment in time. It is a tool 
used in Conflict Resolution workshops to elicit participants’ snapshot view of the conflict.294 For 
the purposes of this research, this task is undertaken to pay closer attention to the dynamics and 
intricacies of conflicts gripping SADC member states as described above with a view to 
establishing SADC’s capacity to transform them and set them on the path of attaining durable 
peace.  
A detailed analysis of these conflicts is beyond the scope of this research, it is useful however to 
examine the dynamics of each of these conflicts with a view to tracing the nature of SADC’s 
intervention in each case as well as the result of the intervention. In the end inferences are drawn 
from the mapping and the case studies to determine SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. As 
shown in previous chapters, conflict transformation is a concept that is underpinned by principles 
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of non- violence and dialogue aimed at healing conflict affected communities. It is concerned with 
offering self-determination opportunities to silenced and marginalized segments of the community 
as well as forging avenues of involving them in the political and decision making processes. It has 
a preoccupation with engendering a culture of empathy in conflict ridden societies driven by the 
belief that empathy leads to the transformation of the patterns of conflict and ultimately durable 
peace. Conflict transformation is also concerned with formulating strategies that mitigate and 
eliminate violence, conflict and injustice in communities by encouraging mutual understanding 
and building compassionate communities. It is through this lens that SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity will be assessed in each case. 
4.4.1 A mini case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Mapping a Protracted Social Conflict in 
the SADC region 
Background and Description of the country 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) joined SADC on 8th September 1997, it is a vast 
country occupying large swathes of territory geographically located in Central Africa, which is 
rich in a variety of natural resources. The DRC has abundant deposits of minerals including, cobalt, 
coltan, copper, diamonds, gold, tin and tungsten.295 The DRC shares a border with three other 
SADC member states, Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. The current protracted instability gripping 
the country is largely the direct aftermath of what has been called “Africa’s World War”.296 This 
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was a five year long conflict which pitted government forces supported by Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe against rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda leaving a devastating humanitarian crisis 
in its wake.  
People in the Eastern parts of the country continue to be terrorized by rebel militias and the army. 
Although a peace deal was signed and a transitional government formed in 2003, the war raged on. 
An elected government was installed in the DRC in 2006 after a series of peace agreements 
followed by another controversial election in 2011. There are still major challenges of 
consolidating peace throughout the territory, there is evidence to suggest that conflict 
transformation in the DRC is impeded by deep structural issues in the society. For instance large 
numbers of the population remain politically and economically marginalized. If addressed the 
problems of the DRC will ensure peace not only for the DRC but for the entire Great Lakes and 
Southern Africa regions. The conflict in the DRC is extremely violent and resource driven, its 
characterized by massive displacement of people, high levels of insecurity and numerous peace 
talks and agreements.297 
The war in the country has claimed an estimated 5.4 million lives either through fighting, disease 
or malnutrition and has caused 2.5 million to flee their homes.298 The instability in the DRC has 
gone on for over five decades now and has revolved around nationalism, corruption, Cold War 
politics, secession attempts, ethnicity and the rich natural resources which all groups have 
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plundered. Given the various regional actors involved, in 2013 the UN facilitated the signing of a 
regional agreement to end the M23 rebellion in the eastern part of the country. One of the group’s 
leaders Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the ICC to face war crimes charges. Rwanda and Uganda 
have denied accusations in a UN report that they had supported the M23 rebels.299 
a) Outline of the History of the Conflict 
The failed attempts at statebuilding in the DRC are largely the legacy of Belgian Colonial rule 
which resulted in state fragility at independence revolving around the Katanganese secessionists 
aligned with Belgian economic interests. This initial conflict at independence spilled over into a 
regional and ethnic crisis which led some to argue that the Congo was too unwieldy as a single 
state and thus needed to be divided into smaller more manageable portions. Ironically, this 
development was prevented by Mobutu’s dictatorship which personalized and centralized power 
although in the process failing to build structures and institutions of state that would outlive him.  
With support from the military and the west, Mobutu’s regime plundered the national economy 
and left a legacy of no road network in the country, no educational standards, and no political sense 
of purpose. This state of affairs served Mobutu well as a developed state armed with strong 
institutions would challenge his dictatorship. The government thus ceased to have relevance to the 
day to day affairs of the people as they devised their own means of survival even where the formal 
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business sector had collapsed.300 The conflict in the DRC can be divided into 3 parts; the first 
Congo War, the Second Congo War and the Third Congo War. 
First Congo War 
The first Congo War ended with the overthrow of Mobutu in May 1997 by Laurent Desire Kabila 
backed by Rwanda and Uganda.301 Shortly thereafter there was a fall out between Kabila and his 
Ugandan and Rwandese allies which sparked the Second Congo War.302  
Second Congo War 
The Second Congo war began in 1998 and involved a myriad of actors forming a complex web 
of alliances. On one side there was Angola, Chad, Namibia, DRC, Sudan, Zimbabwe, the Mai 
Mai and Hutu aligned forces, while on the other side there was Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, the 
Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy and Tutsi aligned 
forces. The Second Congo War was ended through the signing of four major peace agreements: 
i) Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement (1999)303 
ii) Sun City Agreement (April 2002) 
iii) Pretoria Agreement (July 2002) 
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iv) Luanda Agreement (September 2002) – this contributed to the Global and inclusive 
agreement of December 2002 which finally ended the war. 
The myriad actors involved in the DRC war have made it difficult to end the war. There have been 
many actors whose interests were not met each step of the way and they as such either didn’t enter 
into some of the agreements or didn’t respect the ones they entered into. Despite some of the 
challenges the agreements ultimately led to the formation of a Unified Transitional government of 
the DRC in 2003.304 
The Third Congo War 
The current conflict in the DRC can be thought of as the third Congo war, it traces its origins to 
the failure of the transitional government’s efforts to unify the country after many years of civil 
war starting in 2003. Under the arrangement, all the belligerent forces were required to integrate 
their troops into the Congolese National army the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (FARDC). A section of soldiers belonging to the Rwanda backed RCD refused to join the 
FARDC and launched a rebellion which they called the National Congress for the Defence of the 
People (CNDP). The CNDP was integrated into the FARDC following a 1999 peace deal. In April 
2012, CNDP members in the FARDC mutinied and formed the March 23 (M23) rebel group. The 
move was reported to be in protest aimed to prevent their leaders from being dispersed from eastern 
DRC to other parts of the country. The M23 were reported to have received support from 
Rwanda.305  
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Assessment of SADC’s Conflict Transformation Capacity in the DRC 
As shown above, the DRC is a member of SADC, despite the numerous actors who have intervened 
in the country SADC has also carved out a role for itself. In its most recent intervention in the 
DRC, rather than using soft power diplomacy through mediation, SADC decided to deploy an 
intervention brigade to enforce peace. This was prompted by a recognition of the shortcomings of 
the MONUSCO which had a limited peacekeeping mandate which failed to contain the violence 
perpetrated by the belligerents. SADC’s initial plan to intervene alone was thwarted by the UN 
under mysterious circumstances. 
At the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique on August 
17th and 18th 2012, a decision was reached for SADC to send an intervention force to the eastern 
part of the DRC to assist the government of the DRC to disarm all negative forces in the eastern 
parts of the country in particular the M23 rebels. Despite this original position, a UN resolution 
2098 passed on 12th March 2013 appears to have supplanted and eclipsed the earlier stated decision 
by SADC. The UN resolution which created a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) is empowered to 
use force should the need arise. It is wholly owned by the UN in terms of funding and equipping 
but led by SADC member states in terms of human resources with a Tanzanian as its commander. 
Three SADC member states, South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi have also contributed a battalion 
each to the brigade.306 
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During the SADC summit, the DRC had expressed a concern about attacks from the notorious 
M23 rebels who were terrorizing civilians in the eastern part of the country and thus appealed to 
SADC for help. In response, the summit deliberated on the appeal and sought guidance from 
Article 2 (a) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation which holds 
that member states must help each other in the face of external aggression. Further guidance was 
obtained from Article 6.1 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact which reads; “an attack on any 
member state shall be met with immediate collective action”. Having satisfied themselves that 
their consensus was compliant with the law the heads of state summit decided to deploy the SADC 
Standby Brigade in the DRC to pacify the rebels.307  
An assessment team was subsequently dispatched to the DRC to assess the extent of the threat on 
the ground. The team drew up a list of recommendations which justified SADC’s decision to 
intervene. The summit in agreeing to deploy troops made a condition that for the mission to 
succeed SADC ought to work in close cooperation with the International Conference of the Great 
Lakes (ICGLR) at the time chaired by Uganda which the DRC is also a member of. When SADC 
started preparing troops, the DRC government began a parallel process of opening talks between 
the M23 rebels and the government. At this instance, SADC who had been requested to assist and 
had decided on a military solution questioned the rationale of the talks. However since the Heads 
of State had decided to deploy troops and preparations were under way, the arrangements for troop 
deployment could not be aborted. The concept of Operations was prepared by the ICGLR for 
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consideration by SADC in their troop preparations. SADC member states then pledged to 
constitute a brigade size force initially called a Neutral International Force (NIF).308 
The UN Enters the Fray 
While SADC was busy preparing for the deployment, the United Nations came into the picture 
and proposed to both SADC and the ICGLR for the deployment of a joint UN/SADC/ICGLR 
intervention Brigade. The UN’s reasons are unclear although it proposal followed as series of 
meetings with SADC which was adamant to go ahead with the deployment with or without the 
UN. Since the NIF had already been conceived, it was ultimately decided that it would be deployed 
under the UN banner under the name Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) as proposed by the UN. 
SADC possibly agreed to this proposal since it did not have the capacity to sustain its own 
independent deployment in the DRC without the backing of the UN or other donors.  
Since the UN already had peacekeeping troops on the ground in the DRC, the FIB was deployed 
to join the MONUSCO albeit with a particular peace enforcement mandate deriving from chapter 
7 of the UN charter and UN Security Council Resolution 2098 authorising the use of force to 
pacify the rebels in eastern DRC. At the planning stages SADC decided to deploy as a block albeit 
under the UN banner, as such the FIB is wholly made up of 1 SADC brigade commanded by a 
Tanzanian General and troops from Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa with logistical support 
from MONUSCO. Other SADC member states offered to provide financial and capacity building 
support. The inclusion of South Africa in this intervention is crucial given its well-trained 
sophisticated and well-resourced military. Its inclusion greatly enhanced SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity in this case as also supported by initial media reports following the 
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deployment of the FIB that South African snipers had within a short time shot and killed top M23 
commanders on the ground. Further evidence of SADC’s capacity to transform the conflict 
involving the M23 in the DRC was the surrender and defeat of the M23 within a matter of months 
a feat which had eluded the UN MONUSCO forces for years. 
 
SADC’ Conflict Transformation Challenges in the DRC 
A point of contention, speculation and debate revolves around the true motivation of the UN to 
join the mission. Some have attributed the UN’s decision to its desire to avoid being seen as a 
failure since the MONUC and MONUSCO had been deployed in the DRC for decades with a 
lacklustre record. SADC as well possibly agreed to collaboration with the UN since it alone did 
not possess the capacity to sustain the mission. Additionally it was in fulfilment of the 
requirements of chapter 8 of the UN charter which enjoins regional organisations which are made 
up of UN member states to bear responsibility for peace and security in their immediate 
neighbourhoods in line with the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity. A further 
explanation is that the UN is the only body that can afford to compensate its members in the event 
that there is loss of life or equipment such as aircrafts which none of the RECs can afford. 
Clarifying circumstances leading to UN involvement and eventual take over, SADC Director for 
the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Lt. Col (Rtd) Tanki Mothae explained that the UN has 
the prerogative to maintain international peace and security. Further that in this particular instance, 
the UN may have acted to save itself from the likely political embarrassment resulting from its 
absence from a joint SADC / International Conference for the Great Lakes (ICGLR) intervention 
in the eastern DRC.  
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Photograph 5: Interview with Lt. Col. (Rtd) Tanki Mothae, Director of the SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security. SADC Secretariat (7th August 2013), Gaborone, Botswana  
 
Had the two regional organisations intervened without the UN and succeeded in resolving the 
problems of eastern DRC, the UN’s reputation would suffer untold damage as the UN has 
maintained a presence in the DRC for decades through its MONUC and now MONUSCO 
peacekeeping missions which have both failed to pacify the numerous rebel groups in the country. 
According to Mothae, the UN also understood SADC’s displeasure at the modest results of the 
UN missions. As such after lengthy and difficult discussions and in order to avoid diplomatic 
embarrassment a deal was struck where the UN committed to provide a resolution and a mandate 
while SADC committed to contribute personnel. He maintains that SADC was determined to carry 
out its August 17th and 18th 2012 Heads of State and Government Summit resolution even if they 
had failed to reach an agreement with the UN since they enjoyed support from instruments such 
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as chapter 8 of the UN Charter which empowers regional organisations to carry out actions to bring 
about peace and security in their areas of jurisdiction.309 This is also in line with the African 
Union’s principle of subsidiarity which holds that problems should be resolved at the level closest 
to their source and by the most competent structure given the circumstances.  
A caveat ought to be made when dealing with the DRC case, its complexity stems from its multiple 
concurrent membership of other RECs and regional organisations such as SADC, ECCAS, ICGLR, 
CEPGL and COMESA. The problem is that each one of the above wants to take the lead when a 
need for intervention in the DRC arises. As such it is not easy to gauge the extent of SADC’s 
impact and capacity since other parallel efforts are usually involved.  As such when SADC took a 
decision to deploy troops, it remained sensitive to the efforts and interests of the other RECs and 
stakeholders in the DRC. When the FIB was deployed the UN decided to sign MoUs with 
individual member states rather than the SADC secretariat. This is despite the numerous meetings 
conducted between the SADC secretariat and the UN in New York aimed at understanding the 
advisability of the UN’s decision to sign MoUs directly with member states rather than with SADC. 
Conflict transformation has been described as “changes in any or some combination of the 
following matters regarding a conflict: the general context or framing of the situation, the 
contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament, or 
the structures affecting any of the aforementioned”.310 It is a long term process which is ultimately 
about changing individual attitudes and addressing the need for structural reforms. Another 
challenge facing SADC in the DRC conflict were the deep seated and residual effects of decades 
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of conflicts which has left many institutions in a state of disarray. Even the very organs entrusted 
with providing security for the citizens have turned out to be the source of their insecurity. The 
army, police and correctional services suffer a gross lack of capacity and inadequate oversight 
provisions. This has resulted in the DRC security services being accused of extensive and gross 
human rights violations.311 At a very basic level SADC has demonstrated that it at the very 
minimum has a measure of conflict transformation capacity by deploying a brigade on its own 
with each of its three member states (Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa) contributing a battalion. 
It further passed the initial test of changing the context of the conflict by defeating the M23 rebels 
and continuing to pacify other rebel movements in the east of the DRC. 
SADC’ Conflict Transformation Achievements in the DRC 
Despite the challenges of reaching common ground with the UN on the best way to intervene in 
the eastern DRC, Mothae pointed out that SADC has continued to be closely involved in UN 
efforts to bring about peace in the country and the greater Great Lakes region which neighbours 
SADC. This was evidenced by his involvement and contributions to the benchmarking report 
submitted to Mary Robinson, the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General for the Great 
Lakes region. Lt. Col. (Rtd) Tanki Mothae represents SADC in the technical support committee 
which has been advising Mary Robinson and the 11 + 4 Heads of State and Government who are 
signatories to the Peace Framework on the Great Lakes signed in February 2013. 
SADC deserves credit for the commitment demonstrated by its member states, by August 2013, 
almost all member states had pledged troops in a rotational arrangement where when the initial 
three troop contributing countries complete their tour of duty, they will be replaced by three 
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battalions from other member states until a point where peace has been maintained and the 
objectives met. The main focus of the intervention is not to fight but rather to bring the warring 
parties to the table to negotiate a peaceful settlement and to pacify the eastern DRC by getting rid 
of all negative forces.  A key challenge encountered while doing research on this case was the 
dearth of information which is a result of the period under consideration being fairly recent. 
Another explanation is that most materials on the recent developments in the case are still classified 
until the objectives of the intervention have been met.312 
4.4.2 A mini case study of Zimbabwe: Mapping a SADC led Mediation and Conflict Transformation 
effort  
Background & Description of the country 
Zimbabwe is a Southern African country formerly known as Rhodesia during its colonial years. It 
attained independence from it colonial master Britain in 1980 after a bitter liberation war and a 
repressive and racist settler colonial government presided over by Ian Smith. Zimbabwe shares 
borders with Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Mozambique. Zimbabwe’s current constitution 
was part of a ceasefire agreement signed in 1979 known as the Lancaster house agreement signed 
between the country’s liberation movements, the Rhodesian administration of Ian Smith and the 
British government313 
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Outline of the history of the conflict 
Since the year 2000, Zimbabwe has dominated international headlines for all the wrong reasons. 
The country has witnessed economic collapse, ultra inflation, state sanctioned brutality against the 
media, civil society and opposition activists, displacement, death destruction on white owned 
farms, massive brain drain, starvation, disease and growing repression and impunity by the regime 
of President Robert Mugabe.314 All forms of discrimination have been documented in Zimbabwe 
with high levels of poverty, unemployment standing at 82%, inflation at four figures, non - existent 
service delivery, a failed health care and education system, repressive media laws, corruption at 
all levels of government and a shrinking of the democratic space315. All this has been done in 
desperate efforts of self-preservation by the Mugabe regime. 
This intolerance of opposition and state sponsored violence has been described as a continuation 
of state brutality similar to that meted out by the colonial government since very little if any 
changes were made to the inherited colonial laws316. On paper, the country is governed jointly by 
the ZANU-PF party of President Robert Mugabe and the two factions of the former opposition 
party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) represented by Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Aurthur Mutambara. The IMF and other international 
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donors have suspended credit facilities to Zimbabwe citing economic mismanagement and 
undemocratic practices all of which has brought the country to its knees.317 
Other major powers led by the United States and the United Kingdom have the lead the pack in 
imposing targeted sanctions on key figures in Zimbabwe. In 2001 the US enacted the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) which was aimed at putting pressure on 
multilateral institutions to stop extending any credit or assistance to Zimbabwe. The act also 
includes travel restrictions and bans as well as asset freezes on key individuals linked to the ruling 
party and their families. The European Union also imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe which include, 
asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes of the regime318. State sanctioned violence by the 
Mugabe regime predates the advent of the MDC which was for a long time the main opposition 
party. In the 1980s in the immediate post-independence period, Mugabe’s ZANU party embarked 
on a campaign to crush its major opponent PF-ZAPU party made up mainly of members of the 
Ndebele tribe. The Mugabe regime unleashed a campaign of terror on perceived opponents in the 
period around 1983 through its North Korean trained elite squad the 5th Brigade which resulted in 
the loss of life of 20 000 civilians in the Midlands and Matebeleland regions of the country. The 
regime is also notorious for co-opting its opponents as seen by the absorption of the opposition 
PF-ZAPU of the late Joshua Nkomo into a ruling alliance with Mugabe’s ZANU, changing the 
name to ZANU-PF319. This has bred suspicions about the sincerity of the Mugabe regime in the 
power sharing arrangement it has entered into with the MDC. The current power sharing 
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arrangement was born out of the disputed election outcomes in Zimbabwe of March 2008 and the 
July 2008 run-off elections.320  
The core conflict parties are President Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party and Prime Minister 
Morgan Tsvangirai and his MDC party. The ZANU-PF enjoys the support of the security agencies 
and a group called the War Veterans who have unleashed a campaign of terror on opposition 
supporters, ordinary citizens and white farmers whose properties they high jack willy-nilly. The 
MDC has two factions one of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and the other of Deputy Prime 
Minister Aurthur Mutambara. The ZANU-PF mostly relies on a constituency of rural poor voters 
and the elderly who took part in the liberation war and who still find liberation philosophies 
appealing / enchanting. It also enjoys the support of the war veterans some of whom were not even 
born at the time the war was fought. To this Chikwanha, (2010) remarks “the negative engagement 
by some youth has undoubtedly cost us a generation, as has the stalled and regressed educational 
system”.321 Solace is however found in the emergence of new daring civil society groups such as 
Women and Men of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) which continue to be detained and harassed by 
security agents without relenting. The MDC on the other hand relies on the urban voters and the 
working class since it traces its roots back to the trade union movement in Zimbabwe with Prime 
Minister Tsvangirai being a former union leader. It also enjoys the sympathy of some white 
Zimbabweans as evidenced by one of its MPs, Roy Bennet being a white man. 
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The core conflict issues? 
Since the 2008 elections, President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF has more control of the security 
sector. Subordination of the security sector to civilian authorities has only happened in favour of 
one party to the joint power sharing arrangement. In the past decade, Zimbabwe has become an 
international pariah 322 . The issue of sanctions and calls for their removal remains a major 
stumbling block in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis323. The UK and the United States were the 
first to impose “smart sanctions” on Zimbabwe in the early 2000s followed by the EU, Canada, 
Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand324. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF accuses the Tsvangirai’s MDC 
of not doing enough to lobby for the removal of sanctions, while the MDC argues that the 
responsibility for sanctions should rest squarely with the ZANU-PF who brought about the 
sanctions in the first place through intransigence325. The conundrum to resolve is aptly captured 
by Smith-Hohn;  
…is there perhaps a middle ground to be found between the two extremes of 
unconditionally lifting all restrictive measures as called for by some and the other extreme 
of maintaining all targeted sanctions until every outstanding issue surrounding the GPA is 
resolved?.326 
Another key bone of contention is the outcome of the 2008 election which the MDC argued that it 
had won, crying foul over election rigging and other irregularities by the Mugabe regime. This 
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disagreement sparked large scale violence by supporters of both parties across the country 
culminating in the signing of the Global Political Agreement In September 2008 for a government 
of national unity in the interim period before fresh elections. 
The Impact of External Actors on the Conflict in Zimbabwe 
At the regional level, the Mugabe regime has enjoyed the support of neighbouring countries such 
as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola which all share a common legacy of having 
fought liberation wars. This has largely been manifested during meetings of the regional block the 
Southern African Development Community where none of the above have publicly criticized the 
atrocities carried out by the Mugabe regime in what appears to be an unwritten code of an old 
boy’s club. Other member states such as Botswana which lack liberation war credentials and whose 
leaders have dared to publicly criticize the Mugabe regime have seen a straining of bilateral 
relations between the neighbours. The regional sub-hegemon, South Africa has however been 
appointed to spearhead mediation efforts between the conflicting parties in Zimbabwe which 
resulted in the Global Political Agreement. Both former South African president, Thabo Mbeki 
and incumbent, Jacob Zuma have been criticized for being too soft on the Mugabe regime where 
they ought to have taken firmer positions. In 2007 when South Africa held the presidency of the 
UNSC there was no critical focus on the Zimbabwean crisis.327  The late former Zambian President, 
Levy Mwanawasa and Botswana’s current leader Lt.Gen. Seretse Khama Ian Khama are the only 
two leaders who have publicly criticized the Mugabe regime. In the Botswana case there was a 
diplomatic standoff in 2008 when Botswana offered a safe haven for Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister, 
then leader of Opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai to receive medical attention and recuperate in 
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Gaborone after being assaulted by security forces in Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime did not take 
kindly to this and accused Botswana of setting up training camps for Zimbabwe’s opposition 
activists in Botswana. A SADC sanctioned commission of enquiry however found this not to have 
been true. 
The Mugabe regime has largely been seen to be sinking into dictatorship with its close ties with 
the Ghaddafi regime in Libya to the extent that Zimbabwe was often named as a possible escape 
destination for Ghaddafi and his aides during the revolution in Libya. Mugabe has also given 
refuge to former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haille Mariam who is reported to be his adviser on 
national security matters, this is despite that the latter had been sentenced to death in absentia in 
Ethiopia. The SADC and the AU have been most vociferous in calling for the removal of sanctions 
imposed on Zimbabwe. This was exemplified by the boycotting of the EU-Africa summit billed 
for Lisbon, Portugal in 2003 which was postponed due to the boycott by most African leaders 
because Mugabe was not invited.328 
Zimbabwe’s former colonial master, United Kingdom is a key international actor in the conflict. 
Historically it is British settlers who are implicated for expropriating huge swathes of productive 
farming land from indigenous Zimbabwean chiefs for a song. This laid the foundation for the 
highly imbalanced land tenure system where almost 90% of productive land was occupied by the 
white farmers at the expense of 90% of the mostly black population who stayed on the remaining 
unfertile 10% of the land. The liberation war fought in the 1960s and 70s in Zimbabwe was spurred 
on by this imbalance as well as a desire to unseat the minority white settler regime led by Ian Smith 
which they achieved in 1980. A year earlier in 1979, some agreements were signed between 
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Zimbabwe and the United kingdom known as the Lancaster house agreements which saw the latter 
pledging to grant reparation fees to finance the re-buying of farms from minority white 
Zimbabwean farmers to redistribute them amongst the majority of landless blacks.   
In the mid-1980s the United Kingdom froze the payment of these reparation fees arguing that the 
new black led government of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party had reneged on its obligations by 
misappropriating the funds intended for the land redistribution. This saw an angry reaction from 
the Mugabe led Government towards the end of the 1990s after a series of failed negotiations with 
the British of forcibly evicting white farmers under the pretext of redistributing their land to 
landless blacks. Subsequently relations with the UK have been strained to a point where the UK 
government has imposed targeted sanctions on the Mugabe regime and close associates including 
a freeze on their bank account and travel bans. In reaction to this the Zimbabwean government 
adopted a policy dubbed “The look East policy” where relations with a number of Asian countries, 
primarily China, Hong Kong and Thailand blossomed in a cross section of fields. In the 1980s the 
Mugabe regime is famed to have also trained its elite hit squad “The fifth Brigade” in North Korea. 
This special military arm of the regime was responsible for the massacres of thousands of members 
of the Ndebele ethnic group in the Bulawayo area which came to be known as the “Ghukurahundi”.  
The regime also had close ties to the regime of ousted former Libyan dictator, Muamar Ghadaffi 
which is widely believed to have offered financial support to Zimbabwe after the sanctions of the 
European Union and the United States of America. 
The Mugabe regime has repeatedly referred to the sanctions imposed by the west, i.e the European 
Union and the United States as the main factor that remains a stumbling block to finding a political 
solution to the conflict as they continue to hurt the ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe. The sanctions 
have seen hyper-inflation and the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy which at some point 
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was in near collapse. All this is not- withstanding the fact that at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe 
was described as “The Bread Basket” of Africa with the Zimbabwe dollar being at par with the 
American dollar, a far cry from what obtains today. 
As per the US’s ZIDERA act, an asset freeze was also imposed on 200 Zimbabwean individuals 
and businesses by the US government.  Similar measures were adopted by the government of New 
Zealand. In 2002 the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe for all the transgressions it had been 
accused of, to this President Mugabe retaliated by revoking Zimbabwe’s membership of the 
Commonwealth. Australia and New Zealand also banned the children of the regime from studying 
in their schools.329 This notwithstanding, the United Nations has not imposed any sanctions on 
Zimbabwe. This could also in part be explained by the fact that Zimbabwe also enjoyed the support 
of China and Russia in the UNSC (Ibid). The deadlock is perpetuated by SADC’s failure to take a 
firm position on Zimbabwe, at a number of SADC summits, heads of state just pussyfooted on the 
issue without any specific calls for an end to violence, arrests and intimidation.330 Such calls were 
only uncharacteristically made at the Livingstone summit of April 2011 and even then rebuffed by 
an ever defiant Mugabe who played the sovereignty card. 
Assessment of SADC’s Conflict Transformation Capacity in Zimbabwe 
The conflict in Zimbabwe is complex and multifaceted as it traces its roots to the colonial period. 
For purposes of this research, attention will however be limited to the period after the March 2009 
elections characterized by violence which continued to the run up to the presidential run off poll 
of June, 2008. Internal efforts to de-escalate the violence failed as the conflict parties maintained 
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their polarized positions. The continued violence compromised peace, stability and development 
in the country leaving no option but for a regional solution through SADC’s intervention. SADC 
deployed then South African President, Thabo Mbeki to mediate the post-election crisis leading to 
the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008. The GPA led to the 
establishment of a Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009, comprised of the two 
MDC factions, MDC Tsvangirai (MDC-T), MDC Mutambara (MDC-M) and the ruling ZANU-
PF party. The GNU and implementation of commitments under the GPA faced tremendous 
challenges of implementation which stalled and frustrated the SADC sanctioned mediation.331 
SADC’s initial involvement in the conflict can be traced back to 2002 at the onset of the initial 
signs of a deterioration in governance, development, peace and security with implications for 
regional stability. Some trace SADC’s involvement to the year 2000 when the regional bloc sent 
Mbeki and the ex- Presidents of Namibia and Mozambique, Sam Nujoma and Joachim Chissano 
respectively to engage with Mugabe on the controversial land reform programme when war 
veterans began occupying white owned farms. Mugabe reportedly welcomed SADC’s overtures 
although blaming the west for failing to honour the commitment they made at the 1998 donor 
conference respecting the Zimbabwe land question and the United Kingdom’s refusal to join the 
task force for donor assistance.332  
All three parties to the conflict in Zimbabwe agreed to the mediation for different reasons, for the 
ruling ZANU-PF it was a combination of “the free fall in the country’s economy, increasing 
                                                 
331 Khabele Matlosa, The Role of the Southern African Development Community in Mediating Post-Election 
Conflicts: Case Studies of Lesotho and Zimbabwe in Matlosa K, Khadiagala G and Shale V, When Elephants Fight, 
Preventing and Resolving Election-related Conflicts in Africa, Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of 
Democracy in Africa (EISA), 2010, Pg.196-218 
332 Lawrence Mhandara and Andrew Pooe, Mediating a convoluted conflict: South Africa’s approach to the inter-
party negotiations in Zimbawe, Durban, ACCORD, Occassional Paper series, Issue 1, 2013 
176 
 
international criticism and perhaps most significantly, pressure from SADC to accede to the 
negotiations. MDC-T viewed a negotiated settlement as possibly the best route to power, while the 
smaller MDC-M saw it as an opportunity to retain its political relevance”.333 Official SADC 
intervention began in March 2007 when the SOHSG in Tanzania appointed Thabo Mbeki mediator 
to solve the governance crisis and set the economy on a recovery path. This is evidence of SADC’s 
commitment to transforming both the context and structure of the conflict from the onset. The 
objectives of the SADC mediator Mbeki were to ensure that; 
Firstly both parties should agree to hold parliamentary elections in 2008. Secondly, they 
should agree on the steps to be taken to ensure that all concerned accept the outcome of the 
elections as representing the will of the people of Zimbabwe. Thirdly, that there should be 
agreement by all political parties and other social forces on the measures that should be 
implemented and respected in order to facilitate a legitimate election.334 
 
The mediation process started in June 2007 and ended in September 2008 with the signing of the 
GPA. Against the odds, the negotiation process registered the following modest achievements; 
amendments to the Electoral Act, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and 
Broadcasting Act all of which paved way for amendments to the constitution.335 
In its intervention, SADC strove to be as neutral as possible, attempting to genuinely consider both 
the domestic plight of discontented citizens who had occupied white owned farms at the same time 
recognizing that the occupations made a mockery of the rule of law. SADC thus actively engaged 
both the local parties and the international community, this notwithstanding SADC’s position as 
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represented by Mbeki was that of wariness of the West’s regime change agenda which irked SADC 
leaders. 
Challenges encountered by SADC in its Conflict Transformation efforts 
A major constraint which impeded SADC’s capacity to transform the conflict in Zimbabwe is its 
failure to appoint field observers for the duration of the GPA and the transition in Zimbabwe to 
closely monitor compliance with the implementation of the GPA. Further at regional level SADC 
failed to devise an implementation roadmap and a monitoring mechanism at regional level to 
oversee the implementation of the agreement. This was compounded by the failure of the SADC 
mediators to set a strict timetable to review progress of the GPA implementation which resulted in 
the slow pace of reforms in Zimbabwe over that period. More importantly these lapses delayed the 
inauguration of the power sharing government which was only sworn in in February 2009 although 
the GPA was signed in September 2008.336 
SADC efforts to transform the conflict in Zimbabwe were further frustrated by the entrenched 
polarized positions and mutual suspicions which the two parties harboured. The MDC constantly 
raised concerns about the unfair appointment of key government figures and the harassment and 
arrest of the MPs by the ruling party. The ZANU-PF for its part decried the continued imposition 
of sanctions by the west on senior government figures, the establishment of parallel government 
structures by Prime Minister Tsvangirai and the anti ZANU-PF radiobroadcasts beamed into 
Zimbabwe from abroad. 337  The Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) 
comprising of the three coalition partners proved to be toothless. There was minimal interaction 
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between SADC and JOMIC and its very composition rendered it handicapped because the actors 
in the conflict could not be expected to be both the players and the referees at the same time. 
SADC’s ability to assert its authority over the implementation of the GPA was also hamstrung by 
the preoccupation of its heads of state with fears of violating the sovereignty of other member 
states. All the above cumulatively delayed important milestones in the transitional government 
such as the constitution making process which was one year behind schedule.  
A more effective model to ensure impartial monitoring and evaluation would have been the 
appointment of civil society representatives with expertise in governance  and social development 
as was the case in the Kenya post-election violence coalition agreement in 2007.338 A credibility 
deficit of SADC’s mediation in Zimbabwe was the prevalent perceptions which saw the mediation 
effort as a bilateral issue between South Africa and Zimbabwe since the mediation team on the 
ground was wholly South African with little involvement of the SADC secretariat. Further, the 
whole team including the mediator were members of the ruling ANC in South Africa which is a 
close ally the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. SADC was also ill equipped in as far as policy instruments 
were concerned. The mediation in Zimbabwe was an electoral dispute and SADC guidelines for 
democratic elections are not legally binding. Related to that the guidelines hold that electoral 
disputes should be solved only through national laws. As such, all SADC could do was to 
encourage the parties to comply with the guidelines without the legal muscle to enforce them.339 
SADC’s conflict transformation efforts in Zimbabwe were also hamstrung by the fact that the 
security sector in the country is highly politicized largely in favour of the ruling party. Opposition 
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parties have often decried human rights abuses at the hands of the security sector.340 Apart from 
the training offered through the RPTC and the regular regional joint military and security exercises 
there is very little that SADC can do to rein in on the wayward ways of the country’s security 
apparatus without infringing on its sovereign independence. This can only be achieved from within 
the country through independent and democratic civilian oversight of the security sector. SADC 
was widely criticized by the west for endorsing the results of the 2013 Zimbabwe elections. SADC 
itself had in fact previously attempted in vain to advise Zimbabwe to postpone the election date 
until all conditions provided for in the GPA had been met. However a ruling by Zimbabwe’s 
Supreme Court gave the ruling party ammunition to continue with the election amidst the 
prevailing conditions arguing that a postponement would be unconstitutional. Divisions appeared 
within the ranks of SADC itself as member states such as Botswana rejected the election outcome 
describing it as flawed and later vowing to stay away from future SADC election observer missions 
because they fail to comply with the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and 
Observation in the SADC region. 
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SADC’s Conflict Transformation Achievements in Zimbabwe 
The question of whether or not SADC had the capacity to transform the conflict in Zimbabwe can 
be answered in the affirmative in as far as it had established a strong normative framework prior 
to the conflict. This included the SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards (2001), the 
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa/ Electoral Commissions Forum (2003) and the SADC 
Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004) all of which enjoin member 
states to observe best practices in elections.341 The 2008 election outcome in Zimbabwe was 
disputed by the opposition and rejected by SADC leading to a SADC led mediation process which 
resulted in a Global Political Agreement (GPA) being signed. SADC has therefore employed 
mediation as a tool for conflict transformation in Zimbabwe.  
The GPA provided a framework for the parties to address all the issues that had been a source of 
discord for all parties for many years. Although it proved to be a difficult process for two strange 
bed fellows, the GPA represented a major milestone in SADC efforts. It resulted in the formation 
of a Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 which included all the three parties to the 
conflict being the MDC-Tsvangirai, MDC-Mutambara and the ruling Zanu-PF of President Robert 
Mugabe. In the GNU, the MDC-T was allocated the post of Prime Minister while MDC-M was 
allocated the Deputy Prime Minister seat. ZANU-PF retained the post of President.342  
A key conflict transformation feat was that the GNU framework provided the parties with a 
platform for regular interactions and a forum for dialogue on the most difficult issues that lay at 
the heart of the conflict. At the early stages of the mediation the SADC mediator successfully 
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brokered some key reforms which were instrumental to reducing the levels of pre-election violence 
prior to the March 2008 elections.343 Further SADC declared the results of the run off Presidential 
elections which were boycotted by the opposition as neither free nor fair as they were effectively 
a one man race. This set into motion a process which led to the signing of the GPA with SADC as 
the guarantors together with the AU. Initially criticized for complicity and lack of firmness, SADC 
appeared to harden its position in January 2011 when the international affairs advisor to SADC 
Mediator, Lindiwe Zulu made public statements urging the conflict parties to take the GPA issue 
seriously and speed up the implementation of the GPA. This was supported later on that year by 
the Troika Summit of the OPDSC which expressed its disappointment and impatience at the slow 
pace of talks and the looming risk of relapse into crisis in Zimbabwe.344  
The process initially facilitated by then South African President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of SADC, 
later succeeded by President Jacob Zuma ultimately resulted in a collectively owned revised 
constitution. The constitution was met by widespread support from the parties and the population 
at large. SADC efforts in this regard are worth pointing out since numerous attempts at amending 
the constitution to make it more inclusive and representative had previously failed.  
This was followed by a referendum which led to the 2013 elections. The elections which were 
overwhelmingly won by the ruling ZANU-PF were generally less violent although the opposition 
MDC disputed the outcome. Their main contention was that the elections were not fair since they 
had failed to comply with some of the key provisions of the GPA. Despite the flawed electoral 
process, SADC at least saw through the implementation of the GPA culminating in an election 
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which SADC observers described as “free and peaceful” deliberately remaining silent on the 
question of their fairness. SADC’s conflict transformation capacity is improving as it currently in 
the process of setting up a mediation unit which ought to be equipped with both human and 
financial resources. SADC is credited with persevering and sustaining the marriage of the GNU 
despite the odds in the process halting an imminent implosion in Zimbabwe. 
4.4.3 A mini case study of Lesotho: Mapping A SADC Conflict Transformation success story in the 
Lesotho 2007 Post Election Violence and SADC’s Intervention 
Historical and Contextual Background  
Lesotho is a small and unique Southern African country wholly surrounded by its bigger neighbour 
South Africa. Popularly known as the “Mountain Kingdom” or “The Kingdom in the Sky” due to 
its mountainous terrain and its high altitude, it is one of the few remaining constitutional 
monarchies in Africa. Lesotho attained independence from Britain in 1966 under the rule of King 
Moshoeshoe II and Chief Leabua Jonathan of the Basotho National Party (BNP) as the Prime 
Minister after winning the first Post-independence elections. Lesotho’s democratic gains were 
however short lived as the country has for more than three decades thereafter been mired in a series 
of election related conflicts and violence.345  
In 1970, the opposition Basutoland Congress Party won the elections but the ruling BNP of Chief 
Leabua Jonathan suspended the constitution, sent the King into temporary exile, killed and silenced 
political opponents effectively banning all political activity in the country. After nearly two 
decades of rule under a state of emergency, the army over threw Chief Leabua Jonathan in a coup 
                                                 
345 UNDP, 2012, Lessons Learned in the Mediation of the Electoral Dispute in Lesotho, Joint UNDP-DPA 
Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, UNDP, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery (BCPR), Pg.17 
183 
 
and replaced him with Major General Justin Lekhanya. In 1991 General Lekhanya was overthrown 
by Colonel Elias Tutsoane Ramaema who lifted the ban on political activity, re-establishing 
democracy and paving way for the first democratic elections in the country since 1970 which were 
won by the Basutoland Congress Party. Political party splits which became a pervasive feature of 
Lesotho’s politics reared their head in 1997 when the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) split and 
and off shoot, party the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) was formed.346  
Following this split, the romping into victory of the newly formed LCD party in the 1998 elections 
saw a return of violence to Lesotho’s politics. The newly elected Prime Minister Phakalitha 
Mosisili received a baptism of fire as he presided over what was perhaps the most violent episode 
of Post-election violence in the history of the country. Opposition parties who protested the results 
incited mass rioting which burned down large sections of the capital Maseru. The government then 
appealed to SADC for help resulting in the controversial deployment of military forces by South 
Africa and Botswana purportedly under the auspices of SADC to restore law and order in the 
country. Under the supervision of SADC a Multiparty Interim Political Authority (IPA) was 
established to review the electoral process and organize the next elections.347 
In 2001 the parties adopted a new electoral model, the Mixed Member Parallel (MMP) political 
system which is a variation of the Proportional Representation model which advantages or rewards 
minority political parties. This was seen as a solution to the 1998 disputed election outcome which 
used the First Past the Post (FPTP) or Winner takes all electoral system which the opposition 
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castigated for its encouragement of a predominant party system. It was also criticized for favouring 
incumbents in office and excluding opposition and minority parties therefore resulting in an 
election outcome that doesn’t reflect the true will of the cross section of society. In May 2002, 
elections were held using the new (MMP) system. Won by the ruling LCD and endorsed by 
international observers, the election outcome was rejected by the opposition calling the outcome 
fraudulent. They were ultimately accepted by all the Basotho. In April 2005 the ruling LCD 
suffered another split where the former Communications Minister, Thomas Thabane led 17 other 
MPs to leave LCD to form a new party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC). 
 
Photograph 6: Interview with The Right Honourable Lesao Lehoohla, Former Deputy Prime 
Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho and Government Lead Negotiator, Mafeteng, Lesotho 
(August 31, 2013) 
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The SADC Intervention in Lesotho 
In the 2007 elections the ruling LCD won the parliamentary elections taking 61 of the 80 
constituencies. The opposition parties cried foul arguing that the LCD formed a pre-election 
alliance with a smaller party the NIP and instructed its supporters to vote in a way that manipulated 
the MMP system. Further infuriating the opposition, the LCD named its coalition partner, NIP as 
the official opposition. The loopholes in the MMP system exploited by the LCD had rewarded 
NIP, a little known and very small party with a limited following to be the party with the second 
highest number of votes. Although the main opposition party, the ABC had itself gone into an 
“informal alliance” with another smaller party the Basotho Workers Party (BWP) they rallied other 
opposition parties to vehemently prevent the LCD’s move which would effectively install a ruling 
party’s alliance partner into the position of the main opposition in parliament. Among a plethora 
of other factors, this proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back as opposition protests 
culminated in a 2day long general strike which paralysed the public transport system and 
threatened to bring the country to its knees. 
Incidentally during the general strike action, SADC’s Executive Secretary Thomas Salomao was 
in Lesotho for some SADC meetings, acting swiftly to contain the increasingly restive situation he 
held emergency talks with the government and the main parties involved assuring them that SADC 
would intervene to mediate and restore normalcy. The SADC Executive Secretary had been on 
some SADC mandated consultations on the country’s post electoral political developments on the 
18th March 2007. Later on in the month, at its meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the Summit of 
Heads of State and Government took a decision mandating the Organ Troika at Ministerial level 
to conduct an assessment of the post electoral situation in Lesotho with a view to making 
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recommendations to the chairperson of the SADC OPDSC, H.E. Jakaya Kikwete, President of 
Tanzania. 
The ministerial Troika of the OPDSC undertook its working mission to Lesotho from 11-14 April 
2007 with the aim of implementing the decision of the SOHSG. The ministerial mission met and 
received briefings from various stakeholders, including; the Government of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho; the Independent Electoral Commission; opposition political parties; the ruling party; the 
Deputy Speaker of parliament and the Deputy Clerk of the National Assembly; members of the 
diplomatic corps accredited to Lesotho; the Lesotho Council of Churches; former members of the 
Media Monitoring Panel and Election facilitation group and various civil society groups.348 
Core Conflict issues 
The Ministerial troika of the OPDSC identified the following as the core conflict issues from the 
findings of its consultations; opposition parties argued that the MMP system was unfairly 
implemented in the 2007 elections; they further decried the unfair allocation of parliamentary seats 
with one opposition party the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) taking the matter up in court; 
another issue was the controversies surrounding the alliances between the LCD and NIP, the 
latter’s internal power struggles and court battles involving its president and secretary general; the 
ACP staged a sit in in parliament after their request for the LCD/NIP alliance to be discussed in 
parliament and for the NIP leader Manyeli to be sworn in as an MP were turned down; the ABC 
called for a three day stay away which was called off on the second day following their meeting 
with SADC’s Executive Secretary. Another finding was concerns raised about the unruly 
                                                 
348 SADC, 2007, Assessment Report of the SADC Ministerial Troika Mission of the Organ on Politics Defence and 
Security Cooperation to the Kingdom of Lesotho from 11th – 14th April 2007, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, 
Botswana, Pg. 1-2 
187 
 
behaviour of youth supporters of opposition parties which tended to stoke the flames of the highly 
charged environment pre, during and in the post-election period. Further, the ministerial mission 
noted that some parties had violated the code of conduct governing the elections. Irregularities 
were also identified in the reappointment of ministers who had lost the 2007 elections by the LCD 
since their names were also included in the NIP party list. The opposition decried this as an 
imposition of these ministers on the voters. Finally another identified challenge perpetuating the 
conflict was the lack of communication among the political leaders.349 
Taking into account the input of other stakeholders they met in Maseru including offers of 
technical support and possible funding from the UNDP Country Representative, German 
Ambassador, US Ambassador, the Ministerial Troika of the OPDSC made the following 
recommendations to the chair of the OPDSC, that;  
i) The chairperson of the organ in consultation with the Troika of the organ urge the 
government of the Kingdom of Lesotho to initiate a formal political dialogue with a 
view to resolving the political problems between the opposition parties and the ruling 
party. 
ii) SADC should facilitate the internal political dialogue. 
iii) SADC may consider nominating one of its “Eminent Persons” from the ex-Presidents 
to facilitate and supervise the process of the political dialogue. 
iv) SADC should urge all political stakeholders to respect the outcome of the democratic 
elections and address their existing political differences peacefully through dialogue. 
v) A formal request should be made by SADC and the government of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho to UNDP, the governments of Germany and the USA for financial and 
technical assistance. 
vi) The process for internal dialogue in Lesotho should start immediately to pre-empt the 
possibility of repeated waves of tension.350 
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The above were commendable recommendations on the part of SADC reflecting its commitment 
to transforming the conflict in Lesotho timeously as well as precluding the possibility of violence. 
In this spirit, the SADC Organ Ministerial Troika at its meeting held from 25-26th May 2007 in 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania approved the above recommendations of the Organ Ministerial Troika 
assessment report on Lesotho’s post electoral political climate which proposed that the formal 
political dialogue be initiated as well as the appointment of an eminent person to facilitate the 
dialogue process as a mediator. The chairperson of the OPDSC, thus appointed H.E Sir Ketumile 
Masire, the former President of the Republic of Botswana as the SADC eminent person to facilitate 
the dialogue. 
The terms of reference of the eminent person’s mission were to;  
i) Hold consultative meetings with all the relevant stakeholders  
ii) Develop the structure plan for the dialogue 
iii) Initiate dialogue between the ruling party, opposition parties and the relevant 
stakeholders  
iv) Facilitate the dialogue process  
v) Compile a report of the dialogue process for submission to the chairperson of the organ 
and for presentation to the government of Lesotho and other stakeholders.351 
 
Sir Ketumile Masire undertook seven missions to Lesotho over a two year period starting in mid 
June, 2007 until July 2009 when he relinquished his assignment.352  The main agenda of the 
dialogue process revolved around six issues; 
 An enabling environment for a successful dialogue  
 Consideration of certain democratic parliamentary processes  
 The status of lection related court cases versus the need to facilitate the dialogue 
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When Elephants, Preventing and Resolving Election Related conflicts in Africa, Johannesburg, EISA, Pg.206  
189 
 
 Reviewing and safe guarding the MMP model and agreeing on the process of doing so 
 Review of dialogue process and outcomes 
 Institutionalisation of a sustainable culture of dialogue, a code of conduct and political 
tolerance.353  
 
 
Photograph 7: Interview with H.E Sir QKJ Masire, Former President of Botswana (1980 – 1998) 
and former SADC Eminent Person to Lesotho (August 2, 2013), Gaborone, Botswana 
 
Achievements of SADC’s Mediation 
SADC intervened timeously to contain the situation before it became explosive by bringing the 
conflicting parties to the negotiating table and subjecting them to a framework of dialogue over a 
two year period. Although the peace was fragile SADC demonstrated its capacity to transform the 
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conflict sending numerous delegations to Lesotho starting with the Executive Secretary on 18th 
March 2007, the Ministerial Troika of the OPDSC on 11-14 April 2007 and seven missions by the 
SADC Eminent Person, Sir Ketumile Masire between June 2007 and July 2009. The SADC 
SOHSG in Kinshasa DRC, on 8th September 2009 persuaded Masire to stay on as Mediator to 
which he reluctantly agreed provided his terms of reference were revised and only if all the parties 
agreed.354 
The Christian Council of Lesotho Take Over of the Mediation 
Even beyond the resignation of SADC Eminent Person, Masire on 9th July 2009, SADC remained 
seized with the Lesotho situation as evidenced by a mission to Lesotho undertaken by the SADC 
OPDSC Troika on 21 – 22 February 2010 headed by Mozambican President, Armando Guebuza, 
including King Mswati III of Swaziland and Zambian minister of Defence Kalombo Mwanza. The 
delegation met all the key stakeholders with a view to rekindle the SADC mediation. At the end 
they committed SADC’s support to the CCL.355 
A major deficiency in SADC’s CT capacity was exposed when the vacuum created by the 
resignation of it’s mediator became a breeding ground for violence. This was accentuated by the 
high treason charges laid against five individuals for attacks on the home of the leader of opposition 
and cabinet ministers in October 2007. In 2009, the Prime Minister also survived an assassination 
attempt although there was no clear connection to the electoral dispute.356To fill in the void left by 
SADC, in July 2009a group of NGO leaders met with key political leaders to the dispute and 
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convinced them to participate in talks, to be chaired by national heads of churches. At this critical 
transition stage, SADC had dropped the mediation baton as it had made no official commitment 
to support the local parties yet.357 Such a commitment was only made in February 2010 by the 
Guebuza led SADC OPDSC Troika mission to Lesotho. 
When SADC mediator Masire resigned, SADC further demonstrated its commitment to 
transforming the context, actors and structure of the conflict by committing through its Troika that; 
-SADC will support the CCL of Lesotho in its role as mediator in the post-electoral 
dialogue; 
-SADC will appoint, with immediate effect, a team of facilitators to assist the CCL, 
providing  
technical support and facilitating communication with the relevant SADC structures; 
-SADC will assist in mobilizing financial resources to support the mediation process.358  
 
Although helpful, such an intervention had been taken by the interventions of other actors, in 
particular the UN resident team in Maseru. Through the UN Interagency Framework Team and the 
UNDP Regional Service Center in Johannesburg, South Africa and support from the UN Bureau 
on Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the UN Department of Political Affairs the UN 
appointed a Peace and Development Advisor especially assigned to expand the mediation capacity 
of the local CCL team.359  
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This was part of the joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict 
prevention which was launched in 2004. The programme has ended UNDP and DPA to collaborate 
on conflict prevention initiatives in the field,  
…with a goal of strengthening national capacities for dialogue, mediation, and 
reconciliation. Over the past eight years, the joint programme has made a contribution to 
violence free elections or referenda in countries as diverse as Guyana, Ghana, Kenya, 
Sierra Leone, Benin, Togo, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, the Solomon Islands and Lesotho. It has 
assisted the resolution of specific conflicts or deadlocks in Nigeria, Lesotho, Bolivia, 
Ghana and Kenya; helped sustain platforms for dialogue or conflict resolution in Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Fiji, Georgia, Ukraine and Malawi and supported initiatives to reduce 
insecurity in Ecuador, Mauritania, and Bangladesh.360 
From this point on UN efforts in Lesotho appear to have eclipsed SADC’s input and visibility. The 
above described UN intervention also deliberately opted for a discreet behind the scenes role 
ensuring that all credit goes to the local mediation team. SADC lost an opportunity to truly 
transform the conflict in Lesotho by not officially collaborating with the UN at this point. This is 
possibly due to the tension and legal lacunae that exists in international law where there are no 
clear guidelines on how to operationalize the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity to 
inform collaboration efforts between the UN and RECs.  
Given the ultimate success of the CCL led mediation effort which culminated in the successful 
May 26th 2012 elections, it would appear that the ultimate credit is due to the UN although this 
point is open for debate. The UN team through its internal structures maintained a poised and 
experienced posture in the manner that they discretely capacitated the local actors to successfully 
carryout the mediation, allowing them to take credit in the end. This is in line with the conflict 
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transformation principle of local ownership which increases the chances of an effective, locally 
owned and sustainable peace. 
 
 
Photograph 8:  Interview with Arch Bishop Lerotholi – Arch Bishop of Maseru & One of the 
Lead Civil Society Mediators in Post 2007 Peace Talks, Maseru (30-08-13) 
 
In August 2009, talks began at UN House in Maseru, Lesotho chaired by four Heads of churches, 
supported by a UN funded technical team of local NGO leaders. In the year 2010 the talks yielded 
modest results due to the poor attendance of parties and the talks yielded modest results due to the 
poor attendance of parties and the dwindling commitment of the facilitators. A key breakthrough 
publicly brokered by the UN Resident Commissioner was the meeting between then main 
opposition leader and current Prime Minister, Thomas Thabane and the head of the IEC. In the 
meeting, Thabane, apologized to the IEC head for criticizing her and climbed down from his earlier 
194 
 
position of boycotting the 2012 elections. Further, the UN broke the deadlock over the electoral 
law tensions which had stalled talks by flying in a UN-DPA Electoral Assistance Division expert 
in March 2011 who successfully guided the parties to a solution.361 
 
Photograph 9: Interview with Mr Sekhonyana Bereng – Special Advisor to the Prime Minister – 
Kingdom of Lesotho, Maseru (01-09-13) 
 
In the tense build up to the 2012 elections, the UN-DPA took the IEC Commissioners on a two 
day retreat to resolve their personal conflicts to secure the integrity of the elections. It also 
facilitated the hosting of six dialogue sessions in (February – May 2012) hosted by the Heads of 
Churches and attended by all party leaders described as “Prayer Breakfasts”. This followed the 
assassination of the Deputy Leader of the main opposition party the ABC in February 2012. A 
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tense atmosphere had followed the assassination with protesters throwing rocks at the Prime 
Minister’s rallies resulting in serious injuries.362  
On the eve of elections on April 27th 2012, the UNDP facilitated the attendance of Nobel Laureate 
and high profile South African cleric Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu to oversee the signing of an 
Electoral Pledge of good conduct and acceptance of the election outcome. The UNDP printed and 
distributed hundreds of large posters of the pledge and placed full page advertisements in 
newspapers just prior to the election. A defining moment for the mediation was the successful 
holding of elections on 26th May 2012 which were judged free and fair although they resulted in a 
hung parliament. 
The CCL mediation continued in the post-election period where the CCL with support of the UN 
convened party leaders to resolve tensions over a hung parliament and the process for the formation 
of a new government. These talks resulted in the swearing in of the new Prime Minister on the 8th 
June 2012, a pledge by the former Prime Minister to accept his new position as a member of the 
“loyal opposition”, the first ever constitutional transfer of power and the first ever coalition 
government in the history of the country. 
In light of the above credit is clearly due to the local religious leaders and the UN for transforming 
the conflict and leading the parties to a successful and relatively peaceful election. Some members 
of the NGO technical team decried the fact that SADC came to the party too little too late in 
providing some funds for technical support which they also didn’t use due to some tensions over 
the allocation the funds.363 SADC appeared on the scene again only in the period immediately 
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prior to the 2012 elections to assess the country’s readiness for the elections.364 To their credit, 
SADC may have intended to maintain a distance from the CCL mediation to avoid interfering with 
the process but in the process inadvertently created a perception of negligence. UN Secretary 
General ban Ki Moon hailed Lesotho’s mediation process as a success and a model for other 
African countries following the successful 2012 elections.365 
A key shortcoming in SADC’s intervention in Lesotho is however that the mediation efforts only 
went skin deep in addressing the challenges confronting the country. Although it has to a degree 
reduce the politicisation of the defence and police forces in Lesotho through its interventions over 
the years, capacity of the justice and correctional services remain major concerns.366 SADC ought 
to have explored the deeper social, economic and political factors linked to past conflicts in 
Lesotho whose residual effect creates a potential for a relapse into future conflicts. Recent reports 
in July 2014 of the Prime Minister Thomas Thabane suspending parliament for nine months to 
avert a motion of no confidence on him by his allies in the ruling coalition point to this fact. A 
sternly worded warning from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South 
Africa cautioning the army against a coup are instructive. SADC ought to seek innovative ways of 
building Lesotho’s capacity to engender a culture that rejects violence and embrace politics 
grounded on tolerance, political maturity and respects for democratic institutions and the will of 
the citizens. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Although the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the euphoria of newly democratized states 
in the region and throughout the continent, it ushered in new types of conflicts within states as 
previously marginalized groups found space to voice out their concerns about their injustice, 
marginalization and exclusion which became peace threatening factors. As shown in this chapter 
the nature of conflicts changed from being interrelated and border related to being governance 
related intra state conflicts. These conflicts have also been the result of the inability of governments 
to accommodate and effectively reconcile the national, political, economic and socio-cultural 
contradictions within their states. In cases such as the DRC, this has been most pronounced in the 
poor to non-existent infrastructure in border territories which has become a breeding ground for 
criminality by militia and rebel groups from both within and neighbouring countries. These 
conflicts have had a domino effect which has served to destabilize the two regions of the Great 
Lakes and Southern Africa.367 
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CHAPTER 5  
A Critical Assessment of the Human Security aspects of SADC’s Conflict 
Transformation Capacity 
5.1 Introduction 
In line with the stated goal of this research, this chapter sets out to assess SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity. It focusses its attention on the Human Security aspects of SADC’s 
conflict transformation capacity. This it intends to achieve by using Human Security as its point 
of entry based on its role in the transformation of conflict. The chapter then proceeds to identify 
the human security challenges confronting SADC in order to clarify the steps taken by SADC to 
contain the challenges. The work of SADC’s institutions with a mandate to discharge human 
security related functions is outlined and assessed with a view to identifying gaps and opportunities 
for strengthening their capacity. At the end the chapter suggests a framework to be adopted at the 
various stages of a conflict which could serve to strengthen SADC’s capacity to meet the human 
security needs of the region particularly in pre-conflict, mid-conflict, transitional and stabilization 
phases of conflict situations. 
5.2 The nature of Human Security tasks in Peace time and in conflict situations 
The goals of human security vary depending on the operational environment during peace time 
and in conflict situations. In a conflict situation human security tasks manifest through 
humanitarian aid work provided to transform the conflict. During a conflict, humanitarian aid 
workers provide emergency humanitarian aid and medical care to victims of war. Peace-builders 
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on the other hand have a preoccupation with transforming the conflict by offering physical 
protection to civilians, terminating the conflict through humanitarian intervention, employing 
various efforts to build durable peace such as establishing reliable governance structures and 
maintaining social stability.368 Humanitarian aid and peace-building are thus different but essential 
components of human security. The goals of peace-building and humanitarian aid overlap in that, 
the establishment of durable peace is a prerequisite for meeting humanitarian needs while on the 
other hand, the elimination of humanitarian disasters is a foundation for a peaceful society. 369  
5.2.1 Human Security 
Human Security has been broadly defined as a term that encompasses economic security, food 
security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and 
political security.370 Despite the above definition, some non-traditional approaches to the study of 
security have however retained the state as the referent object of study while broadening their 
analysis of the threats to the state to include, economic, societal, environmental, and political 
security challenges.371 The individual has however been retained as ‘the irreducible base unit’ for 
explorations of security while the state remains the referent object for security as it is the central 
actor in international politics and the principal agent for addressing security.372 For the reason that 
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human security is premised on the interconnectedness between security, development and 
democracy, the concept requires a security sector that is responsive to the needs of its citizens to 
ensure that they are free from fear.373 
Omari gives texture and a human face to the concept in quoting the Bonn Declaration of 1991 
which describes human security as “the absence of threat to human life, lifestyle and culture 
through the fulfilment of basic needs”.374 A more comprehensive definition of the concept is given 
by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the Commission for Human Security report. In his 
explanation of the concept, “human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than absence 
of violence. It encompasses human rights, good governance, and access to education and health 
care and ensuring each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own 
potential”.375  
The most common way that governments the world over meet the human security needs of their 
citizens is through the provision of Social Services. Failure to perform this function has often 
resulted in protests and in extreme cases revolution as seen in the Arab spring. In other extreme 
scenarios where states have failed to guarantee the social security of their citizens, the result has 
been a humanitarian emergency. The United Nations Peace dividends report of 2012 defines social 
services as organized efforts to advance human welfare and / social wellbeing, generally 
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understood as efforts provided by governments. This includes support provided by governments 
with regard to education, health, water and sanitation.376  
This research adopts the definition of social services outlined in the SADC Code on Social Security. 
In the code, social services are seen as being part of the broader concept of social protection which 
refers to public and private, or to mixed public and private measures designed to protect individuals 
against life-cycle crises that curtail their capacity to meet their needs. The overall objective being 
to enhance human welfare. Social protection encompasses social security, social services and 
developmental welfare.377 It should thus be seen as an investment which helps the poor escape 
social exclusion.378 It is against this backdrop that global calls encouraging governments and the 
international community to avail services such as, sanitation, water, education, health care and 
income security programmes to all, dubbed; a ‘social protection floor’ have emerged. 379  A 
discussion of the provision of social services would be incomplete without highlighting its links 
to overall development. The concept of Social development is the point of confluence for social 
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services and development. It is a form of human welfare that seeks to harmonise social policy and 
economic development.380  Social development has also been defined as;  
that aspect of overall development brought about by the coordinated effort 
of an interdisciplinary team of experts from governmental and non-
governmental institutions, with the active participation of the people as a 
whole, and is concerned with the qualitative and quantitative changes in 
social conditions aimed at enhancing levels of improvement in the level of 
living of individuals, groups and communities through such measures as 
social policy, social welfare, social services, social security, social 
administration, social work, community development and institution 
building through proper utilization of available resources.381  
A key deficiency identified in the social protection regimes of most SADC member states is that 
they are narrow and do not cover all the branches of social security. The social protection systems 
are also either un-developed or under developed, unemployment is one of the schemes that are not 
covered in SADC. This state of affairs is attributed to a lack of political will on the part of SADC 
leaders who hide behind the excuse of a lack of sufficient resources.382 Although this may be 
plausible in some cases, there is no demonstrable intention on the part of governments to 
progressively extend social security coverage. Unrealistic as it is to provide for everyone over-
night, gradual but progressive efforts need to be put in place to establish social protection systems 
that cover all aspects of social security.383 A recent report by Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 
reveals that eighty percent of the citizens in Zimbabwe are unemployed while 6 out of every 10 
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households live in abject poverty. This state of affairs is reported to be synonymous in many other 
SADC member states.384 
5.2.2 Matching goal of conflict transformation 
For purposes of this research, SADC’s conflict transformation capacity is put under the micro 
scope, its relevance comes into play in as far as it is understood to be a tool for achieving the goals 
of peacebuilding. In this sense, conflict transformation performs its peace-building role through 
its guiding principles of transforming the issues and structures of the conflict. Regarding ‘issues’, 
its focus is on redefining the issues that are central to the prevailing conflict and reformulating the 
position of key actors on those very issues. On the ‘structure’ of the conflict, the conflict 
transformation goal is “adjusting the prevailing structure of relationships, power distributions and 
socio-economic conditions that are embedded in and inform the conflict, thereby affecting the very 
fabric of interaction between previously incompatible actors, issues and goals”.385 With the above 
in mind, by pursuing the goals of conflict transformation, one indirectly meets the goals of human 
security. In like manner, by pursuing the goals of human security one indirectly meets the goals of 
conflict transformation. As such, we can conclude that conflict transformation is a tool of 
peacebuilding which together is a component of human security as described earlier.  
Long-term human security will only be achieved when peace-building succeeds in establishing 
local good governance and a stable society. Peace-building is thus concerned with the long term 
and group oriented goals of human security. The requirements of peace in a particular conflict 
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determine the demands of humanitarian aid. Peace-builders therefore need to incorporate 
humanitarian needs into the frameworks of their missions. Further, if the goals of conflict 
transformation are to be met, the activities of international actors ought to be well coordinated and 
to the extent possible efforts of the local people should be incorporated into the overall objectives 
of the mission.386 
Historically Peacebuilding has been defined as actions to identify and support structures which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. In this conception, 
efforts to rebuild peace are conceived of in the context of the aftermath of conflict as captured in 
Boutros Ghali’s famous “Agenda for Peace” report which captured the mood and thinking in the 
immediate Post Cold War era.387 According to the UN Secretary General’s policy committee, 
“peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing 
into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay 
the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent 
and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and 
should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities 
aimed at achieving the above objectives”.388  
A distillation of the main goals of most peacebuilding efforts is listed as; the need for a cease-fire 
to attain a cessation of hostilities, measures to prevent a relapse into hostilities by the warring 
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parties, including the prevention of new conflicts. Of immediate relevance to our discussion on 
human security and humanitarian aid are the goals of democracy, justice and equity which are seen 
as key pillars in most contemporary peacebuilding efforts. Although there exists a semblance of 
consensus about the above, there remains disagreement about their linkages and relative priority 
among each other.389  
The basic promise of Democracy is that the elected leaders will put in place measures to ensure 
that all citizens lead dignified lives with the enjoyment of amenities and social services that support 
the attainment of their life goals. Relatedly, social services are seen to be basic social and economic 
rights which all governments should uphold as per their commitment to international instruments, 
highlighting the pillar of Justice above.390 In the words of Bratton and Mattes (2004) the above is 
an instrumentalist definition of democracy where citizens’ support for democracy is conditional 
on its ability to deliver social development and improve living standards. Their findings suggest 
that Africans support democracy as an intrinsic value and an end in itself beyond instrumental 
considerations only to a limited extent, citing the case of South Africa where the ruling party 
continues to enjoy popular support despite its shortcomings in the delivery of basic services to the 
majority. 
South Africa remains an exception to the trend seen on the rest of the continent as the majority still 
have high hopes on the ruling African National Congress which only came to power in 1994 faced 
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with the mammoth task of reversing the decades old injustices of past minority white regimes.391 
Elsewhere on the continent citizens have grown disillusioned by repeated shattered hopes and 
promises made by politicians. They attribute this to the limited experience that the continent has 
had with democracy and elections and the failure of a democratic culture to take root in most 
African societies.   
5.3 SADC’s Human Security and Humanitarian aid challenges 
5.3.1 Human security challenges 
This section outlines the challenges encountered by ordinary citizens of SADC in their daily lives 
and the extent to which they live secure and dignified lives. It lays the foundation for an assessment 
of SADC’s capacity for conflict transformation where human security challenges are concerned. 
SADC’s human security challenges are identified with a view to assessing what the organization 
has done to change and improve the quality of life of its people.392 Although human security has 
found its way onto the SADC agenda, there is insufficient debate about the topic which is a sign 
that concern about the issue is not accompanied by political commitment. This state of affairs is a 
result of three factors; one, a lack of consensus on how to prioritize human security without 
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abandoning state security; two, over which security concerns should top the SADC agenda and 
lastly, what must be done to respond to human security challenges.393 
Human insecurity, poverty and underdevelopment have been identified as major challenges that 
remain to be overcome by the SADC region. The people in the SADC region have cultural 
similarities, some similarities have also been found in their low socio-economic status, this seems 
unlikely to improve at least in the foreseeable future due to the high levels of unemployment and 
underemployment in member states. 394  Economies in the region “have a high proportion of 
workers earning low wages in the formal sector, low labour absorption rates, and a large informal 
sector”.395  
HIV/AIDS is another key threat to the attainment of “SADC’s economic, social and political goals 
as the sub-region is the epicentre of the pandemic, with an average prevalence rate of 11% as 
compared to 1% for the rest of the world”.396 The above is further compounded by the high levels 
of inequality in the region with more than five countries of the region, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and 
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Zambia having a Gini – co-efficient of more than 50 as seen in table 1 below.397 The Gini-co-
efficient is a comparative measure of inequality (where zero represents perfect equality and 100 
perfect inequality), readings above 50 are deemed critical.398 This means that these SADC member 
states have some of the highest levels of inequality in the world. 
Table 8: Gini-Coefficients of Some SADC Member States 
Country (Year) 
Distribution of income or consumption, 2010 World 
Development 
Gini 
Index 
Percentage share of income or consumption 
Lowest 10 percent (%) Highest 10 percent (%) 
Botswana (2005 -06) 61.0 1.3 51.2 
DRC (2005-06) 44.4 2.3 34.7 
Lesotho (2002-03) 52.5 1.0 39.4 
Malawi (2004-05) 39.0 2.9 31.7 
Mozambique (2002-03) 47.1 2.1 39.2 
Namibia (1993) 74.3 0.6 65.0 
South Africa (2000) 57.8 1.3 44.9 
Swaziland (2000-01) 50.7 1.8 40.8 
Zambia (2004-05) 50.7 1.3 38.9 
Source: Muchena, 2011 
Although SADC and its member states have over the years put in place a variety of human security 
measures, some seemingly insurmountable challenges remain. Statistics on a variety of socio-
economic indicators in the region paint a chequered pattern where some member states have 
registered “pockets of excellence in a sea of significant weakness particularly in the area of social 
protection”. 399  Some member states have put in place complex multi-pillar approaches for 
providing social services to their citizens while some have only fragmented mechanisms of 
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provision. As Table 9 below shows, countries such as Mozambique, Madagascar and the DRC for 
instance still have a major problem of access to improved water.400 
Table 9: Summary of Selected Socioeconomic Indicators in SADC Countries 
Country HDI 
GINI 
Coefficient 
Access to 
Improved 
water 
Average% real 
GDP Growth 
1990 – 2008* 
GDP per capita 
(PPP) 
US$ 2006** 
Angola 0.564 58.64 51% 6.28 4, 631.44 
Botswana 0.694 60.96 96% 5.32 13, 474.95 
DRC 0.389 4443 46% -1.15 295.24 
Lesotho 0.514 52.5 78% 3.93 1, 183.81 
Madagascar 0.543 47.24 47% 2.74 879.43 
Malawi 0.493 39.02 76% 3.92 694.57 
Mauritius 0.804 - 100% 4.88 10, 446.49 
Mozambique 0.402 47.11 42% 6.41 782,57 
Namibia 0.686 74.33 93% 4.41 6, 009.12 
Seychelles 0.845 42.0 87% 3.63 18, 972.52 
South Africa 0.683 57.77 93% 2.68 9, 150.58 
Swaziland 0.572 50.68 60% 3.56 5, 202.86 
Tanzania 0.530 34.62 55% 4.79 1, 164.30 
Zambia 0.481 50.74 58% 2.61 1, 241.92 
Zimbabwe N/A 50.1 81% -0.51 9.65 
*Mean 3.57, Median 3.92; ** Mean US 4,942.63, Median US 1,241.92 
Source: Mupedziswa and Ntseane, 2012: 57401 
A combination of factors have been fingered for the failure of most SADC member states to meet 
the human security needs of their citizens as reflected in the above statistics. Chief among these is 
the sheer extent of poverty, dysfunctional labour markets and the colonial legacy inherited by 
SADC member states.402 Other factors which exacerbate the situation are social exclusion in the 
social protection systems of SADC member states, particularly in respect of the poor and informal 
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sector workers and a lack of comprehensive social protection systems in a majority of member 
states.403  
The region has continued to register poor results on the above indicators as shown in the 2013 HDI 
results where DRC is the worst ranked in the region at 186 closely followed by Mozambique (185) 
and Zimbabwe (172). Seychelles and Mauritius are the only two with scores below 100 having 
scored 46 and 80 respectively. This was the case for 2011 as well as shown in table 10 below. The 
HDI measures the life expectancy, education levels as well as income disparities of the surveyed 
countries. 404  There appears to be no clear correlation in these figures between the war torn 
countries and the performance of their more stable counterparts except for the case of the DRC. 
The findings show a more stable and reformed Mozambique, ranked amongst the fastest growing 
economies in the world faring worse than Zimbabwe which has suffered unprecedented levels of 
hyper-inflation and economic collapse in recent times. 
A key lesson to be learnt from the above statistics is that life for the ordinary citizens of the region 
is precarious. They are faced with important threats which have broadly been identified as; 
HIV/AIDS; socio-economic inequalities; gender inequalities; landlessness; bad governance; lack 
of resources and capacity; forced migration; poor development and democratization processes; 
destabilization; civil wars; state failure and natural disasters.405 Ordinary citizens in member states 
have to contend with food insecurity, both human-made and natural, due to droughts; people are 
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also threatened by their governments, even though there is no overt civil war and despite the fact 
that successive elections have been declared free and fair, e.g in Zimbabwe; people are threatened 
by low life expectancy due to diseases such as HIV/AIDS; the imminent threat of intra state 
conflict, disorder, destruction to human life (notably in the civil war in the DRC, the very slow 
peace process in Angola and the continuing implosion in Zimbabwe); there has also been a steady 
decline in the quality of life in most member states.406  
The above scenario is underpinned by a low coverage of social protection schemes in the region 
despite there being instruments like the SADC Social charter of 2003. This is attributable to the 
lack of political will which has resulted in inadequate budgetary allocation to the provision of 
social protection. Other causes are seen as; geographical coverage and poor targeting; poor 
governance; beneficiaries not being aware of their entitlements; inefficient record keeping; 
premature withdrawal of beneficiaries from programmes due to the cumbersome process of 
accessing benefits; since most programmes in member states are not linked to poverty alleviation, 
they have a minimum impact on social development; they are also elitist as they provide assistance 
to groups that need it the least; lastly most SADC member states are unable to provide 
comprehensive social protection measures.407 
The 2006/7 SADC Annual Report recorded a decline in the regional human development index 
(HDI) due to the high level of both communicable and non-communicable diseases and high 
poverty levels reflected by limited access to social services like education, health and work 
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opportunities.408 According to the report, 50% of the population in the SADC region lacked access 
to essential medicines and the life expectancy in the entire region was 39.7 years, the lowest in the 
world for that period. This gloomy picture notwithstanding, some policy measures within the 
framework of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programme (RISDP) were taken to 
address these challenges. At programmatic level, the report lists the; Maseru Declaration, NEPAD, 
Dakar goals, Second Decade of Education and the Millennium Development Goals.  
Table 10: HDI Rank of SADC Member States - 2011 
S. No. Country  HDI Rank 
1 Seychelles 52 
2 Mauritius 77 
3 Botswana 118 
4 Namibia 120 
5 South Africa 123 
6 Swaziland 140 
7 Angola 148 
8 Madagascar 151 
9 Tanzania 152 
10 Lesotho 160 
11 Zambia 164 
12 Malawi 171 
13 Zimbabwe 173 
14 Mozambique 184 
15 Democratic Republic of Congo 187 
Source: UNDP HDR 2011: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
The report also identifies the following as some of the policy and strategic frameworks developed 
to implement the above; SADC Malaria Strategic Framework; a Framework for the 
Operationalisation of the SADC HIV and AIDS Fund; a Business Plan for the Implementation of 
the Regional Pharmaceutical Programme including African Traditional Medicines; the SADC 
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Open and Distance Learning Programme, the SADC Declaration on Productivity; the SADC Code 
on Social Security and the SADC Protocols on Health, Education and Training.409   
5.3.2 Human Security and Conflict Transformation challenges requiring Humanitarian aid 
Most of the humanitarian aid needs and emergencies of the SADC region are the result of natural 
disasters and a limited number are conflict related, this is due to the relative peace that currently 
prevails in the region. Natural disasters have affected several countries simultaneously requiring 
collective regional action. Since the year 2000, the Southern African region has witnessed an 
increase in the frequency, magnitude and impact of droughts and floods. Adverse effects related 
to climate change are also expected to affect the region increasing the risks related to water 
resources, fire, and agriculture and food security. Climate change has also left island states such 
as Seychelles facing the danger of losing their protective reef barrier and threats of a sea level rise 
which could threaten their survival. This state of affairs is exacerbated by economic under-
development and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS all of which hamper the achievement of the 
Millennium Development goals.410 
The challenges requiring humanitarian aid in the SADC region are largely due to policies pursued 
by member states as well as deficiencies in long term development aid arrangements both at 
regional and at member state levels. The economic meltdown in Zimbabwe for instance has 
resulted in unrest and insecurity for ordinary Zimbabweans. The economic sanctions imposed on 
the country have over the years caused a series of humanitarian emergencies which have rendered 
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many Zimbabwean citizens illegal immigrants and economic refugees in neighbouring countries. 
The country has also since the sanctions and as a result of its controversial land redistribution 
programmme, experienced food shortages, an outbreak of diseases such as cholera and 
vulnerability of its citizens to HIV/AIDS.  
In another incident in 2005, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on a controversial exercise 
dubbed ‘Operation Murambatsvina - clear out the filth’. Rolled out ostensibly to rid Harare, the 
capital city of shacks, slums, shanty towns and illegal structures, the government mercilessly 
demolished housing and properties mostly belonging to the poor and unemployed precipitating an 
unprecedented humanitarian crisis where many were rendered homeless overnight. Of great 
concern, very few if any SADC member states criticized the Zimbabwean government for the 
direct threat it posed to its own citizens. This reflects the elitist identity of the SADC region which 
is characterized by the mutual protection of governments despite the security threats they may pose 
to their citizens.411 
Ordinarily, regular long term development assistance programmes extended both to SADC and 
Zimbabwe would be able to the extent possible address the above identified problems, however, 
this is unfortunately not the case. As shown above, a characteristic feature of SADC is its policy 
of not publicly criticizing other member states (silent diplomacy) as they have shown with the case 
of Zimbabwe.412 As a result of this most International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) have responded 
by reducing funding for SADC and opting to provide funding for parallel structures that voice 
condemnation for the Zimbabwe regime. A case in point is the United States Aid for International 
                                                 
411 Maxi Schoeman, 2006, Op. Cit. Pg. 257 
412 Zibani Maundeni, 2006 in Larona Makgoeng, SADC: Current State and Perspectives, in Kosler and Zimmek (eds), Global 
Voices on Regional Integration, Centre for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper C176, 2007, Pg. 39 
215 
 
Development (USAID) who stopped funding SADC because US legislation does not allow 
funding for organizations such as SADC who have Zimbabwe as a member since they have 
imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. This is unfortunate since SADC depends heavily on donor funds 
for survival, for instance, nearly 60% of the (2006 – 2007) budget of the SADC secretariat was 
provided for by foreign donors.413 Most donors have chosen to channel funds through individual 
member states and civil society groups bypassing SADC. This has the potential of eroding the 
legitimacy of SADC in the eyes of the donors.414 A key challenge for SADC therefore is to balance 
donor expectations such as those of the United States of America who put democracy and human 
rights as a condition for aid in Zimbabwe, with their search for autonomy. Failure to strike this 
balance would frustrate and ultimately paralyze the regions’ security cooperation efforts due to a 
lack of funding.415 
Against the above backdrop, the protracted implosion in Zimbabwe where ordinary citizens have 
been violently punished for their opposition to the regime has continued unabated. Despite there 
having been everything in place at least on paper to address the situation, SADC dragged its feet 
preferring a moderate carefully calculated and slow mediation approach instead. Although this 
resulted in the Government of National Unity (GNU) and ultimately the 2013 elections which were 
overwhelmingly won by the ruling ZANU-PF, the victory was a hollow one for the ordinary 
citizens of Zimbabwe. With the earlier described challenges having not been addressed, it does not 
look like their situation will improve any time soon. 
                                                 
413 Elling Tjonneland, 2006, Ibid. 
414 Buzdugan, 2006, Ibid. p. 40. The author quotes officials of the UNDP, European Commission and USAID in Gaborone as 
saying that national contributions have eclipsed support at regional level. 
415 Ibid. Pg. 41 
216 
 
To further complicate matters, 90 year old Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe was elected 
chairman of SADC in 2014, a move which proves that the old guard in the organization is still in 
charge. The prevailing state of affairs, is indicative of a circulation of elites and elite interests in 
the leadership of SADC. As the leadership continues to make a mockery of the organisation’s 
principles and objectives, it further alienates itself from the ordinary citizens of the region who 
cannot relate to the values and image forged by the elites. Regime security is pursued in the name 
of human security as the quality of life of ordinary people in SADC including in the richer and 
more developed countries like South Africa has deteriorated. In cases where economic growth has 
been registered, it has not been translated into economic development but growth that benefits only 
a small elite.416 Regarding the worsening inequality and the plight of the ordinary citizens in 
Zimbabwe, a leading economist in the country remarked: 
A privileged elite [has consolidated] its position to the point where its interests are best 
served by maintaining the status quo. A feature of Zimbabwe’s decline has been the shift 
in income and wealth from poor to rich and the associated near-elimination of the middle 
class.417 
In Johan Galtung’s conceptualization of violence, a low life expectancy is a clear indication of 
violence. In this way, poverty, underdevelopment and other social ills afflicting billions of people 
in developing countries can be seen as manifestations of violence.418 Violence ought not to be 
understood in the context of war and crisis only, in a more widened reading and conceptualization 
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of conflict and violence, Galtung sees violence as anything that produces a gap between the 
physical and mental potentials of human beings and their actual conditions.  
To Galtung, violence is a factor common to both war and social injustice; put differently, it does 
not matter whether one is killed in war or famine, the result is premature death which is a 
deprivation of one of the human potentials. This is how peace came to be defined as the absence 
of violence rather than war. This conception of violence presupposes distributive justice, the theory 
presupposes an ideal state in which goods and services available are distributed equally which 
makes the issue of structural violence, an issue of social justice as well.419 The thinking is that in 
as much as direct violence is produced by human actors, structural violence is produced without 
any human agency but impairs and reduces the human potentials in the forms of poverty and 
discrimination which are forms of social injustice.  
The SADC NGO Coalition focused on, Angola, DRC, Swaziland, Madagascar and Zimbabwe in 
its ‘Hot Spots tracker’ study of 2010. The study identified areas experiencing conflict in the region 
and makes recommendations of what ought to be done from a civil society perspective. 
Marginalisation of certain groups, rapid urbanization, rising unemployment, poverty and 
underdevelopment are singled out as the most pressing human security challenges in Southern 
Africa. Factors affecting societal security and triggers to conflict are listed as; politicized ethnicity, 
xenophobia, large scale economic migration, transnational crime syndication, droughts and 
flooding (which threaten large scale displacement of people), food shortages, natural disasters and 
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the spread of diseases. All these are compounded by water stress, with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Namibia projected to be water stressed by the year 2025.420  
Poverty, over-stocking, unsustainable land use, soil erosion and water stress are also said to be 
structural factors requiring sustained attention to avert deepening food shortages in the region. 
These challenges have manifested in high levels of inequality, jobless economic growth and 
unemployment of levels between (30-50% as at 2008) in countries like Botswana, South Africa, 
Mauritius and Namibia often viewed as better performing economies in the region. As a result, 
increased levels of criminality through poaching and illegal mining have been recorded in the DRC 
and Zimbabwe.421  
Countries such as Botswana have even deployed their armies into their anti-poaching programmes 
reflecting the gravity of the situation. The above scenario paints a picture of the constraints 
confronting the provision of social services in the region. The SADC-CNGO study on land reform, 
conflict and poverty eradication in the region identifies landlessness as an acute problem in the 
former colonial settler territories of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe where historically fertile 
farming land was the preserve of the white minority at the expense of the majority black 
populations who languished in the fringes. As a result of this legacy, access to land is still a major 
challenge in these countries as shown also by Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform programme. 
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This is an issue needing urgent attention as it has implications for food security and the general 
well-being of the citizen.422  
5.4 SADC’s Institutional Infrastructure in support of Human Security and 
Humanitarian challenges 
With the above human security challenges and areas needing humanitarian aid in mind, this section, 
traces and assesses the measures put in place by SADC to contain, mitigate and prevent the above 
challenges. Given the multi-disciplinary nature of human security and well as humanitarian relief, 
SADC has adopted a multi-pronged approach characterized by a number of its directorates and 
policy instruments which guide its work in ensuring human security and providing humanitarian 
relief. The concerned directorates discussed below are the Directorate of the Organ on Politics 
Defence and Security, Directorate on Social and Human Development and Special Programmes, 
Directorate of Infrastructure and Services and the Directorate on Food, Agriculture and Natural 
Resources. 
5.4.1 Directorate of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) 
Disaster Risk Reduction  
In 2007, heavy floods unexpectedly displaced more than a million people in Southern Africa, as a 
result SADC held annual meetings to prepare for future occurrences culminating in the formation 
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of a Disaster Risk Reduction Unit in 2011, located in the Politics and Diplomacy unit of the 
Directorate of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security.423 The Disaster Risk Reduction Unit is 
responsible for the coordination of regional preparedness and response programmes for trans-
boundary hazards and disasters.424  
SADC’s disaster risk reduction measures are aimed at; preparedness, mitigation, response, 
rehabilitation and recovery. It is pursued as a multi-disciplinary enterprise through the collective 
efforts of stakeholders and partners such as national governments, non-governmental organisations, 
International Cooperating Partners, donors, civil society and the private sector. The above efforts 
are however hamstrung by a lack of funding and poor coordination of disaster risk reduction 
frameworks at the regional, national as well as local / community level. Other challenges are a lack 
of comprehensive and constantly updated risk assessments and analysis; weak information and 
knowledge management systems, specifically in high risk areas; and the need to reduce underlying 
risk factors. SADC has mostly experienced small but recurrent disasters which have caused more 
damage cumulatively than large scale events which draw more international media attention. These 
have adversely affected communities recovering from previous disasters.425   
The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) underscores cooperation in 
food security policy, effective disaster preparedness aimed at early detection, early warning and 
mitigation of disaster effects. While SADC has not developed a protocol on disaster risk reduction 
or management, it has programmes in place rolled out through the following units; the Climate 
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Services Centre; Water Programmes; Natural Resources Management Programme; Regional 
Remote Sensing Unit and the Regional Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment Programme 
Management Unit. A number of pre-existing protocols provide policy direction in the area of 
disaster risk reduction and management, this is a result of its multi-disciplinary nature. They are, 
the Protocol on Health (1999)426; Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation427; the 
Regional Water Policy (1995)428; the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons; SADC 
Disaster Risk Reduction Pre-season Planning Workshop Outcomes and Recommendations, 2010 
and the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Update (published monthly). The key regional disaster 
risk management partners and International Cooperating Partners that SADC works with are: the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR); United Nations Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction; UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit; Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.429 
Early Warning 
As shown above, SADC has taken steps to establish an early warning capability, this is vital for 
purposes of human security as well as for SADC to possess capacity for early detection, early 
warning and mitigation of disaster effects in the region. Although not explicitly spelt out in the 
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language of human security, such a capability has the potential of preventing large scale 
humanitarian catastrophes in the region as well as mitigating their effects through early detection. 
SADC’s early warning capability forms part of its Regional Early Warning System which 
integrates inputs from National Early Warning Centres (NEWCs) and the Regional Early Warning 
Centre (REWC). The REWC derives its mandate from SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan of the 
Organ (SIPO) on peace, security and defence.  
The Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) in July 2004, mandated the Troika of the Organ 
to initiate the establishment of the REWC in two phases, Phase I, which dealt with the concept, 
structure working system, administrative and financial issues and Phase II which focused on the 
operationalization of the centre. Aimed at strengthening SADC’s mechanisms for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution as per the provisions of the protocols on politics, defence 
and security cooperation, the REWC was officially launched on 12th July 2010.430 The functions 
of the REWC are to, compile strategic assessment and analysis of data collected at regional level; 
share information on major issues posing a threat to security and stability of the region; and 
propose ways and means for preventing, combating and managing such threats. The REWC also 
serves as the hub links the National Early Warning Centres of member states and the Continental 
Early Warning Centre (CEWC) of the African Union.431 
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Civil Society  
Van nieuwkerk (2001) suggests that in pursuit of the human security agenda in the SADC and 
ECOWAS regions, the non-state sector needs to be roped in. He identifies, civil society groups, 
non-governmental organizations, business interests and organized labour as stakeholders who 
ought to be involved in collaborative regional peacemaking efforts to avoid a stalemate or 
failure.432 Some progress has been made in this regard with the formation of the SADC Council of 
Non- Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) which is made up of NGO mother bodies from 
15 SADC member states. It was formed in 1998 and has as its aims; the coordination of civil 
society engagement with SADC at regional and national levels, awareness raising through 
advocacy and campaigns, placing human security on the regional agenda of SADC and civil 
society organizations, influencing policy, exerting pressure, monitoring SADC’s implementation 
and adherence to protocols and declarations on human security issues as well as monitoring 
integration.433  
To steer its development agenda, the basis upon which human security is provided, in 2003 SADC 
crafted the Regional Indicative Development Plan (RISDP) which is a 15 year long framework to 
guide interventions to overcome the challenges identified in this research. The RISDP is 
underpinned by the Strategic Indicative Development Plan of the Organ (SIPO) which serves to 
operationalize the goals of the RISDP over a five year period. SIPO I was adopted in 2004 and 
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was recently reviewed and re-launched as SIPO II in November 2012, its aim is to promote 
democracy, the observation of universal human rights and conflict prevention. It has been critiqued 
for being a voluntary political agreement of member states which isn’t legally binding and that 
large parts of it remain unchanged from SIPO I. Another criticism is that SADC only has national 
coordinating committees in select member states which will impede the implementation of SIPO 
II making it difficult to evaluate SIPO in an inconsistent manner among member states.434  
The delay in operationalizing the Regional early Warning System (REWS) launched in 2012 is 
seen as an impediment for the early detection and prevention of conflicts within the region. This 
is further compounded by the recent decision of the Heads of state summit to remove Human rights 
adjudications from the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal which leaves citizens in the region with 
no regional recourse for justice since SADC has no human rights courts.435  
The Peacebuilding department is the least active unit within the Organ on Politics Defence and 
Security (OPDS), from inception it has preoccupied with tasks that do not directly fit the mould of 
traditional peacebuilding such as the Universal Visa project in collaboration with the Regional 
Tourism Association (RETOSA) as well as refugee related programmes jointly with the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugess (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for 
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Migration (IOM).436 There is no running Demining programme at present due to a lack of funds, 
the last such prgramme was funded by the European Union in the 1990s. This is despite that a few 
member states are still in need of demining, these include, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and 
DRC. A proposal by a 2009 heads of state Summit to set up a peacebuilding office in the DRC has 
been stalled.437 
The directorate of OPDS has been criticized for being too secretive to the extent that other 
directorates are often in the dark about its activities and plans. This is made worse by the fact that 
the directorate seldom if ever consults or collaborates with other SADC directorates. As such the 
directorates are not linked in their human security and humanitarian aid related work. The situation 
is compounded by the fact that the reporting lines of the OPDS and other operational directorates 
are different. The OPDS reports directly to the Executive Secretary of SADC while the other four 
directorates report to the Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration.438 This presents a 
challenge of harmonization at the operational level as the Deputy Executive Secretary has no 
power to call the OPDS to order let alone cause it to harmonise its work with the other directorates. 
The OPDS works closely with the Council of Ministers and the Ministerial Committee of the 
Organ, other directorates have complained about the fact that 80% of the time at high level 
meetings is spent on OPDS matters while only 20% is shared among the other directorates. This 
impacts on integration efforts and impedes the achievement of peace on the ground.439  
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5.4.2 Directorate on Social and Human Development and Special Programmes (SHDSP) 
The Directorate on Social and Human Development and Special Programmes is the main unit in 
SADC whose mandate covers a wide array of human security related themes. Its stated goal is to  
“contribute to the reduction of human poverty and to improve the availability of efficient 
human resources for the promotion of the region’s economic growth, deeper integration 
and its competitiveness in the global economy…and consolidating the historical, social and 
cultural ties and affinities of the people of the region”.440  
 
The directorate is mandated to ensure the availability of educated, skilled, healthy, productive 
human resources required for promoting investment, efficiency and competitiveness of the region 
in the global economy as well as improving the quality of life of the region’s population.441 The 
directorate pursues this goal through striving for the widening of the provision of social services 
to citizens in member states. The provision of social services ought to be thought of as part of a 
social protection floor which denotes a set of basic social rights, services and facilities to which 
any global citizen should have access. The provision of these rights ought to be supported and 
enforceable by law and should be in conformity with international treaties signed by member 
states.442 In the case of SADC such rights derive from the SADC Treaty (1992) and other social 
protection instruments such the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC  / the Social 
Charter (2003), SADC Social Security Code, Protocols on Gender and Development, Health, 
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Education and the Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC. Other 
instruments include the SADC Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008), the SADC Minimum Package 
for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children and Youth (2011). At a continental level the African 
Union NEPAD framework informs SADC’s efforts. At the international level the framework 
includes the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1996), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) as well as 
the ILO and WHO Social Protection Floor 4 and 12.443 In order to have true conflict transformation 
capacity it ought to put more emphasis on ensuring that member states include women in their 
security forces on a 50/50 basis as per the provisions of the SADC Gender Protocol. The target of 
2015 of realising this goal will however be missed by most member states.444 
The SADC Social Security Code gives member states strategic direction and guidelines in the 
development and improvement of social security schemes to improve the welfare of citizens as 
well as acting as a framework for monitoring at national and regional levels for coordination, 
convergence and harmonization. The institutional architecture of SADC also comprises of the 
Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM); the Secretariat; the Tribunal and the National 
Committees. The Directorate of Social and Human Development and Special Programmes strives 
to harmonise social security schemes of member states by promoting equity and the protection of 
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vulnerable groups. Within the directorate there is the employment and labour sector tasked with 
establishing and harmonizing the social security schemes of member states.445  
The directorate has six areas of responsibility i) Education and Skills Development: includes access 
to quality education and training, the aim to increase availability of educated and skilled human 
resources within the region to contribute to poverty alleviation and regional integration ii) 
Employment and Labour: promoting demand for labour and labour absorption in the regional 
economy through fostering decent work (employment, social protection, social dialogue, labour 
standards) and the establishment of labour market information systems iii) Health and 
Pharmaceuticals: focuses on attaining an acceptable standard of health for all SADC citizens. 
Implementing the SADC Protocol on health and achieving the Millennium Development Goals iv) 
HIV and AIDS: aims to significantly reduce the number of people living with HIV and AIDS in 
the region. Through the implementation of the HIV and AIDS Strategic framework, attempt to 
reduce the impact of the virus v) Orphans, Vulnerable Children and Youth: ensures that the needs 
of vulnerable children, orphans and youth are integrated into SADC sector specific activities and 
programmes vi) Science, Technology and Innovation: use Science and technology to drive 
sustainable social and economic development.446 
To ameliorate the poor access to social services in the region Nyenti and Mpedi advocate for the 
establishment of a minimum social protection floor 447  in member states. This will ensure 
protection for vulnerable groups such as migrant workers, people living with HIV/AIDS, and the 
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provision of empowerment to women. To put this in place they propose a social security stair case 
comprised of four key guarantees being; access to essential healthcare, income security for 
children, assistance for the unemployed and poor, and income security for the elderly and persons 
with disabilities linked to a mandatory social insurance and voluntary insurance, these it is believed 
will facilitate access to other services. 448  Gender disparities in Southern Africa continue to 
decrease as women continue to have greater access to credit and land ownership, this is due to the 
emergence of more organized women’s groups as well as a widening of political space with more 
countries enacting legislation calling for gender equality.449 
HIV/AIDS is one of the biggest security threats to SADC member states, it has been declared a 
national emergency in countries such as Botswana. Access to life saving Antiretroviral drugs is 
mainly accessed through the public health system which is used by the majority of citizens in 
SADC member states. Despite that most public health systems suffer challenges such as shortage 
of infrastructure, skilled personnel and are generally inaccessible to the rural poor as they are 
mostly found in the urban areas, access to ARVs for Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission 
(PMTCT) has reached 80% in South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia with AIDS related 
deaths falling by 24% between 2004 and 2009. In Botswana AIDS related deaths fell by 50% 
between 2002 and 2009 because there is over 90% access to ARVs in the country while access to 
ARVs is credited with the 10% drop in adult mortality in Malawi. A number of countries, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Namibia and Botswana have social protection programmes 
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for orphans and vulnerable children while Mauritius is the only country that pays unemployment 
or hardship relief allowances to its unemployed.450 
All units of the directorate of SHD&SP hold joint monthly and quarterly meetings to harmonise 
their work. The unit has devised a Monitoring and Evaluation tool through which member states 
periodically fill out a questionnaire and meet to share experiences at regional level. The 
directorates cooperates with the directorate of OPDS through the Protocol on the Facilitation of 
the Movement of Persons where the employment and labour unit in the SHD&SP collaborates 
with the OPDS in facilitating the movement of labour in the region. This will further be 
strengthened by the draft Protocol on employment and labour which has been approved at 
ministerial level. A key challenge is however that the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of 
Persons has not been ratified by all member states and is as such not fully implemented.451 
There is limited knowledge about the available policy instruments at the regional level by member 
states. If citizens in member states knew about the policy instruments they would refer to some 
SADC Protocols when they bargain with their governments rather than resorting to protests and 
conflicts. This is a result of the failure both at SADC and member state levels to popularize the 
policy instruments. At the member state level, those who attend SADC meetings tend to attend 
and then forget shortly thereafter. The SADC National Contact points in member states are weak 
as they only do SADC work on a part time basis, they as such pay little attention to it and in some 
cases officers only look at the files when they prepare to go for a meeting. If they had a strong full 
time and coordination role then things would be much better. The state of Human security in the 
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region is expected to significantly improve with current efforts to transform the SADC Charter on 
Fundamental Social Rights into a Protocol with legal muscle. 
5.4.3 Directorate on Infrastructure and Services (IS) 
The Directorate of Infrastructure of Infrastructure and Services performs an indirect role in 
supporting the objectives of human security and humanitarian aid as outlined in the challenges 
outlined above. Its stated objective is to ensure “the development and quality of strategic 
infrastructure in the Southern African region”.452 It goes without saying that in the face of conflict 
infrastructure such as roads, energy grids, water and transport systems are destroyed. Conflict and 
other natural and man-made disasters disrupt regular provision of services such as water, electricity 
and telecommunication services. It is against this backdrop, this section outlines the work of the 
Infrastructure and Services to show the measures that SADC has put in place in this regard. The 
directorate looks to the SADC Protocol on the Development of Tourism, Protocol on Energy, 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses and the Protocol on Transport, Communication and 
Meteorology.453  
The activities of the directorate are coordinated by six thematic units as stipulated in the Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) i) Energy: focusing on electricity and hydropower 
development ii); Tourism: promoting investment for infrastructure and products; iii) Transport: 
providing strategic support to transport corridors & spatial development initiatives, roads & road 
transport development, railway infrastructure, air transport & aviation, maritime concerns, and 
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ports & inland waterway development; iv) Water Resources Management & Sanitation: supporting 
and facilitating integrated water resources management, water-related infrastructure, access to 
clean drinking water and sanitation; v) Meteorology: including a Regional Observation Network, 
global telecommunications systems for meteorology and Regional Climate Data Processing 
Centre; vi) Communication: Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) and 
telecommunications.454 
5.4.4 Directorate on Food Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) 
For the simple reason that food is the provider and sustainer of life, food security lies at the heart 
of human security objectives. Humanitarian emergencies disrupt the regular daily lives of civilian 
populations hampering their ability to feed themselves. It is therefore instructive to look at the 
mechanisms that SADC has put in place to ensure the food security needs of the citizens of the 
region. This lays the foundation for an assessment of the extent to which these measures are 
sufficient in the face of natural disasters such as droughts and famine as well as food shortages 
that follow conflict situations. The mandate of the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(FANR) directorate is to coordinate and harmonise agricultural policies and programmes in the 
SADC region as per the priorities of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). 
The directorate draws its policy direction from The Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law 
Enforcement, Protocol on Fisheries, Protocol on Forestry and the SADC Policy Paper on Climate 
Change: Assessing the Policy Options for SADC Member States.455  
                                                 
454 Ibid. 
455 SADC, Food Agriculture & Natural Resources, available at: http://www.sadc.int/sadc-
secretariat/directorates/office-deputy-executive-secretary-regional-integration/food-agriculture-natural-resources/ 
[accessed on: 24-03-14] 
233 
 
The specific functions of the directorate are the; development, promotion and facilitation of 
agricultural policy harmonization, taking into account gender equity in all strategies and 
programmes; ensuring sustainable food security policies and programmes; development, 
promotion and harmonization of biodiversity, phytosanitary, sanitary, crop production and animal 
husbandry policies; development of measures to increase agricultural output of agro-based 
industries; development, promotion and facilitation of harmonized policies and programmes aimed 
at achieving effective and sustainable utilisation of natural resources such as water, wildlife, 
fisheries, and forestry; development and facilitation of harmonized and sound environmental 
management policies; and promotion of trade in agricultural products. All the above are done to 
ensure, food availability; access to food; promotion of improved safety and nutritional value of 
food; disaster preparedness and awareness for food security; equitable and sustainable use of the 
environment and natural resources; and an institutional framework strengthening and capacity 
building.456 
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5.5  A Framework for Human Security and the Provision of Humanitarian 
Assistance at various phases of a conflict 
5.5.1 Pre- Conflict Phase 
During peace time, a lack of access to social services as discussed above can lead to rebellions 
which may turn violent even in peaceful and stable societies. This may result from grievances 
ranging from political corruption or extreme poverty explained as ‘living in an environment 
without food security, clean water, sanitation, basic health service, literacy and basic income. This 
school of thought argues that poverty and conflict have a positive correlation as both result in 
destitution, despondency, disintegration, destruction and human suffering. The argument being 
that when their grievances are not met, the poor and deprived in society will riot, question the 
leadership as well as join rebel groups.457  
The correlation between absence of material wellbeing and the prospects for violence manifest 
through incidences of crime in inner-city neighbourhoods, political instability and social conflict 
in poor nations.458 In light of the numerous service delivery protests in various SADC member 
states, no effort should be spared by both the secretariat and member states in ensuring the 
equitable and broad based provision of social services to all citizens to stem the tide. In this way, 
poverty causes conflict, but conflict may also cause poverty as during the mayhem and violence 
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people will not be able to till their lands and feed themselves leaving them at the mercy of 
humanitarian aid workers.459 
At the heart of human security is the issue of equity which corresponds directly to the question of 
access raised at the beginning of the chapter. It is therefore not enough to put the services in place 
without accompanying them with measures that will ensure that they are equally and equitably 
enjoyed and accessed by all citizens.  The above views are echoed in Roland Paris’ (2004) work 
looking at the types of interventions that have followed violent conflicts worldwide, particularly 
in the Post-Cold War era.460 Salient in their debates is the need to address the root causes of conflict 
which revolve around the above themes and which if left unresolved may result in a relapse into 
hostilities or worse still a triggering of fresh conflicts.  
The above begins to paint a picture of the linkages that exist between peacebuilding and 
development, it has in fact been argued that development is a human rights issue which is central 
to reducing conflicts in Africa. The inequitable distribution of development in most African 
countries is faulted for plunging economies into a state of permanent crisis which has in some 
cases exacerbated pre-existing tensions and elsewhere reduced the capacity of the state to respond 
to emerging tensions. The legacy of Structural Adjustment programs prescribed by the Bretton 
Woods institutions is also blamed for the significant reduction in social spending in most African 
countries which has greatly curtailed the delivery of the most basic social services in most African 
countries. In response to this, the IMF and the World Bank have since 1999 developed the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) framework geared at devising a comprehensive country-based 
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strategy for poverty reduction. The strategy is meant to link national public actions, donor support, 
and the development outcomes needed to meet the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
aimed at halving poverty between 1999 and 2015.461  
Perceptions about imbalances and inequality in the access to basic social services have only 
cultivated fertile ground for even further conflict as parties advance their grievances.462 The report 
points to economic growth as the panacea that will result in increased household spending and 
broader access to social services. In his 2012 report the UN Secretary General reiterates the above 
by making reference to “The New Deal”, the UN system’s strategy for engagement in fragile states 
which underscores the centrality of social services to peacebuilding and state-building. The report 
outlines the UN’s commitment and support to its six focus countries none of which are in the 
SADC region. It identifies, population growth, environmental degradation, demand for water, food, 
energy and poverty reduction as sub-Saharan Africa’s key challenges.463 
At the SADC level there is also a discrepancy between policy and implementation, different 
member states are doing things differently in the area of provision of social services. The Organ 
on Politics, Defence and Security has also not made sufficient provision for human security laying 
a lot of emphasis on state security. There is limited political will to address the threat of  HIV/AIDS 
in SADC member states. Some leaders such as former South African president Thabo Mbeki dwelt 
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on debates about the origins of AIDS and its linkages to poverty rather than providing much needed 
lifesaving drugs to citizens. Other leaders such as Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe make 
grand statements about the need to fight the disease but on the other hand condone state sponsored 
violence which cultivates ground for rape and the spread of disease. Botswana especially under 
former President Festus Mogae is the only leader who declared HIV/AIDS a national emergency 
and rolled out a comprehensive ARV programme for free to all citizens.464  
5.5.2 The Mid- Conflict Phase 
During the conflict phase there are a number of critical humanitarian and peacebuilding activities 
which need to be under taken to meet the human security and conflict transformation needs of the 
civilian population. These will be outlined in this section as areas in which SADC’s capacity needs 
to be improved to better meet the human security needs of its citizens. In the mid conflict phase, 
human security needs are met through the provision of humanitarian aid. 
Humanitarian Aid 
Humanitarian aid has been defined as aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and 
maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. This definition 
excludes any long term development assistance. Humanitarian aid is governed by the principles of 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.465 Examples of humanitarian aid provided in 
response to humanitarian crisis are; material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, 
medicines etc); emergency food aid (short term distribution and supplementary feeding 
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programmes); reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (repairing pre-existing infrastructure as 
opposed to longer term activities designed to improve the level of infrastructure); disaster 
prevention and preparedness (disaster risk reduction, early warning systems, contingency stocks 
and planning).466  
At the beginning of a conflict the aim of humanitarian aid is to provide the vital needs of human 
life such as water, food, medicine, sanitation, shelter, clothes, fuel and the protection of people’s 
lives and liberty from physical threats. Humanitarian aid is as such, short term in scope and is 
aimed at meeting the individual based demands of human security. A major disadvantage of 
humanitarian aid is that it does not guarantee durable human security as it may make people 
vulnerable and dependent upon foreign aid. Another shortcoming is that it may not be able to 
distinguish between victims and wrong doers and as a result prolong conflict.467 
In the mid conflict phase, unarmed humanitarian workers find it difficult and unsafe to work but 
since most victims are civilians, there’s a strong demand for humanitarian aid. This is often 
provided by prominent International NGOs such as United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) as well prominent NGOs like Medicine Sans Frontiers (MSF), OXFAM and CARE 
which all work hard to provide vital services for suffering people during the conflict.468 
The demand for such aid is heightened by the fact that large numbers of refugees and Internally 
Displaced People (IDPs) are moved out of conflict areas. As such, international aid could be their 
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channel for sustenance. A limited role needs to be reserved for development aid workers who 
usually start their work when the conflict is over. This averts the formation of a gap which may 
leave civilians vulnerable when emergency aid workers hand over to development aid workers at 
the end of the conflict. Although controversial, the involvement of the military in humanitarian aid 
in the mid conflict phase is often a necessity. Neutral military actors like the U.N peacekeepers 
could be authorized to help in delivering humanitarian aid where more robust measures to protect 
civilians are needed.469  
There’s however need for balanced involvement of the military in important roles like policing in 
peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention. Peace enforcement measures need to be anticipated 
depending on the peacebuilding needs. When deployed during a conflict the military may be given 
roles including the creation of safe havens and humanitarian corridors. In the case of SADC, the 
SADC Brigade needs to be capacitated to be able to carry out these functions on top of its normal 
military roles. In some cases, military measures are the only ultimate option to make humanitarian 
aid possible. In conflict situations, certain legal services may count as humanitarian work in 
refugee camps and detention centres to help refugees obtain legal status. Legal personnel may be 
required to collect evidence for future war crimes tribunals and reconciliation commissions for 
human rights abuses, further efforts need to be taken to protect investigative NGOs.470 In this phase, 
political leader who serve as negotiators and brokers should also function as coordinators of human 
security related activities.471  
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5.5.3 The Transitional Phase  
The transitional phase starts after the brokering of a peace agreement and the termination of armed 
conflict, society is often still fragile at this stage and thus susceptible to criminal activities 
including, riots, looting, terror and physical violence through vandalism, factional disputes, 
revenge, rape etc. While there is need for emergency aid to continue during this phase, there is 
also need for increased security measures such as the involvement of the military and police 
personnel.472 In this phase aid workers are guided by a peace agreement or a UN Security Council 
resolution. Humanitarian workers play a peacebuilding role through the creation of institutions. 
Institution building at this early stage serves to lay the foundation for political, social and economic 
institutions necessary for stable peace in the long term.473 
Humanitarian organisations make more use of local resources by for example recruiting local 
personnel which will reinforce resettlement efforts. Empowering local communities can also take 
the form of provision of social services and rebuilding of infrastructure essential for human 
security such as hospitals, police facilities, fire stations and main roads. Programmes for 
facilitating Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) may also be rolled out in the 
form of aid in kind, submission of small arms and light weapons in exchange for job training and 
community based infrastructure. At the political level, administrative infrastructure necessary for 
elections may need to be rebuilt. The first critical stages of DDR have to be finished before 
elections, this is to contain disruptions from resistant armed groups. The 1992 election in Angola 
showed that holding an election without real disarmament puts the peace process at risk.  A 
                                                 
472 Ibid. Pg. 32 
473 Ibid.  
241 
 
successful DDR programme is important for transforming the transitional phase to the stabilization 
phase.474   
The SADC region currently enjoys relative peace, sporadic violent conflicts can be found in only 
a few member states. Most member states although free of violent conflict are still grappling with 
challenges of building peace and setting their countries on a development path that would ensure 
human security and the accessibility of social services to all. Presenting the data for 2012 on 
conflicts in Southern Africa, the Hedelberg Research Centre only identifies incidences of full war 
and limited war at level 5 and 4 of intensity to have taken place in the DRC.475 SADC has 15 
member states which vary in size, economic development, resources, vegetation, political maturity, 
history and levels of conflict. A hallmark of SADC’s peacebuilding efforts is that it has assigned 
mediators from within the region to defuse conflicts in member states. This is due to its excessive 
suspicion of external, especially western intervention in regional affairs; a consequence of the 
region being the last to be liberated on the continent. These mediation efforts were preceded by 
two sets of controversial military interventions by two sets of countries in Lesotho and DRC in 
1998.476  
                                                 
474 Ibid. 
475 See Hedelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer: 2012, Department of Political 
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Cambridge University Press,  2007 
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Examples of SADC’s mediation efforts include the Inter Congolese Dialogue (2000 – 2003) where 
former president of Botswana Sir Ketumile Masire was appointed the lead mediator, as well as in 
Lesotho in 2007, although in the latter case the mediation process was completed by SADC backed 
civil society groups in Lesotho. Other mediation efforts in the region include the appointment of 
former Mozambican President, Joachim Chissano as lead mediator in Madagascar after the coup 
of 2009. In the case of Zimbabwe where SADC appointed South Africa to mediate, the regional 
grouping jealously guarded the case from western interference signaling the sad reality that the 
region has not fully recovered from its colonial past and hurt.   
5.5.4 The Stabilization Phase 
Since institution building was started in the transitional phase, the stabilization phase puts an 
emphasis on capacity building. At this stage international actors efforts shift from direct human 
security measures to the cultivation of local capacity to sustain human security measures. The 
goals of human security do not change in this phase, they are just pursued using different methods, 
for instance, the roles of the security sector change according to the daily needs of the people. 
Humanitarian aid is channelled into peacebuilding activities to create durable stability.477  
In this phase, international actors are encouraged to retreat and act as trainers or consultants for 
locals. The capacity of local people is the focus of the stabilization phase with the goal of achieving 
a sustainable social system. The repatriation of refugees is a major challenge in this phase as many 
refugees remain stuck in post conflict societies. This can be addressed through the coordinated 
efforts of multiple actors including, the host government, international agencies like UNHCR. 
Repatriation helps to ensure long term stability, as such the refugee question needs to be addressed 
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simultaneously with the political question through dialogue to avert threats to peace. 478  If 
addressed well, repatriation will allow for smooth voter registration in preparation for new post 
conflict elections. In this stage, emergency aid is scaled down and developmental aid increases in 
importance. The goals of peacebuilding shift towards social and economic development which 
couldn’t be pursued in the immediate aftermath of conflict. They aim at addressing poverty, 
joblessness, scarce resources and rehabilitating destroyed infrastructure. This task ought to be 
performed jointly by developmental agencies such as International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 
international social development agencies such as the UNDP, UNICEF and development oriented 
NGOs.479 
At this phase, there is a need to formulate a strategy to reconcile the desperate post conflict 
conditions with the demands of IFIs. Human rights NGOs also have a role to play to achieve social 
stability to check human rights violations. There is also a need to set up a system to ensure rule of 
law and to punish international criminals and to afford victims justice to victims through setting 
up a special war crime court. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions may also be set up to 
compensate for the limitations of the judiciary and to avoid a “cycle of revenge” at the grass roots 
level.480TRCs insert a sense of justice in post conflict society and bolster peacebuilding efforts. In 
this phase conflict prevention, early warning and other measures to avoid conflict ought to be 
employed. Measures to crack down on organized crime such as trafficking in women, abduction 
of children, illegal trade in narcotics and weapons which are common in post conflict societies. 
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The achievement of this will ensure social stability. Failure to curb the above may reverse the 
achievements of DDR programmes.481 
In addition to the above, international actors may need to assist in the creation of a new professional 
and disciplined army and police force by unifying the various armed groups. Their roles may 
include providing training and equipment to ensure law and order and to ensure conformity to a 
normative framework of human rights. These may extend to the rolling out of Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) and Security Sector Transformation (SST) programmes depending on the extent of 
the damage.482In extreme cases the old army and police may need to be abolished depending on 
the record of human rights violations and acts of corruption committed. Difficult decisions would 
also need to be made regarding the recruitment of former officers in the army, policy and judiciary. 
Such measures need to ensure the restoration of public trust in the judiciary which is key for 
durable peace. The rule of law will lead to durable social stability and long term peace and human 
security.483 
If the above are carried out, countries can avert a relapse into hostilities and build confidence in 
the political process early on by prioritizing the strengthening of core national capacity. The 
provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, support to 
the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees; the 
restoration of core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public 
finance at national and sub national levels. The UN Secretary General’s report on Peacebuilding 
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in the Immediate Aftermath of conflict acknowledges that this is one area which the UN has failed 
to deliver immediate tangible results in. The increase in the inclusion of social services in peace 
agreements is proof of their role as a vital cog in peacebuilding efforts.484 Basic social service 
infrastructure is usually severely damaged during violent conflict, this is despite that the two 
conflict drivers with the highest ratings have been identified as ‘poverty/poor education’ and 
‘injustice /inequality / corruption.485  The skewed provision of social services in favour of other 
groups may also trigger conflicts, these services need to be delivered in a conflict sensitive manner 
as they may reinforce the horizontal inequalities that triggered the conflict in the first place.  
The end of the Cold War and the interventions that took place in previously protracted conflicts 
internationally provide a backdrop for this study’s analysis. In the SADC region such interventions 
were seen in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). The attainment of peace in these countries as elsewhere also saw key questions taking 
centre stage, revolving around what should be done once the humanitarian emergency was over.486 
This was met with the reinterpretation of the patterns of international conflicts led by Cousens 
(1998). Their core message centred around the finding that in the 1990s Post Cold War world era, 
most conflicts were intrastate in nature and as such required the parties to the conflict to live 
together once the violence had ended. This therefore meant that intervention efforts in this period 
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focused on rebuilding states destroyed by the war, restoring the rights of citizens and on post 
violence peacebuilding.487 
A key challenge in this regard in the SADC region is the fact in most member states, the social 
protection framework is very narrow and don’t cover all aspects of social security as shown earlier. 
They mainly cover retirement, public service pensions, limited maternity and worker’s 
compensation. The elderly and children are littering the country’s cities as the governments and 
the community fail to provide for the weak in society. To remedy this state of affairs SADC 
member states need to nip corruption in the bud and re-align their priorities to guarantee their poor 
to a dignified existence. There is need to make provision for poverty alleviation measures and 
deliberate action to curb corruption, fraud and wasteful government expenditure.488  
A major deficiency in most SADC member states is that social security in the region is still framed 
in a way that mostly caters for formerly employed people. This state of affairs can be ameliorated 
by increasing efforts towards growing the economy, economic growth will ensure that more people 
are able to pay taxes. The numbers of the unemployed will also be significantly reduced freeing 
up government resources to be used for the provision of more social services.489  
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated and concludes that SADC is faced with numerous seemingly 
insurmountable human security related challenges as well as those that may require humanitarian 
aid. Further, the chapter concludes that although SADC has taken extensive efforts to address 
human security challenges in the region as well as setting up structures and institutions to address 
disaster risk reduction and management, serious discrepancies exists as the various SADC 
directorates operate in silos leaving gaps that perpetuate human insecurity in the region. A major 
conclusion in the chapter is the lack of political will by the leadership in the region to broaden the 
social security systems in their countries to include all aspects of social protection as well as to 
cover the unemployed, children and the elderly. This failing has deprived many ordinary citizens 
of SADC member states of access to vital social services leaving them vulnerable to a plethora of 
human security related threats. 
A major obstacle to the achievement of human security in the region is the different reporting lines 
of the various SADC directorates where the directorate of the OPDS reports directly to the 
Executive Secretary while the other four directorates with human security related mandates report 
to his deputy. This arrangement has served to privilege state security at high level meetings at the 
expense of human security which is also not addressed as an important problem deserving of its 
own stand-alone department in the SADC directorate of the OPDS. At the end, the chapter has 
also outlined measures that SADC should focus on in order to strengthen its conflict transformation 
capacity and ultimately ensure durable peace in the region. The recommendations cover the pre 
conflict, mid conflict, transitional, and stabilization phases of a conflict, explaining the roles of 
various actors involved in humanitarian aid and peacebuilding activities. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Peacebuilding and Operationalising Conflict Transformation through the 
creation of an Effective and Self-Sustainable Regional Infrastructure for 
Peace (RI4P) in SADC 
 
“Essentially, the aim should be the creation of a sustainable national infrastructure for peace that 
allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with their own skills, 
institutions and resources…” – Kofi Annan (Former UN Secretary General) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As seen from the findings of chapter two to five, SADC’s conflict transformation capacity has 
been grossly undermined and impeded by a host of factors. As such SADC has only gone skin 
deep in transforming conflicts in the region. In light of this, this research proposes a deepening of 
the search for an effective and self-sustainable conflict transformation framework by 
recommending that SADC ought to formulate a comprehensive Regional Infrastructure for Peace 
(RI4P).  
This chapter unpacks the meaning and rationale for such a framework, what it entails, how it should 
be implemented as well as the need for it to be underpinned by a sensitivity to local ownership to 
guarantee its effectiveness as well as to ensure that it’s rolled out in a self-sustainable manner. This 
as shown in previous chapters is for the reason that SADC has not explicitly nor thoroughly applied 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation, therefore failing to effectively and thoroughly address 
the root causes of conflicts in the region. The chapter argues that since SADC has alienated 
ordinary citizens in its member states, serving instead the interests of leaders as abundantly 
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demonstrated in previous chapters, an RI4P is the ultimate solution to ensure local ownership and 
capacity to effectively resolve conflicts at member state level in a self-sustainable manner. 
It demonstrates how the RI4P constituted by peace committees at ward and district levels and a 
regional and national peace council or bureau supporting a full-fledged Ministry of Peace would 
function in rolling out the regional conflict transformation programme. It envisions that such a 
structure would be funded and supported from regional / SADC level aimed at capacitating local 
communities in member states to solve their own conflicts in a self-sustainable manner. It also 
proposes the introduction of Peace Education at all levels in schools in member states to entrench 
a culture of peacefulness. In the end it highlights precedents of similar structures in countries such 
as Ghana, Kenya, Solomon Islands, Nepal and South Africa. It also highlights international 
instruments in support of such proposed reforms as well as recent dialogues and consultative 
processes and declarations which support capacitating communities at the local level for conflict 
transformation and linking them up with national, regional, continental and international efforts. 
6.2 Deepening our Understanding of Conflict Transformation 
Conflict Transformation is an approach to peacebuilding that focuses explicitly on relationships 
between people. It engages with and tries to influence the power that characterizes each 
relationship from three angles – ‘where it comes from, who has it, and how it is used or abused’. 
It is based on the understanding that human relationships are both at the root of conflict and the 
key to finding alternatives to violence. It explores the ‘attitudes, behaviours, systems and structures 
that define people’s perceptions of each other and uses solution focused dialogue to develop goals 
to aim at in transforming the root causes of conflict’. It focuses both on the individuals within an 
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organization as much as it does on the organization itself.490 It is for this reason that this research 
endeavours to establish the suitability of the conflict transformation approach as a peacebuilding 
tool even at the level of the SADC secretariat.  
Action for conflict transformation offers the following definition of the concept; 
Conflict transformation is a holistic and multifaceted process of engaging with 
conflict. It aims to reduce violence and to protect and promote social justice and 
sustainable peace. It requires work in all spheres, at all levels and with all 
stakeholders. Conflict Transformation needs to be accountable to those directly 
affected by conflict but requires networks and linkages to sustain it. Conflict 
Transformation is an ongoing process of changing relationships, behaviours, 
attitudes and structures, from the negative to the positive. It requires timely 
interventions, respect for cultural context, patience and persistence and a 
comprehensive understanding of the conflict. As conflict is dynamic and Conflict 
Transformation is an ongoing process, learning is a vital component.491 
 
Rather than eliminating conflict, conflict transformation aims to change conflict into something 
constructive. The term was coined by John Paul Lederach in the 1980s, its emergence was a 
response to critiques levelled against Conflict resolution and management which were increasingly 
seen as quick solutions to deep social political problems which didn’t change things in any 
significant way. They were seen as being a way to cover up the changes that are really needed in 
conflict settings. The Conflict transformation approach aims to build relationships and social 
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structures through respect for human rights and non-violence as a way of life, it sees peace as being 
embedded in justice and seeks to find constructive responses to violent conflict.492  
In its early days conflict transformation was critiqued for being too value laden, too idealistic or 
too “new age” while its proponents saw it as accurate, scientifically sound and clear in vision. This 
was because Conflict Resolution was more well-known and accepted in the mainstream academic 
and political circles.493 Conflict transformation has however over time grown in prominence and 
usage by both academics and practitioners. Global networks specializing in Conflict 
Transformation work and promotion have also emerged, two such examples are the Global 
Coalition for Conflict Transformation (GCCT) and the Action for Conflict Transformation who 
do advocacy and capacity building in conflict torn societies the world over using conflict 
transformation methods. In the SADC region, the SADC Coalition of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (SADC-CNGO) appears to have embraced the approach in its appointment of a 
Regional Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation Advisor.494 There is little evidence in the 
literature of where else it has been applied in the region except for through the activities of the 
South African based NGO, Action for Conflict transformation whose work is mentioned above. 
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6.3 An Adoption of Conflict Transformation Principles as Analytical Points for 
SADC’s Capacity  
The Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation (GCCT) has developed sixteen key principles495 
to aid in understanding the concept of conflict transformation. In this section, analysis is conducted 
of the extent to which these principles have been adhered to and applied in SADC’s peacebuilding 
and conflict transformation efforts. The conflict transformation approach has predominantly been 
used as an assessment tool in situations of protracted conflict as well as in localized community 
based conflicts, this research extends this scope to include an assessment of efforts made at the 
formal regional institutional setting of the SADC organization as well as to non-state actors within 
the region. Due to the multi-faceted and broad scope of the concept of conflict transformation, this 
research has uncovered constituent parts of the theory which may be well suited to efforts aimed 
at deepening peacebuilding within SADC. Due to its non-linear and cyclical nature, the mandate 
of conflict transformation spills over into all stages of a conflict including the; conflict prevention, 
conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict settlement stages. It is on this reasoning that 
this research tests its applicability even at the formal institutional level in SADC. 
6.3.1. Sixteen (16) Analytical Points  
1. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict should not be regarded as an isolated event 
that can be resolved or managed, but as an integral part of society’s on-going evolution 
and development;  
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Reality in SADC: peacebuilding efforts within SADC have mostly revolved around 
conflict management and resolution, which have been criticized by proponents of conflict 
transformation as being shallow and inadequate since the organization has only come up 
with short term solutions to the causes of conflicts. Although there are only a few cases of 
protracted social conflict within SADC, possibly in the eastern DRC, there are threats of 
more emerging in other member states. Threats of re-escalation of conflict in Angola and 
Mozambique, democratic deficits in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, the over throw of 
government in Madagascar, threats of secession in Namibia, violent xenophobic attacks 
against immigrants in South Africa and high rates of inequality in Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa. This list is of course not exhaustive, but it provides a glimpse into the 
challenges to peacebuilding that are prevalent in the region which need to be addressed in 
an effective and sustainable manner at their roots. 
2. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation goes beyond merely seeking 
to contain and manage conflict, instead seeking to transform the root causes themselves – 
or the perceptions of the root causes – of a particular conflict; 
Reality in SADC: Due to a host of reasons chief among which being the loyalties of heads 
of state towards each other, efforts to diffuse conflicts in the region have borne only limited 
fruits. SADC interventions have only gone skin deep in addressing the root causes of 
conflicts in the region. The Summit of Heads of State and Government (SHSG) which is 
the highest decision making body in the organization, operates like an old boy’s club where 
fears of violating each other’s sovereignty have allowed governments to ignore calls to 
strengthen their democracies and to stop human rights violations. A conflict transformation 
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approach if adopted would address this anomaly by ensuring that the best interests of the 
ordinary citizen of SADC are served even at the highest levels of the institution. 
3. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation is particularly suited for 
intractable conflicts, where deep-rooted issues fuel protracted violence; 
Reality in SADC: as indicated above, there are few instances of protracted conflicts in the 
SADC region safe for the long running conflicts between the government of the DRC and 
various rebel formations in that country. These as well as the other potentially explosive 
situations emerging in other member states provide impetus for the need to deepen efforts 
of getting to the root causes of these conflicts and defusing them even before they manifest. 
At the institutional level, SADC has an opportunity for its various agencies and units 
including those tasked with non-traditional security related mandates to work together 
within a conflict transformation framework to formulate innovative strategies of both 
curbing and diffusing social conflicts where ever they manifest in the region. This may be 
through formulating a Common Regional Peacebuilding Policy underpinned by a Conflict 
Transformation strategy to complement other pre-existing policy instruments.  
4. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation adjusts to the ever changing 
nature of a conflict, particularly during pre- and post-violence phases and at any stage of 
the escalation cycle; 
Reality in SADC: the malleability of the conflict transformation approach described above 
presents an opportunity for SADC to widen its efforts and strengthen its capabilities in 
solving a wider range of conflicts and their causes. Hitherto most efforts at dealing with 
conflicts in the SADC region have largely been top down revolving around mediation and 
external military interventions in conflict situations in the region to the neglect of other 
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types or aspects of conflict. To date, SADC does not explicitly commit to the goal of 
peacebuilding, within the Directorate of the Organ of Politics Defence and Security 
(OPDS) there exists a post of a peacebuilding officer whose terms of reference are vague 
and have largely included other non-traditional peacebuilding tasks. The directorate has 
concentrated its energies on military, governance (elections) and mediation related 
interventions. In fact there is even limited usage of the word peace, something which is 
indicative of the lens through which conflicts are viewed in the region. If there are to be 
deliberate efforts at resolving conflicts, the starting point should be the framing of the 
approach and end point which should be durable peace instead of defence and security as 
is the case at present. 
5. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation is always a non-violent 
process, which is fundamentally opposed to violent expressions of conflict; 
Reality in SADC: following on from the point made in number 4 above, it would appear 
that the energies of the SADC secretariat have been directed predominantly at the violent 
expressions of conflict. This explains why the SADC military Brigade is one of the most 
organized units in terms of preparedness levels within the directorate. A conflict 
transformation approach if adopted will compel the organization to pay closer attention to 
the non-violent expressions of conflict revolving around the relational structures and power 
dynamics within conflict settings. The approach aims at ridding conflict societies of a 
culture of violence as well as addressing the drivers of injustice, social exclusion and 
inequality which are some of the most frequent grievances to trigger and escalate conflicts. 
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6. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation is concerned with five 
specific types of transformation, focusing upon the structural, behavioural and attitudinal 
aspects of conflict: 
a. Actors – modifying actor’s goals and their approach to pursuing these goals, 
including by strengthening understanding as to the causes and consequences 
of their respective actions; 
b. Contents – challenging the meaning and perceptions of conflict itself, 
particularly the respective attitudes and understandings of specific actors 
towards one another; 
c. Issues – redefining the issues that are central to the prevailing conflict, and 
reformulating the position of key actors on those very issues; 
d. Rules – changing the norms and rules governing decision-making at all levels 
in order to ensure that conflicts are dealt with constructively through 
institutional channels; 
e. Structures – adjusting the prevailing structure of relationships, power 
distributions and socio-economic conditions that are embedded in and inform 
the conflict, thereby affecting the very fabric of interaction between 
previously incompatible actors, issues and goals. 
Reality in SADC: reforms in SADC’s institutional structure for addressing conflicts in the 
region can be underpinned by the above framework. This presents an opportunity for 
structures such as the SADC Parliamentary Forum which was recently formally 
incorporated into the institutional structure of the organization to modify the norms and 
decision making mechanisms of SADC to embrace a philosophy of conflict transformation 
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if ever there is to be long lasting in and durable peace the region. This can be through 
innovative legislation of conflict transformation strategies or through playing an oversight 
role over the Organ’s activities. 
7. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation stresses the human 
dimension by reminding parties of the compatible nature of their needs, instead of 
emphasizing their opposing interests, and by rejecting unilateral decisions and action, 
particularly those representing a victory for one of the parties to the conflict; 
Reality in SADC: this presents an opportunity for SADC to shed its image and negative 
reputation for favouring sitting heads of state to the exclusion of opposition parties in 
conflict settings. Adopting a conflict transformation approach would mean winning over 
the conflicting parties to both work towards a solution in the knowledge that the type of 
settlement reached would meet both their needs. 
8. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation invariably involves a third, 
impartial party, in order to help actors alter their cognitive and emotional views on the 
‘other’, thereby helping to break down divisions between ‘Us and Them’; 
Reality in SADC: conflict transformation affords SADC an opportunity to introspect and 
improve on those aspects of its character that bring its credibility as an impartial third party 
into doubt. It gives the organization a chance to explore innovative and dynamic ways of 
engaging with conflicting parties through mediation and other locally brewed solutions. 
9. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation represents an ambitious and 
demanding task, which is better equipped to contend with the asymmetric, complex and 
protracted nature of contemporary conflicts than prevailing techniques and approaches. 
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Reality in SADC: this attribute of conflict transformation is yet another chance for SADC 
to give its newly revised SIPOII impetus for greater impact by thinking outside the box in 
its implementation. As described above, the region is now confronted with new types of 
threats and with the individual as the referent of security, this is an opportunity for the 
Human Security situation in the region to be improved since human beings are the ones at 
the heart of all protracted social conflicts. The risk of such protracted conflicts emerging is 
now more than ever highly likely since the threats to security are no longer strictly related 
to a violation of sovereignty by the minority white regimes as was the case during the 
apartheid era. The threats are now directed to the very citizens of the region directly rather 
than their states in the form of unemployment, poverty, food shortages, disease, illiteracy, 
trans-border crime, cattle rustling to name but a few examples. 
10. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict should not be understood solely as an 
inherently negative and destructive occurrence, but rather as a potentially positive and 
productive force for change if harnessed constructively; 
Reality in SADC: a conflict transformation approach presents an opportunity to non-state 
actors such as the SADC Council of Non- Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) to 
engage with communities in conflict torn societies to help deepen their understanding of 
conflict and its positive elements can be harnessed for peaceful co-existence.  
11. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation addresses a range of 
dimensions – the micro-, meso- and macro-levels; local and global; 
Reality in SADC: through the conflict transformation approach interventions aimed at 
resolving conflicts in SADC will not only be top down and state centric. Non state actors 
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have an opportunity to engage with conflict parties from grass roots level, national as well 
as regionally through collaborative efforts with other regional civil society actors.  
12. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation looks beyond visible issues 
and is characterized by creative problem-solving, incorporating the perspectives of a broad 
array of actors, including those typically marginalized from such considerations;  
Reality in SADC: the conflict transformation approach will afford SADC a chance to 
interrogate past approaches to peacebuilding in the region, with a view to formulating 
innovative alternative approaches to address the weaknesses and un intended consequences 
of past peace processes such as the peace deal signed with RENAMO in Mozambique 
which is now showing signs of cracking. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa is another case in which past efforts at peace and reconciliation in the region 
are now showing cracks through the cases of reverse racism meted out on whites by blacks 
in the country as well as the violent xenophobic attacks on foreigners in the country.  
13. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict transformation does not resort to a 
predetermined set of approaches and actions, but respects and adapts to the particularities 
of a given setting; 
Reality in SADC: SADC’s rigid conception of peacebuilding largely framed through a 
military security, DDR and SSR lens, will be widened by the adoption of a conflict 
transformation framework to include other elements of peacebuilding, making it more 
malleable and applicable to the particularities of different conflict settings. Non state actors 
appear to be best suited for this task. 
14. Conflict Transformation Principle: For conflict transformation to occur, tensions 
between parties to the conflict must be overcome – first, by ensuring all actors recognize 
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that their respective interests are not served by resorting to violence; and second, by seeking 
consensus on what should be transformed and how; 
Reality in SADC: this is another area where non state actors led by (SADC-CNGO) who 
are seen as impartial can have a meaningful role to play by conducting workshops and 
providing forums in communities in conflict societies for the conflicting parties to explore 
less expressive forms of violence in their conflicts. By working closely on the ground with 
the conflicting parties, they can shepherd them towards consensus on what needs to be 
transformed and how with a view to comprehensively and totally addressing the conflict. 
15. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict Transformation is not just an approach and 
set of techniques, but a way of thinking about and understanding conflict itself; 
Reality in SADC: since peacebuilding appears not to be a priority for SADC, non-state 
actors can lead efforts to enhance the role of civilians in peacebuilding in the region. The 
level of engagement can be led from below in an effort to address the root causes of conflict. 
The SADC-CNGO has an opportunity to enhance peacebuilding capacities of member 
states outside of the framework of states. This can be achieved through giving practical 
meaning to the MoU and programme of action they signed with the OPDS. This will serve 
as a tool to prevent future conflicts where structures will be in place to set the necessary 
processes in motion at the early signs of conflict in a decentralized manner. 
16. Conflict Transformation Principle: Conflict Transformation is a long-term, gradual and 
complex process, requiring sustained engagement and interaction; 
Reality in SADC: due to the long-term nature and scope of the conflict transformation 
process, opportunities exist for the process to be driven by non-state actors even if it is only 
at the initial stages of the conflict. In any case, non-state actors are often more accepted by 
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local communities in conflict situations since they are sensitive to the context of the conflict. 
In cases like Swaziland which is Africa’s last existing absolute and executive monarchy, 
the authoritarian nature of the state apparatus veiled in the pretext of tradition has seen hard 
handed crack downs on any sign of dissent and a ban on party politics in the Kingdom. 
SADC has remained ambivalent and conspicuous in its failure to intervene or condemn 
state sponsored repression in the country. Within the framework of a conflict 
transformation approach, non-state actors can work with local parties in the country to 
deepen their understanding of the conflict as well as to devise innovate, appropriate and 
culturally sensitive methods of continued engagement with the monarchy.  
6.4 What is a Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P)? 
The idea of a RI4P is an adoption and expansion of the I4P concept for application at a regional 
level. The UNDP defines I4P as “a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills 
held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and 
consultation, prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society”.496 
I4P is described as a promising, comprehensive, inclusive approach in peacebuilding which 
involves the main stakeholders at all levels: national, district, and local. It is a problem solving 
approach to conflict, based on dialogue and non-violence. It allows societies and their governments 
to resolve conflicts internally, developing institutional mechanisms, structures and capacities that 
                                                 
496 UNDP quoted in Van Tongeren P, 2013, Background Paper on Infrastructures for Peace, Seminar on 
Infrastructure for Peace; part of the Sixth GAMIP Summit, September 19th, 2013, Geneva, Switzerland, Global 
Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace and International Civil Society Network on Infrastructures for 
Peace, Pg. 9 
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promote this approach. I4P holds a lot of promise as it has already worked several times in 
countries like South Africa, Kenya and Ghana.497 
The core components of an I4P include: 
-National, district and local peace councils comprised of trusted and highly respected 
persons of integrity who can bridge political divides and who possess competence and 
experience in transforming conflicts; 
-National peace platforms for consultation, collaboration and coordination of peace issues 
by relevant actors and stakeholders; 
-A government bureau, department or ministry of peacebuilding; 
-Passing legislative measures to create national infrastructures for peace with appropriate 
budgets; 
-Expanding the capacities of national peacebuilding institutions, related government 
departments, peace councils and relevant groups of civil society organisations (CSOs); 
-Renewing and using traditional perspectives and methodologies for conflict resolution; 
-Promoting a shared vision for society and for a culture of peace.498 
6.5 Why a RI4P? 
In a “world divided into states and moderated by international organisations”, there are questions 
about whether the international liberal human rights regime and a liberal social contract can be 
reconciled with local customary practices in different parts of the world. The international peace 
architecture that emerged in the 20th century lacks an understanding of and often empathy for the 
contextual local political dynamics in conflict settings.499 As a result, the great powers and the UN 
cannot be expected to permanently take care of and maintain stability in some of the most volatile 
                                                 
497 Van Tongeren P, Infrastructure for Peace is a promising approach, Peace Monitor; Changing Perspectives, April 
1, 2013, downloaded on: 10-01-14 available at: (http://peacemonitor.org/?p=427)  
498 Peter Van Tongeren, Increasing Interest in Infrastructure for Peace, Op. Cit. 2011 
499 Richmond O, no date, Pg. 3 
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regions of the world. As such regional bodies such as SADC should step up their efforts since they 
are closer to the conflicts and have a better understanding and influence on them. A RI4P fosters 
mutual understanding and a deepening of trust between the regional body and the local 
communities in the conflict affected country. This is because it is underpinned by the principle of 
local ownership which is sensitive to the local context and the distinctiveness of the local society. 
It also bridges the gap between the implementation system of international peacebuilding activities 
and the local society.500 
The rationale for advocating for I4Ps is that they are timely and urgent since most countries lack 
structures, capacities and mechanisms to deal adequately with ongoing and potentially violent 
conflicts. Another reason is that violent conflicts are widespread and a global problem which will 
not go away on its own. Immediate and long-term conflicts have been forecast to emerge due to 
competition for scarce resources, contested elections, energy deficits, climate change issues, 
migration, displacement and many other factors. There is also strong evidence from countries such 
as South Africa, Ghana and Kenya where I4Ps have worked successfully. Another reason in 
support of the feasibility of I4Ps is that they are inexpensive, in the past decade alone the UN has 
funded the establishment of I4Ps in ten countries spending on average 2 to 3 million US dollars 
per country. Lastly, outside interventions have for a number of reasons often proven to be 
ineffective. They have tended to be slow, difficult and costly, I4ps on the other hand allow societies 
to build peace on their own terms thereby promoting long term stability.501  
                                                 
500 Shinoda H, The Difficulty and Importance of Local Ownership and Capacity Development in Peacebuilding, 
Hiroshima Peace Science, 30, 2008, Pg.101 
501 Van Tongeren P, 2011, Increasing Interest in Infrastructure for Peace, Journal of Conflictology, Policy Briefing, 
November, 2011 Pg. 50 
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The creation of a RI4P by a regional organization such as SADC also affords it a chance to redeem 
itself and rid itself of the image of a body which constantly favours governments of member states 
with little regard for the interests of local communities. This is because in war torn societies in a 
state of fragility and transition, there are usually a variety of actors with a claim to and different 
interpretations of local ownership. These actors may also include the government of such a state 
which lacks legitimacy and may serve as a divisive and disruptive force. There is thus a need to 
widen the net by accommodating as many actors as possible from the local government, tribal and 
religious leadership to civil society organizations within the structures of a RI4P. This will not 
only show respect and an acceptance of the principle of local ownership, but it will also ensure 
that it is fostered for outcomes which are desirable and favourable to all.502   
RI4P provides a unique opportunity for conflictual regions to turn into areas of positive 
cooperation where the likelihood of another war is reduced or even eliminated. Peacebuilding 
strategies after a war are usually geared towards one country, however, neighbouring countries are 
affected by refugee flows, disruption of transportation routes and smuggling of weapons. They are 
as such actively involved in these wars. In some cases as seen in Rwanda and Uganda’s 
involvement in the DRC, neighbouring countries may actively support certain opposition parties 
or the government making a civil war in one country a regional concern. Seemingly unrelated 
conflicts become interconnected through what has been called a ‘regional conflict complex’. 
Another advantage to a regional approach to building peace is that finding a regional settlement to 
all conflicts is more effective than dealing with them one conflict at a time.503  
                                                 
502 Shinoda, H, 2008, Pg. 101  
503 Wallensteen P, 2012, Regional Peacebuilding: A new challenge, New Routes, Vol. 17, 4, Pg. 3-4 
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A Self-Sustainable and Effective Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P) in SADC 
Through the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996, the 
signing of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in 2001 and the Strategic Indicative Plan 
of the Organ (SIPO I & II) in 2004 and 2012 respectively, SADC strengthened its capacity to 
respond to the above regional challenges. Its institutional capacity was further enhanced by the 
restructuring exercise which created the Directorates on Social & Human Development and 
Special Programmes (SHDSP), Infrastructure and Services (IS) and Food Agriculture and Natural 
Resources (FANR) all of which have human security related mandates. SADC thus has admirable 
policies and institutions in place which are hamstrung by implementation failures.  
The earlier identified challenges have set in motion a series of identity conflicts in SADC member 
states fuelled by actual or perceived exclusion, inequality and discontent relating to control over 
access to natural resources and decision making power. Current traditional conflict resolution 
efforts employed by SADC have thus only gone skin deep in addressing the above challenges. 
These have failed to deliberately and effectively transform the conflictual attitudes, perceptions, 
beliefs and cultures amongst conflict parties in member states. It is against this backdrop that this 
contribution recommends the creation of a self-sustainable and effective Regional Infrastructure 
for Peace (RI4P) in SADC. The RI4P will enhance peacebuilding capacities in the region and link 
grassroots conflict transformation efforts in SADC member states with regional efforts. At the 
systemic level the RI4P ought to be underpinned by a common foreign and security policy 
outlining shared regional interests and values which will serve to improve relations with donors, 
the AU and the UN. The increased donor funding and support will greatly enhance SADC’s 
capacity to address the human security related factors that impede conflict transformation. 
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At the Institutional level The RI4P ought to be underpinned by a regional peacebuilding policy, 
and a regional conflict transformation strategy. Since human security challenges are cross cutting, 
a dedicated human security department and a human security policy and strategy ought to be 
created to transform the human security aspects of conflict at all levels. At the member state level 
the RI4P should be operationalized by local peace committees and councils at the ward, district, 
regional and national levels. Fully fledged Ministries of Peace may be established in countries 
experiencing or emerging from protracted conflicts. These peace infrastructures ought to work 
closely with civil society groups and other non-state actors to effectively contain human security 
related challenges. The RI4P framework ought to increase the ability of individuals involved in 
conflicts to empathize with the other side. It should further transform relationships between 
conflicting parties from a mistrustful to a friendly and cooperative one by engendering trust. The 
RI4P will ultimately transform societies in conflicts by promoting positive attitudes, perceptions, 
emotions and personal relationships between conflicting parties resulting in durable peace in the 
region. The findings of this research indicate that this would be an effective intervention which 
would result in the attainment of self-sustainable peace in the region. A representation of the RI4P 
is shown in figure 5 below. 
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A Self Sustainable and Effective RI4P
 
Figure 5: A self-sustainable & effective regional infrastructure for peace (RI4P) in SADC 
Operationalising A Self Sustainable and Effective RI4P in SADC 
There are many advantages to the creation of an RI4P in SADC, a decision to create an RI4P 
enables planning for peace and conflict prevention. An RI4P provides a ready standing capability 
to build peace in case of instability or conflict through cooperation by all stakeholders. I4Ps have 
been found to be inexpensive and cost-effective, compared to the cost of armed conflicts. An RI4P 
enables Early Warning and Early Response capabilities in conflict areas and builds on traditional 
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structures such as Councils of Elders, which ought to be community driven and locally owned. An 
RI4P ought to be supported by legislation in each member state to make it effective and functional, 
it should be accompanied by Peace Education in the school curriculum from elementary school to 
university and involve non state actors such as the private sector to reflect how peace supports 
business and economic development.  
An RI4P should have the capacity to conduct Peace impact assessments for monitoring and 
evaluation purposes, it has the potential to reduce crime by engendering a culture of social peace, 
harmony, justice and co-existence in SADC member states. RI4P will ensure that conflicts are 
readily contained within the societies they occur and ensure the emergence of a strong and 
dedicated cadre of peace professionals and practitioners forming part of a peace bureaucracy in 
SADC member states which works proactively to find innovative ways of sustaining peace rather 
than taking it as a given. An RI4P will ensure deliberate and ongoing efforts to build capacities in 
member states and within the region at all levels, this will give peace the urgency and sensitivity 
afforded to similar topics such as Climate Change and Global Warning. An RI4P will help change 
the nomenclature and vocabulary in SADC member states to replace the usage of defence and 
security in its nomenclature with peace. The mindsets of all involved will thus be conditioned to 
pursue positive and self-sustainable peace proactively. An RI4P would thus ensure that SADC 
member states seek for peaceful solutions to problems and conflicts as opposed to the status quo 
where they have a disposition toward solutions involving the use of force as evidenced by the fact 
that the SADCBRIG is one of the most advanced units within the Organ. 
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Historical Precedents for Infrastructures for Peace 
In 1793 US founding father Dr Benjamin Rush called for the creation of a Department of Peace 
on equal footing with the department of war in the US. The aim of the department would be to 
teach us to forgive and love our enemies and subdue our passion for war and encourage respect 
for human life. In 1935 the first bill was introduced in Congress for the creation of a Department 
of peace in the US. Since then over 100 similar bills were introduced in 31 Congressional sessions 
but none of them has ever passed.504 There is evidence of success of I4Ps in other African countries 
such as Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. I4Ps have thus proven to be adaptable to country specific 
contexts and needs of the environment. Other structures that resemble I4Ps have been created in 
Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Peru, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, South Sudan, The Philippines, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Nicaragua, Northern 
Ireland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.505 Based on the foregoing, the creation of 
an RI4P in SADC would thus not be a far-fetched idea. 
International Instruments in Support of RI4P 
Impetus for a RI4P can also be found in a number of recent reports and activities organised by 
regional and international organisations. These include; the 2009 UN Secretary General’s Report 
on “Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict”; the 2011 UN Secretary General’s 
Report on “Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict”; the 2012, UNDP Governance and Peace 
Report; the UNDP Study of local peace committees, “An Architecture for Building Peace at the 
                                                 
504 See: Peace Now:  www.admissionsfilm.com/admissions-screening-for-peacenow/ 
505 Ibid 
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Local level” authored by Andries Odendaal; the Busan Partnership Agreement on development 
cooperation and on a “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”.506   
Other similar instruments, declarations, campaigns and reports include: The Peace Now! One 
Billion Signatures for Peace Campaign; UN CHARTER- “…dedicated to saving succeeding 
generations from the scourge of armed conflict”; Universal Declaration on Human Rights- 
“…human-beings should act towards one another peacefully and in the interest of the common 
good”; UNESCO Constitution- “Since wars begin in the minds of men, defences of peace must 
also be constructed in the minds of men”; UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 31st 
2001 on Women, Peace and Security- acknowledges women’s role in peace processes; UNSC 
Resolution 1820 of 19 June 2008 on Women, Peace and Security; UN Resolution 52/15 of 20 
November 1997- Proclaiming the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace; UN 
Resolution A/RES/53/25 of 19 November 1998, proclaiming 2001-2010- “The International 
Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence for the Children of the World”; UN Resolution 
53/243 of 13 September 1999 about UN Declaration and Program of Action for a Culture of Peace- 
to strengthen global culture of peace; UN Resolution A/RES/52/13, 15 January 1998 on a Culture 
of Peace; A/RES/55/282 of 28 September 2001 on International Day of peace; 2005 Mid-Decade 
Status Report on the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence for the Children 
of the World; Earth Charter Initiative- recognizing global inter-dependence and indivisibility of 
ecological protection, poverty eradication, equitable economic development, respect for human 
rights, democracy and peace; 2009 UNSG Report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict; 
2011 UNSG Report on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict.  
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Recent Dialogues and Consultative Processes in Support of Building Capacities for I4Ps 
Further international consensus and support which justifies the timeliness of this research and 
approaches which build a bridge between local, national, regional and international efforts to 
transform conflicts was shown by the collaborative work of the UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention 
and Recovery (BCPR), African Union, ECOWAS and SADC. On 24th – 25th June 2013, the 
UNDP-BCPR and the African Union hosted a Joint African Union Commission (AUC) and 
Regional Economic Community (REC) Consultation on Linking National to Regional and 
Continental Efforts in Conflict Prevention and Mediation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.507  
This meeting was followed by another one in Accra, Ghana on the 9th – 10th September 2013 where 
the UNDP, the AUC and ECOWAS hosted a regional consultative meeting. The meeting resulted 
in the signing of the Accra Declaration on strengthening national, regional and continental 
coordination towards building national peace infrastructures for conflict prevention.508 On 16th – 
17th September, a similar consultation process took place in Maseru, Lesotho, jointly hosted by 
SADC, the AU and the UNDP. The consultation was aimed at exploring the modalities for 
strengthening peaceful and resilient development in SADC by building and strengthening national 
capacities for peace and sustainable development and establishing synergies between national, 
regional and continental efforts. The consultation resulted in the signing of the Maseru 
                                                 
507 UNDP, Report of the Joint AUC-RECS-UNDP Consultation on Linking National to Regional and Continental 
Efforts in Conflict Prevention and Mediation, 24-25 June, 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
508 Government of the Republic of Ghana, The Accra Declaration on Strengthening National, Regional and 
Continental Coordination towards Building National Peace Infrastructures for Conflict Prevention, 10 th September, 
2013, Accra, Ghana,  
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Declaration.509 Relatedly the secretariat of the African Insider Mediators Platform in collaboration 
with the Action Support Centre and the UNDP-BCPR hosted a consultative meeting aimed at the 
development and application of national and local capacities for mediation in Africa. The meeting 
resulted in the signing of the Liliesleaf Declaration on the 13th September 2013 at Liliesleaf, 
Rivonia, South Africa.510  In tandem with the above, on the 29 – 30th October 2013 the Government 
of Cote d’Ivore, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the 
African Leadership Centre (ALC), Kings College, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies 
(IPSS), Addis Ababa University and the African Union Commission jointly hosted the Annual 
Pilgrimage of International Envoys and Mediators working on Africa. This was among others 
attended by members of the AU Panel of the Wise, as well as members of the Pan-African Network 
of the Wise (PanWise). This was the fourth African Union (AU) High level retreat of Special 
Envoys and Representatives on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa held in 
Abidjan, Cote d’Ivore under the theme: “The AU 2013 Golden Jubilee Retreat: 50 Years of Peace-
making in Africa- A Critical Retrospective of the OAU/AU Peace-making” resulting in the signing 
of the Abidjan Declaration.511 
In 2014, a similar consultative process was held in Gaborone, Botswana on the 14th – 15th May 
2014 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the African Union Peace and Security Council 
(PSC). The meeting served as a consultative exercise for civil society representatives from across 
                                                 
509 Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, The Maseru Declaration on A Framework for Peaceful Development in 
Southern Africa, 17 September 2013, Maseru Lesotho 
510 Drums of Change, Liliesleaf Declaration, Volume 8, Issue 4, 2013, A Quarterly Newsletter of the Peace and 
Development Platform of the Action Support Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa 
511 ACCORD, Abidjan Declaration, The AU 2013 Golden Jubilee Retreat: 50 years of peace-making in Africa: A 
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the continent to give their perspectives on how the PSC has responded to conflicts and security 
challenges in Africa since inception as well as to explore ways of improving relations between the 
PSC and non-state actors.512  
International Organisations Working in Support of RI4Ps and Engendering a Culture of Peace 
Over the years a number of organisations and networks in support of agendas that resonate with a 
RI4P have emerged. Listed here are some examples; Global Alliance for Ministries and 
Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP); Peace Now; Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) International 
Network; Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT); UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery (BCPR);  West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP); The Earth Charter 
Initiative; African Union Commission; Campaign to Construct A Canadian Department of Peace; 
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC); SADC-CNGO; The Africa 
Insider Mediator Platform; The UN Non-Governmental Organisation Liaison Service and the UN 
General Assembly; Operation Peace Through Unity; Global Movement for the Culture of Peace. 
  
                                                 
512 ACCORD, “Report of the Southern Africa Consultation on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Peace and 
Security Council”, 14-15 May 2014, Gaborone, Botswana, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of 
Conflicts (ACCORD) 
 Also see issue 14 of Drums of Change, Action Support Centre newsletter of 14th May, 2014, Action Support Centre, 
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6.6 Strengthening Conflict Transformation capacity and enhancing Local Ownership 
in SADC through the creation of a Self-Sustainable Regional Infrastructure for Peace 
(RI4P)  
A logical starting point for an assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity is to assess 
the organization against its own stated goals and objectives. Questions which ought to be asked -
should include whether the objectives truly reflect the aspirations of member states or whether 
they are just rhetorical. A further interrogation should be done to identify the unstated objectives 
such as a tendency to protect incumbents in government which has been prevalent in SADC.513  
A key objective of SADC is 
stated as being to “promote 
self-sustaining development 
on the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the inter-
dependence of Member States, 
achieve complementarity 
between national and regional 
strategies and programmes, and promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of 
resources of the region”. SADC has not succeeded in achieving most of the above objectives.514 
In order to achieve this, SADC needs to lead and guide the development of policies at national 
level as well as the development and implementation of regional norms and standards and the 
                                                 
513 Nathan, 2012 
514 Ibid 
Box 1. Objectives of the SADC Organ  
- Protecting the people of Southern Africa from 
instability and conflict 
- Promoting the evolution of common political values 
and institutions 
- Developing common  foreign policy approaches 
- Promoting regional cooperation and coordination on 
security and defence 
- Preventing, containing and resolving inter and intra 
state conflict by peaceful means 
- Promoting the development of democratic institutions 
and practices (SADC, 2001, Article 2) 
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development of the necessary capacity at member state level.515 International peacebuilders have 
been called upon to embrace the principle of local ownership and capacity development in order 
to achieve sustainable peace. Ownership here is understood as one’s right over his or her property, 
although used in the context of a state and external actors.516 In the area of Peacebuilding this can 
be achieved through the construction of an effective and self-sustaining RI4P which would serve 
as the point of confluence for attaining the complementarity between national and regional 
strategies and programmes.  
6.7 The Merits of a RI4P 
RI4P is a multi-level regional peacebuilding initiative, this is defined as “ a collective initiative by 
various actors aimed at ensuring the absence of violent conflict and presence of positive / structural, 
sustainable peace from a regional perspective – taking into account the geographic and functional 
elements of the regional conflict formation”.517 Regional peacebuilding doesn’t negate national 
and local peacebuilding, it instead seeks to complement them with additional levels of action that 
wouldn’t ordinarily be targeted at the latter. National or state level initiatives remain important as 
the state remains the framework within which solutions to violent conflict will be found. However 
                                                 
515 Report on SADC’s Regional Capacity Building Strategy for Education Management and Information Systems 
(EMIS), March 2009 commissioned by the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) 
Working group on Education Policy Support for the SADC Secretariat. Pg.  9 
516 Shinoda H, 2008, The Difficulty and Importance of Local ownership and Capacity Development in 
Peacebuilding, Hiroshima Peace Science, 30, 2008, Pg. 95 - 97 
517 Maina and Razia, 2012, Pg. 23 
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a key challenge for national peacebuilding initiatives is that they focus on promoting peacebuilding 
at the national level and are not designed to accommodate specific trans-national problems.518 
 Regional peacebuilding therefore aims to bridge this gap through innovative solutions such as the 
creation of a RI4P. Lederach underscores the importance of the creation of infrastructures for peace 
which eventually lead to the formation of Peace Commissions and even official Peace Ministries. 
He draws from his pioneering involvement in the formation of similar structures in Nicaragua in 
the 1980s and South Africa in the early 1990s.519  
I4Ps help fragile, divided, and transitional or post conflict societies build and sustain peace by: 
-managing recurring conflicts over land, natural resources or contested elections; 
-finding internal solutions, to specific conflicts and tensions through mediated consensus 
or multi-stakeholder dialogue; 
-negotiating and implementing new governing arrangements, such as new constitutional 
provisions, in an inclusive and consensual manner.520 
 
The main objective of this research which is to assess SADC’s conflict transformation capacity 
has been given greater impetus by an ongoing joint consultation process between the African 
Union Commission (AUC), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), including SADC and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) aimed at harmonizing conflict prevention 
policies and mechanisms between the AU and the RECs in search of long lasting peace, security 
and stability on the continent as shown earlier. A notable pattern in all the above mentioned 
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gatherings and in their resolutions was their explicit reference to the idea of conflict transformation 
and calls for the establishment and strengthening of Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps) in their 
member states. “The UNDP’s recent programmes in support of local ‘peace architectures’ is 
indicative of a realization of the potential and legitimacy of such processes. In UNDP’s vision 
local peace architectures link grassroots organisations, local peace councils and committees, with 
local and national governmental institutions”.521 This development although rare is both timely 
and welcome as it represents a turning point in efforts to deepen the pursuit of sustainable peace. 
6.8 A RI4P as a Fosterer of Conflict Transformation and Local Ownership 
With the inherent contradictions in the argument for SADC (an external regional actor) to 
strengthen local capacities for conflict transformation in Southern Africa, an appropriate role of 
SADC in the creation of a RI4P could be that of a “fosterer” of conflict transformation. This can 
take the form of nurturing and creating the right conditions for sustainable conflict transformation. 
SADC will first need to examine the roles and functions of external actors in various conflict 
situations in the region. The roles which ought to be geared towards strengthening and creating 
local capacities should be conceived of in a positive manner since local ownership is “pursued for 
better self-realization, which ought to be supported by self-confidence and developed through 
capacity development by enlargement of choice and freedom of the “self”.522 
In order to succeed in its role of a fosterer of conflict transformation, SADC can draw a leaf from 
the experiences and precedents set by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) which was 
                                                 
521 UNDP report, “An Architecture for Building Peace At the Local Level: A Comparative Study of Local Peace 
Committees” cited in Richmond, no date, Pg. 9 
522 Shinoda H, 2008, Pg.102 
278 
 
established in December 2005. The PBC is a forum-style organization which doesn’t implement 
programmes by itself but only recommends strategies for peacebuilding. The UN Security Council 
and General Assembly gave national governments the primary responsibility for peacebuilding 
strategies to ensure national ownership of the process as well as to ensure that the PBC doesn’t 
interfere with national jurisdictions. The PBC is supported by the Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO) which offers the intellectual support for better implementation of peacebuilding strategies. 
It also administers the Peacebuilding Fund which finances the policy goals of peacebuilding.523 
Guided by the above framework of the UN PBC, SADC could formulate a Regional Peacebuilding 
Policy (RPP) underpinned by a Regional Conflict Transformation Strategy (RCTS) which can 
form the basis of the RI4P by guiding its formation and roll out. As is the case with the UN PBC, 
which has an initial focus on a limited number of countries of need, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-
Bissau, the SADC RI4P may adopt a modest start by prioritizing those member states in critical 
need of intervention. With the support of a regional tool similar to the Peacebuilding Fund of the 
UN, the RI4P can gradually be rolled out in all SADC member states to serve as a conflict 
transformation and early warning device.  
6.8.1 Local Ownership & Civil Society Participation In a RI4P 
The real challenge for peacebuilding is not the amount of aid given but the design of peacebuilding 
programmes and support as well as the sustainability of peacebuilding interventions. Ideal 
peacebuilding interventions ought to be viable long term projects with an ability to measure impact. 
They should also be under pinned by an integrated peacebuilding framework rather than a 
fragmented approach which fails to synergies activities and make the maximum use of limited 
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resources. The intervention has to incorporate local ownership right form the design stage with a 
view to building local capacities for peace by utilizing local resources.524 A RI4P is informed by 
the principle of local ownership in peacebuilding which holds that local people should be allowed 
to play a leading role in the process of creating social foundations for durable peace. Understood 
in this way, peacebuilding is seen as a set of activities to create social foundations for durable 
peace.525  
SADC government’s suspicions of non-state actors especially civil society organisations have been 
fuelled by fears that foreign powers use them to gather intelligence and exert their influence in the 
region. That notwithstanding, taking cue from the AU and other RECs, SADC has made provision 
for civil society actors both in the SADC treaty as well as through an MoU signed with the SADC 
Council of NGOs, the Protocol on Politics Defence and Security 526  as well as the Strategic 
Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO II). Commitments made in these agreements have for the large 
part remained hollow platitudes without any real translation at both national and grassroots level 
in member states. In fact knowledge or indeed awareness of SADC, its work and achievements 
within its member states and among ordinary citizens has remained confined to the educated few 
and those with access to the media.527 This lack of awareness about SADC is coupled with the 
non-existence and in some cases incomplete status of SADC National Committees (SNCs) which 
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were intended to be the primary vehicles for consultations and implementation of SADC activities 
at national level.528  
These lacunae represent lost opportunities for effectively addressing the root causes of conflicts 
and structurally unfair patterns of relation which could prevent future conflicts and resurgences of 
old conflicts. This presents space for the introduction of idea of Conflict Transformation and a 
RI4P to the case of SADC. With its systemic focus which ensures a greater role for civil society 
in conflict prevention, management and resolution, a conflict transformation approach also creates 
scope for the transformation of the relationship between states and civil society in SADC from one 
of mutual distrust to one of interdependence and sharing which means unlimited potential for 
durable peace in the region.529 
6.8.2 Preconditions for Success in engendering Local Ownership  
Peacebuilding and conflict transformation interventions are doomed to fail unless the local society 
acquires the will and capacity sufficient enough to build and maintain durable peace. This point is 
highlighted by the fact that in most conflict affected societies, local people often lack the sufficient 
will and capacity for peacebuilding. Since it is difficult to readily find individuals with an aptitude 
and a predisposition to build peace, deliberate efforts should be made to identify and capacitate 
them. Another challenge is that even where there are local people willing to own and engage in 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation activities, they will need to be equipped with the 
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political and socio-economic capacity in the form of human, institutional, material and financial 
resources to enable them to do their work.530 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion 
In chapter one the declared goal of this research was to assess SADC’s Conflict Transformation 
capacity with a view to identifying gaps and opportunities to strengthen the current existing 
capacity if any. This was to be done looking at SADC’s capacity to transform the context, structure, 
issues, actors and rules governing conflicts in the region. To do this, the research adopted a 
framework which assessed SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the systemic, institutional 
and national / member state levels. At the member state level it considered three mini case studies 
of conflicts in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho which SADC intervened in. This was in an effort 
to assess SADC’s conflict transformation capacity as shown by the results or outcomes of the 
interventions. Further, the research assessed the human security aspects of SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity. This was informed by the fact that at the heart of conflict transformation 
lies a concern for social justice, equality, empathy and the prevalence of a culture of peaceful co-
existence. SADC’s social protection mechanisms were thus assessed in an effort to establish the 
efficacy of the mechanisms and institutions in place at the regional level to ensure the optimal and 
equitable delivery of social services to citizens in member states.  
Overall, the research recognized the fact that at all the above mentioned levels SADC had to 
varying degrees put in place some measures and mechanisms which armed it with a degree of 
capacity to transform conflicts in the region towards the realization of durable peace. However the 
overall conclusion drawn from the findings in the research is that there are major limitations in 
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SADC’s capacity to transform the context, structure, issues, actors as well as the rules governing 
conflicts in the region. A recurring explanation for this limitation has been SADC’s failure to 
implement its own treaties and agreements which are consonant with the agenda of conflict 
transformation. Another consistently identified impediment is the elitist nature of its structure 
which vests all decision making powers in the hands of heads of state and government who make 
all the ultimate decisions relating to regional peace and security. On numerous occasions regional 
leaders have taken decisions informed by personal, parochial, factional and at times national 
interests to the detriment of the ordinary citizens of the region in order to protect each other. 
7.2 Summary of Major Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 
The research has established that in an ideal set up regional organisations such as SADC are best 
suited and equipped for the implementation of conflict transformation. This is based on the fact 
that regional organisations are constructed by states to facilitate cooperation and to provide a forum 
for states to discuss how to deal with conflicts. The advantage of having a regional forum for 
discussion is that it is less costly since diplomatic solutions may be reached through discussions 
and negotiations precluding the need to resort to violence. Through information sharing at the 
regional level, confidence building measures (CBMs) are established enabling an air of 
transparency which minimizes suspicions and misperceptions among member states. Addressing 
issues at the regional level also has the added advantage of having a sobering effect on states to 
take a long term perspective on issues under consideration without being blinded by the allure of 
immediate pay-offs. Due to their multilateral nature regional organisations are perceived as being 
impartial and thus more effective when intervening in conflict situations. This research has gone 
to great lengths to illustrate the extent to which SADC has established itself in law and in deed as 
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an entity in possession of most if not all of the above qualities. Notwithstanding the goodwill 
bestowed on it by the supposed air of impartiality surrounding it, SADC’s conflict transformation 
capacity has been put to the test at a number of levels and on several occasions and unfortunately 
it has been found to be wanting on many fronts. 
Chapter 2 of this study established that at the systemic level, this has been the result of a 
multiplicity of reasons ranging from systemic and structural factors such as the legacy of 
colonialism, the vestiges of Cold War and apartheid era proxy wars fought in the region as well as 
modern forces of globalization and capitalism which have put pressure on SADC member states 
in many ways. During the Cold War era, some SADC member states used external military threats 
as a pretext for militarising their domestic politics. The military and other state security agencies 
were used to crush domestic dissent, sadly this has lingered on in the post-apartheid and post-cold 
war era and is a major constraint for SADC’s ability to transform the context of conflicts occurring 
in member states when the military remains a strong political actor. 
The legacy of colonialism is especially a key factor in SADC since the Southern African region 
was one of the last regions on the continent to decolonize. As such SADC’s conflict transformation 
capacity constraints can be traced to the nature and history of its member states most of which are 
still grappling with basic post-colonial state-building and consolidation challenges. They as such 
cannot be expected to fully perform the functions of the state as defined in western International 
Relations theory. This means that the conflict transformation project in SADC was founded on a 
weak foundation from inception since the primary unit expected to drive the process, the state was 
itself weak to start with. Most member states have become non-viable entities whose leaders are 
preoccupied with regime survival as opposed to providing the best services to their people. Leaders 
have been entangled in contests for state power robbing their citizens of the enjoyment of rights 
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and services. Rather than a guarantor of security, the state in SADC has been a constant source of 
insecurity as it grapples with preventing an implosion caused by threats of civil war, secession, 
ethnicity, social exclusion, greed, corruption, repression etc. 
  The latter have been latent causes and drivers of conflicts in the region in the process eroding 
SADC’s capacity to transform the conflicts. Plagued by corruption, bad governance, economic 
mismanagement, inequalities, social exclusion, state weakness and failure, transnational organized 
crime, war-lordism, militias and rebel movements, wars over natural resources among a host of 
social and political problems, most SADC member states have found themselves in a state of near 
implosion. Their preoccupation with these first order issues of state building and development has 
robbed the regional project at SADC level of their undivided attention and contribution towards 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. The above issues have had a spill-over effect beyond 
the jurisdiction and control of single member states requiring the collective attention of SADC at 
the regional level.  
A major conclusion from the findings of this research has thus been the fact that most conflict 
transformation efforts in SADC have been conducted in a shallow and cosmetic way which has 
not paid attention to addressing the root causes of conflicts and social inequality for the realization 
of long lasting, self-sustainable and durable peace in the region. There is very little and scant if 
any reference to peacebuilding and conflict transformation in the lexicon and nomenclature of 
SADC, as evident in its treaties, protocols, declarations and literature generally. This is indicative 
of the fact that thinking about conflict transformation both at an institutional and member state 
level in SADC is still in its nascent stages. As such, SADC’s conflict resolution, conflict 
management and mediation activities have been equated to bandage remedies which have only 
covered the surface or symptoms of conflicts without adequately addressing the core of the wounds 
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inflicted by conflict. It is against this backdrop and on the back of ongoing international consensus 
by leading organisations such as the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit as well as calls 
by non-state actors such as the I4P, Trans Conflict and GAMIP, that the research recommends the 
need to deepen the search for regional peace through the formulation of an effective and self-
sustainable Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P). 
Part of the research’s assessment of conflict transformation capacity was guided by Galtung’s 
theory of conflict which holds that, even the non-military aspects of conflicts need urgent attention 
because when measures to curb the conflict fail, it is the very failure to transform conflicts that 
leads to violence. He identifies three types of violence, cultural, structural and direct violence 
which require transformation. Cultural violence is the invisible element of violence which has 
significant weight on the minds of individuals stemming from a clash in norms and value systems 
of different cultures which gives individuals the distinction between right and wrong, good and 
evil or acceptable and unacceptable. Structural violence is also an invisible form of violence which 
occurs when the structures in a society are geared in a rigid inflexible manner. Direct violence is 
the most understood of the three as its direct, wilfully harmful and aims to harm, injure or kill 
making it the most destructive and irreversible form of violence.531 A key finding in the research 
is thus that SADC has not fully nor successfully succeeded in transforming the cultural, structural 
and direct forms of violence in regional conflicts. Some of SADC’s capacity limitations in this 
respect were flagged above and more are illustrated below. 
When South Africa became a member of SADC in 1994, it served as a divisive force among the 
ranks of SADC member states as some still viewed it with suspicion. This was due to the lingering 
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memories of the systematic harassment meted out on neighbouring states by the apartheid regime. 
Although some had hoped that it would play a leadership role as the sub regional economic and 
democratic hegemon, the reality is that it is a reluctant hegemon. This reluctance represents a lost 
opportunity as South Africa could boost SADC’s conflict transformation capacity by influencing 
the context that breeds the conflicts as well as the rules and actors who govern the conflicts. Indeed 
South Africa has in some instances made contributions to conflict transformation such as when it 
spearheaded the Zimbabwean mediation process on behalf of SADC as well as its contribution to 
the Madagascar mediation and the UN/SADC Force Intervention Brigade operating in the eastern 
DRC. It is implausible to think of a SADC military intervention without the involvement of South 
Africa, never mind a scenario of SADC intervening in South Africa itself should the need arise. 
These represent major constraints on SADC’s independence and conflict transformation capacity 
as a regional organization which if not timeously addressed will render SADC toothless. 
Related to the above is SADC’s strained relationship with International Cooperating Partners 
(ICPs), the colonial history of SADC member states has made them sensitive to external influence 
in foreign policy related matters as they jealously guard their self-determination, and avoid 
receiving policy direction from donors. In spite of this SADC relies on donors for more than half 
its funding, this has denied most donors access to funding SADC projects in the process impeding 
its ability to implement its conflict transformation programmes and mechanisms such as the SADC 
Brigade which is not deployable without donor support. Another conflict transformation capacity 
constraint is the tension and inconsistency in the policy framework and strategies guiding the 
working relationship of the UN, AU and SADC. This is worsened by SADC’s own highly 
politically charged work environment which is antagonistic to other external actors. Compounding 
the situation is the fact that the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU clash in that they 
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both claim primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent. The clash is exacerbated 
by a vacuum created by the absence of clarity on how to implement the principles of subsidiarity 
and complementarity in operational terms. Unless addressed timeously by all parties concerned 
this legal tension and lacuna may delay and frustrate future conflict transformation efforts. 
The multiple concurrent membership of other regional organizations on the continent by SADC 
member states has been identified as another constraint on SADC’s capacity to transform both the 
context and rules of conflicts as it has failed to adequately transform its own context and rules in 
preparation for such a conflict transformation role. The findings indicate that from inception, a 
number of SADC member states have held multiple concurrent memberships in other regional 
organisations such as COMESA, East African Community and the International Conference of the 
Great Lakes just to name a few. This has had negative implications for their commitment as they 
have torn loyalties and responsibilities demanding them to abide by different rules of more than 
one regional body. This has been accompanied by a duplication of efforts and a waste of resources 
which complicates the harmonization and coordination of member states at SADC level. This 
phenomenon described as a ‘spaghetti bowl’ results in a complex entanglement of political 
commitments and institutional requirements which impedes all conflict transformation efforts. 
Member states are derailed by counter-productive competition in pursuit of political and strategic 
national interests which push them to join multiple RECs.  
Another identified constraint on SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the systemic level is 
member state’s experiences with democracy which is an enabler of successful conflict 
transformation. Conflict transformation requires equality, social justice and social relations based 
on empathy, fairness and mutual respect, democracy provides good ground for these to flourish. 
Research findings indicate that in most SADC member states democracy has been reduced to a 
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preoccupation with holding regular elections which although frequent are often not free and fair. 
A typology of SADC member states reveals a variation of dictatorships, one person and one party 
ruled states, defacto one party ruled states, military dictatorships and dejure one party ruled states, 
dynastic rule and some liberal democracies.  
The above differences in the nature of member states has provided grounds for a divergence in 
values and political culture. Although member states are loathe to publicly admit the divisions in 
their ranks, two camps exist of the militarists (those inclined to military solutions) and pacifists 
(those inclined to diplomatic solutions). The existence of these divisions does not bode well for 
conflict transformation since time may be wasted unnecessarily on suspicions and failure to reach 
unified responses to crisis and conflicts in the region fanned by state parties’ divergent  value 
systems. This situation can in the long run be remedied by reforming SADC to become a 
supranational body with the legal muscle to enforce compliance with protocols on democratic 
governance upon member states.  Related to this is a predisposition to a policy of non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of other member states even in the face of human rights abuses against 
citizens. The values of the leaders thus don’t always match the rapidly evolving political and 
cultural values of their own citizens as they tend to protect each other. 
The research has established that the pattern of conflicts in the region has been intra-state rather 
than the traditional inter-state conflicts seen during the cold war and apartheid era. In SADC these 
occurred in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
With most of the above over, in some cases such as in Mozambique there have been threats of a 
relapse while Angola and Namibia contend with threats of secession. South Africa is marred by 
regular mass protests which at times threaten to paralyse the economy while the DRC is constantly 
fighting off rebels and war lords. Zimbabwe and Lesotho have also had to contend with election 
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related conflicts and disputes. In order to be effective, SADC thus has to focus its attention on 
these internal conflicts through the involvement and empowerment of local actors in the 
communities where the conflicts first began and where they will inevitably end. Although some 
would argue that this would be tantamount to a breach of sovereignty, a way has to be found 
through the framework of SADC treaties and commitments signed by member states   committing 
to aid the peaceful resolution of conflicts in their midst. 
In chapter 3, the research has established that SADC has established a comprehensive policy 
framework that supports conflict transformation at the institutional level. This is comprised of the 
SADC Treaty of 1992, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP). All these 
constitute SADC’s policy framework in support of the AU’s APSA which is the framework within 
which all conflict transformation activities take place. On top of these an MOU was signed with 
the SADC CNGO, though commendable, civil society has not been sufficiently involved in 
SADC’s conflict transformation related activities.  
Further, SADC has formulated Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections which 
articulates the values and normative framework to be observed by all member states in the conduct 
of elections. It has been shown in this research that SADC member states have constantly breached 
and ignored their obligations as outlined in the above treaties and agreements. This is a major 
problem that has undermined and will continue to limit SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
Aiding this is SADC’s Troika system which despite its advantage of speeding up decision making, 
it has had the unintended effect of serving the narrow interests of a small cabal who make decisions. 
SADC’s conflict transformation policy framework has further been undermined by its failure to 
coordinate the formulation and implementation of the SIPO and the RISDP. Despite the existence 
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of this framework, implementation of the commitments made in the policy instruments often go 
unimplemented which circumscribes its conflict transformation capacity. SADC’s SIPO I was thus 
akin to a wish list without clear benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation and implementation 
responsibilities for the relevant structures. By 2013, SIPO II’s implementation also appeared 
stalled after being launched a year earlier. This is another limitation on SADC’s conflict 
transformation capacity since it is also a voluntary political agreement which isn’t legally binding. 
SIPO II has also missed the opportunity to repair SADC’s fragile relationship with ICPs which as 
shown earlier greatly throttles its conflict transformation capacity.  
The MDP is a strategic fulcrum in SADC’s conflict transformation machinery, it outlines the action 
to be taken in response to an armed attack against a signatory party which sees an attack on any 
member state shall be met with immediate collective action. It has guided SADC’s recent decision 
to intervene in the DRC to pacify the rebels in the east of the country. The success of the 
intervention is a reflection of the existence of some capacity on the part of SADC although it was 
financed by the UN. SADC thus has capacity to transform conflicts in terms of its policy 
frameworks although it has serious constraints to deploy alone. This is further complicated by the 
identified legal tension that exists between the MDP and the UN charter where the latter requires 
UNSC authorization before enforcement action and the former which says that the UNSC needs 
to be notified soon after a military response by member states which weakens its conflict 
transformation capacity. 
Regarding the institutional conflict transformation capacity of SADC, the findings have identified 
some shortcoming in its supreme decision making structure, the SOHSG which is the fact that its 
decisions are taken by consensus and aren’t legally binding on member states. It was also found 
that the summit may also at times take decisions which favour individual leaders or member states 
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over the interests of the region. This does not bode well for its conflict transformation capacity 
which is premised on social justice and serving the interests of grass root communities. 
 The Summit also robs the SADC secretariat of autonomy and decision making power especially 
in the areas of conflict transformation and security. This is despite that the 2001 restructuring 
exercise centralized programme coordination and implementation to the secretariat. The secretariat 
has also not clearly spelt out its coordination arrangements with departments in member countries. 
It is faced with serious human resource challenges in the form of the mismatch between available 
staff and work loads as well as poor investment in staff development especially in technical areas 
such as mediation. These are major capacity constraints which inhibit success in conflict 
transformation.  
The SADC Directorate of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is the primary arm charged 
with carrying out conflict transformation work in SADC. The findings however reflect that it lacks 
in-house technical expertise in fields like mediation support and early warning although it is in the 
process of establishing REWS and a POE. These deficiencies were reflected in the limited 
successes and setbacks that SADC mediation missions suffered as shown in this study. Within the 
OPDS is the RPTC which has the primary responsibility of building peace and security in the 
region. From inception in 1995, RPTC has carried out numerous training courses and participated 
in all major SADC Peacekeeping exercises. Most of its activities have been financed by SADC 
since 2005 when the main donor Denmark pulled out. This is a sign that SADC has some measure 
of conflict transformation capacity and commitment. The findings however reflect a need for the 
RPTC to drop its military identity and adopt a multi-dimensional character consonant with 
international trends of PSOs as well as by including civilian police and other civilians in its training. 
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A key milestone in SADC’s conflict transformation capacity was the launch of the SADC Standby 
brigade (SADCBRIG). Armed with civilian policing and civilian components, it has a permanent 
presence at the SADC secretariat through its planning element (PLANEL) in Gaborone. The 
pledge by member states of all the required 3500 troops was a great sign of their commitment to 
transforming conflicts in the region. The findings urge SADC to address the challenges of 
interoperability and incompatibility of equipment among member states which may impede future 
deployment.  
The closure and the limiting of the powers of the SADC Tribunal which was the only SADC 
judicial dispute settlement mechanism has robbed SADC citizens of a mechanism for recourse in 
their social justice needs. It has also robbed SADC of a chance to effectively transform the rules, 
actors and issues at the heart of regional conflicts further weakening its conflict transformation 
capacity. Related to this are the numerous strong calls for the need to equip the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum with legislative powers and to convert it into a full-fledged regional 
parliament to enhance its democratic stature and to improve governance, accountability and local 
ownership in SADC. This would greatly boost SADC’s Conflict Transformation capacity since it 
would be compulsory to domesticate conflict transformation related legislation formulated at 
SADC level within member states. The findings have also pointed at a need to further involve the 
SADC-CNGO in the internal institutional structure and activities of SADC beyond the MoU they 
signed with a particular focus on helping to empower civil society organisations with capacity to 
conduct conflict transformation related work. 
Chapter four conducted an assessment of SADC’s conflict transformation capacity at the national 
level in SADC member states. Following the 2001 restructuring exercise SADC member states 
were expected to establish SADC National Committees tasked with national level coordination of 
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SADC activities. The findings show that the committees are weak in countries where they have 
been established while they haven’t been established in most other countries. Where they exist 
SNCs are supposed to involve civil society, workers unions and private sector representatives. The 
reverse is however true in practice. This is a great capacity constraint as SNCs provide a good 
foundation for conflict transformation work as they can serve as local forums to resolve and 
transform conflicts. Further, the findings show that there is no clarity on how the organ relates to 
the SNCs and their implementation frameworks. It is thus recommended that SNCs should be 
reformed into semi-autonomous structures located outside government for greater efficiency and 
local ownership. 
A key capacity weakness for SADC at the member state level is its failure to enforce and 
implement commitments made at regional level in SADC. Within SADC member states, matters 
of conflict transformation, peace and security remain the traditional preserve of the state which 
isolates communities and other non-state actors key to the conflict transformation process. 
Although they were meant to enhance the visibility and awareness about SADC at member state 
level, only a small group of people working directly with SADC appeared to know about the 
existence of the SNCs.  
Since SADC is nothing more than a formation of states, SADC will not do anything that its member 
states will not permit it to do. As such, SADC needs to formulate a deliberate strategy that will 
guide the orientation of its member states to equip them with a capacity to transform and defuse 
conflicts at national level. The findings also point to a need for the emergence of a core group of 
democracies in the region who can form a united front to safeguard democracy and condemn 
human rights abuses. This can be bolstered by making membership of SADC legally conditional 
on a member state’s record of good governance and implementation of democratic reforms. The 
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divergent foreign policy positions often adopted by SADC member states was another issue put 
under the  microscope in the research. This tension which breeds suspicion also goes against the 
goals of conflict transformation as it risks pitting member states against each other as they pursue 
national rather than regional interests. Examples given in the research were Botswana’s unilateral 
decision to continue engaging USA on AFRICOM although other member states took a collective 
decision not to. Another issue viewed in dim light was South Africa’s unilateral involvement in 
peace missions on the continent outside SADC’s mandate as well as the failure of the regional 
collective to denounce the human rights abuses and democratic deficits in Swaziland. 
Chapter 4 also considered three mini case studies of the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in efforts 
to assess SADC’s capacity to intervene in the three countries. In the case of the DRC, the findings 
reflect that DRC’s joining of SADC in 1997 has overstretched the attention and resources of SADC 
as seen in the 1998 intervention which dragged in three SADC member states and the recent 
UN/SADC FIB made up of battalions from three SADC member states. The country which has 
been marred by a protracted conflict involving other actors in the Great Lakes region who aren’t 
members of SADC and who SADC has no control over has greatly burdened SADC by diverting 
its attention from other equally pressing conflict transformation needs in the region. 
The impact of SADC’s intervention in the DRC cannot easily be seen as there are numerous other 
actors who have intervened in the country. In its most recent intervention which jointly with the 
UN rooted out the notorious M23 rebels, credit cannot be solely given to SADC as the UN financed 
the mission although SADC contributed troops. Since only SADC member states deployed and 
not under the banner of SADC, it cannot be said that the intervention was a sign of SADC’s 
capacity.    
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Since DRC is a member of SADC however, the findings see a role for SADC in transforming 
conflicts at the grassroots level through peacebuilding and conflict transformation programmes 
which empower civil society groups and communities to be able to achieve durable and self-
sustainable peace. This in the long run will alter the context of the conflict, the structure of the 
society as well as the attitudes of the actors involved in the conflict. SADC can however be credited 
with taking a firm position to pacify the eastern DRC although its programme was later high-
jacked by the UN who wanted to save face. Its commitment to the cause is reflected in its continued 
involvement and support of the Peace Framework of the Great Lakes and the inclusion of the 
Director of the OPDS Col. (Rtd) Tanki Mothae in the technical support committee led by the 
Special Representative of the U.N S.G for the Great Lakes, Mary Robinson. Further commitment 
to transforming the conflict in the DRC was demonstrated by SADC member states all of whom 
had by the end of 2013 committed troops in a rotational arrangement to substitute the three 
currently forming part of the FIB when their tour of duty ends and until the mission objective is 
met. 
In Zimbabwe SADC is credited with preventing an implosion and a civil war resulting from the 
post 2008 political crisis. SADC transformed the conflict by altering its structure leading the 
conflict parties into a Global Political Agreement which created the Government of National Unity 
(GNU). The SADC led mediation process also led to the transformation of the rules of the conflict 
through the adoption of a new constitution which led to the 2013 elections. Despite these 
achievements the organization is critiqued for failing to ensure that the ruling ZANU-PF party 
fully complies with the implementation of the GPA and the new constitution which puts a dent in 
the peace that currently prevails. 
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Another criticism of SADC’s handling of the mediation in Zimbabwe is that the ruling ZANU-PF 
enjoyed the support of its neighbouring countries who shared a common legacy of having fought 
liberation wars. This was evident in the resolutions of SADC summits most of which were never 
openly critical of the ruling party in Zimbabwe despite the human rights abuses it carried out. The 
SADC appointed mediator, former S.A president, Thabo Mbeki and incumbent Jacob Zuma were 
also critiqued for being soft on the regime where they ought to have taken firmer positions. The 
bias in favour of the ruling party was also shown by SADC’s frequent calls for the removal of 
western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. SADC went further to boycott the 2003 EU-Africa 
summit in Lisbon, Portugal and has recently elected President Robert Mugabe to the position of 
chairman of SADC. 
As shown in chapter 2 SADC’s conflict transformation capacity has been limited by its strained 
relationship with donors. Most donors have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe and have not funded 
SADC since Zimbabwe would indirectly benefit. Despite this SADC has consistently maintained 
its policy of silent diplomacy on Zimbabwe. Some judge the 2013 elections won by the ruling 
party in Zimbabwe as a success of SADC’s mediation efforts. The SADC election observer team 
declared the elections free and peaceful and remained silent on their fairness. Overall the elections 
can be seen as a success for SADC in transforming a potentially explosive conflict and averting 
civil war. SADC changed the rules, structure and to some extent the attitudes of the actors involved 
in the conflict who didn’t actively incite their followers to violence. 
Following the disputed outcome of the 2007 elections resulting from the manipulation of the new 
electoral model by the political elites seeking to exploit its compensatory mechanism for political 
mileage, a number of election observer missions raised concerns about the unholy political 
alliances between the bigger and smaller parties. Due to the conflict that ensued following the 
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disputed election outcome and the failure of home grown solutions, SADC decided to intervene. 
SADC nominated Botswana’s former President, Sir Ketumile Masire as a mediator and eminent 
person to lead the mediation effort. The Lesotho case can in some way be seen as a SADC success 
story. The success is however attributed to its swift intervention which contained a potentially 
explosive situation. SADC is as such credited with having the capacity to transform the conflict 
by at least bringing the conflict parties to the negotiation table through its mediation efforts. 
Although the mediation process took two years, by the time Masire relinquished his task he had 
undertaken seven missions to Lesotho, reflecting his commitment to the course as well as the 
intricate nature of the conflict. The limitations and challenges that SADC faced in transforming 
the conflict emanated from the following external and structural flaws; firstly the simultaneous 
pursuit of litigation and mediation related to the results by some of the parties derailed and 
complicated the mediation, secondly, the failure of a planned seminar of experts to review the 
electoral model used during the elections stalled the mediation, thirdly the conflict parties failed 
to reach agreement on signing an MoU seeking to commit ruling and opposition parties to a well-
defined course of action, fourthly the high stakes involved in the conflict polarized the positions 
of the parties causing them to dig in their heels and preventing them from reaching a compromise. 
Lastly Mistrust and some lapses creeped into the mediation resulting from the poor communication 
from the SADC secretariat and SADC’s tendency to only consult with the ruling party during 
discussions about the Lesotho conflict at summit level to the exclusion of the opposition.  
The conflict was ultimately resolved by the local Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) with the 
financial and technical support of the UNDP, Action Aid and Ireland Aid. When the SADC 
mediator, Masire resigned from his position as mediator after his efforts were frustrated by the 
ruling party, critics denounced his decision to publicly state his opinion on how the mediation 
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ought to proceed after relinquishing his mediation work. This has been seen as a reflection of the 
inadequate technical mediation expertise on his team to advise him which is a further blight on 
SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. 
In chapter five, SADC’s conflict transformation capacity was assessed, it was established that 
SADC has established a complete institutional framework made up of various directorates with 
mandates to transform the human security related aspects of conflicts as well as to provide social 
services and protections to prevent conflicts. The findings point at evidence that SADC has made 
progress in developing a policy framework to transform the human security aspects of conflicts. 
However, it revealed that there were insufficient linkages to conflict transformation and human 
security needs in conflict settings. 
A key deficiency identified in the social protection regimes of most SADC member states is that 
they are narrow and don’t cover all the branches of social security. This is attributed to a lack of 
political will on the part of SADC leaders who hide behind the excuse of a lack of resources. In 
conflict situations SADC needs to have the capacity to transform the course of the conflict by 
providing vital human needs such as water, food, medicine, sanitation, shelter, clothes, fuel and 
protecting civilians from physical threats. The findings have shown the difficulty of assessing 
SADC’s impact and capacity to transform the human security aspects of conflicts due to the 
involvement of numerous other actors such as the United Nations Office of the Commissioner for 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The chapter also showed the complementary links between 
conflict transformation and human security and that long term human security will only be 
achieved when conflict transformation succeeds in establishing good governance and a stable 
society. 
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An important finding is that citizens in SADC member states have grown disillusioned by the 
repeated promises and shattered hopes at the hands of their leaders. They attributed this to the 
region’s limited experience with democracy and the failure of a democratic culture to take root in 
SADC and in Africa in general. Further, it has been established that although human security is 
featured in SADC’s agenda, there is insufficient debate about the topic which means that concern 
about the topic isn’t accompanied by political commitment. This is therefore a deficit in SADC’s 
conflict transformation capacity as attention is mostly given to transforming the state centric 
aspects of peace and security. As such human insecurity, poverty and underdevelopment have been 
identified as major challenges that remain to be overcome by SADC in order to enhance its conflict 
transformation capacity. 
Related to this is the fact that economies in the region have a high proportion of workers earning 
low wages in the formal sector, low labour absorption rates and a large informal sector. These 
manifest in the high gini-co efficients recorded in the SADC region with some of the highest levels 
of inequality in the world. This is another impediment to SADC’s conflict transformation capacity 
as it negates the goals of social justice, dignity and empathy which conflict transformation 
embodies. 
Although SADC and its member states have over the years put in place a variety of human security 
measures, great challenges remain. Some member states have put in place complex multi-pillar 
approaches for providing social services to their citizens while some only have fragmented 
mechanisms of provision. This is reflected in the unflattering socio-economic indicators presented 
in chapter five where many citizens still don’t have access to basic services such as improved water. 
This provides fertile ground for future conflict and protests and by extension constitutes a negative 
reflection of SADC’s limited conflict transformation capacity since it is a form of structural 
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violence. The failure of SADC member states ability to meet the human security needs of their 
citizens has been blamed on poverty, dysfunctional labour markets and the legacy of colonialism. 
This is exacerbated by social exclusion of poor and informal sector workers in the social protection 
systems of member states which themselves are not comprehensive.  
It thus stands in the way of SADC’s ability to transform the context of conflicts and better the lives 
of its citizens in the long term. This is a challenge affecting SADC’s conflict transformation 
capacity as most employees remain vulnerable to structural violence itself a form of conflict 
requiring transformation in order to be fully addressed. Life for the ordinary citizen in SADC is 
thus precarious as they grapple with overcoming stubborn human security challenges such as 
HIV/AIDS, socio-economic inequalities, gender inequalities532, landlessness, bad governance, a 
lack of resources and capacity, forced migration, underdevelopment, destabilization, civil unrest, 
state failure and natural disasters. Challenges of natural disasters in the region include, climate 
change, droughts, floods, loss of protective reef barriers and a rise in sea levels in island states, 
over stocking, unsustainable land use, soil erosion and water stress.  These are all factors requiring 
transformation to mitigate conflicts and avert food shortages in the region. 
Chapter five has shown that SADC has at least established institutional capacity for human security 
through the creation of the Directorate of Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS), with a 
disaster risk reduction, peacebuilding and early warning units; Directorate of Social and Human 
                                                 
532  It has been shown however that SADC has promulgated a Gender and Development Protocol which is 
commendable. A blemish on this achievement is that two leading democracies in the region, Botswana and Mauritius 
have refused to sign the protocol citing the instructive nature of the language in the text. A middle ground ought to be 
found and progress made women and children suffer the most in conflicts. The inequalities between men and women 
in SADC also need to be bridged. During conflicts women are forced to look after their families alone as husbands 
are forcibly enlisted and children forced into child soldiering. Women also suffer the brunt of rape which is often used 
as a weapon of war. 
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Development and Special Programmes (SHDSP) with a Social Security Code, a SADC poverty 
reduction strategy, HIV/ AIDS Strategic Framework;  Directorate of Infrastructure and Services 
ensuring the provision of water, sanitation, energy, transport, meteorology, and communications 
services; Directorate on Food Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) charged with agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry and managing climate change. The findings have also proposed a framework of 
human security related challenges which need to be transformed during the pre-conflict, mid 
conflict, transitional and stabilization stages of a conflict. 
In chapter 6 the study carried out an analysis of SADC using some key conflict transformation 
principles as analytical points. At this stage the study clarified and unpacked the need to deepen 
the search for an effective and self-sustainable Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P) to 
strengthen SADC’s conflict transformation capacity. It emerged that conflict transformation has 
not traditionally nor deliberately been adopted nor applied in SADC. As such in order to succeed 
in transforming the root causes of conflict and engendering a strong culture of peace chapter 6 
proposed the creation of an effective and self-sustainable RI4P. This thinking was supported by 
the finding that most interventions in SADC have only gone skin deep in their attempts to address 
the root causes of conflicts. It argues that the adoption of a RI4P would enable SADC to more 
explicitly embrace the conflict transformation framework as problems would be dealt with at their 
source in an effective and self-sustainable way.  
It has been shown that such a reform would also allow SADC to more honestly introspect as it 
strengthens its relations with ordinary citizens as heads of state and citizens realise the compatible 
nature of their needs. Such a move would allow it to sober up and evolve into a truly supra national 
entity with resolutions which are legally binding and enforceable on member states. The chapter 
demonstrated the fact that since conflict transformation is a malleable, long-term, gradual and 
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complex concept requiring sustained engagement and interaction, it lends itself to being driven by 
non-state actors who are usually better accepted as mediators than states. An RI4P thus provides a 
platform for such engagement since it is “network of interdependent systems, resources, values 
and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue, 
consultation, prevent conflict, and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a 
society”.533 
The proposal for the creation of a RI4P is premised on the logic that it involves stakeholders at all 
levels, national, district and local and is a problem solving approach to conflict based on dialogue 
and non-violence. A RI4P allows for conflicts to be solved internally and for the development of 
institutional mechanisms, structures and capacities. Its promise is informed by its success in South 
Africa, Kenya and Ghana where it was previously implemented albeit with slight modifications. 
Its core components include local peace councils, national peace platforms, a government bureau, 
department or ministry of Peace as well as expanding the capacities of national peacebuilding 
institutions and civil society organisations. Its suitability is anchored on the fact that its sensitive 
to the local context since its underpinned by the principle of local ownership as well as due to the 
fact that international organisations often lack empathy for the contextual dynamics of conflict 
settings. The rationale for a RI4P is also premised on the fact that most countries lack structures, 
capacities and mechanisms to deal adequately with conflicts. 
On top of its success in previous cases where it was applied, the findings have shown that the 
creation of an I4P in one country is relatively inexpensive as the UN has funded ten I4Ps in ten 
countries in the past decade. Outside interventions have also proven to be ineffective, slow, 
                                                 
533 UNDP quoted in P Van Tongeren, 2013, Op Cit. 
304 
 
difficult and costly and a RI4P reduces and in some cases eliminates the likelihood of another war. 
Support for the idea of an RI4P has also been evident through consensus in various forms from a 
host of reports by international organisations such as the UNDP, the Busan Partnership Agreement 
on development cooperation and a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the AU and a 
number of RECs on the continent. The construction of an effective and self-sustainable RI4P 
would thus serve as a point of confluence for attaining complementarity between national and 
regional strategies and programmes showing that regional peacebuilding efforts ought not negate 
local efforts but rather complement them with additional levels of action. The proposed role of 
SADC in the RI4P is that of a fosterer of sustainable conflict transformation who nurtures and 
creates the right conditions along the model of the UN PBC which is a forum style organization 
which only recommends strategies for peacebuilding without implementing them itself. At the end 
the findings recommend that the RI4P should be underpinned by a Regional Peacebuilding Policy 
(RPP) and a Regional Conflict Transformation strategy (RCTS) which will guide its formation and 
roll out. In the forefront and at the centre in such a matrix would be local communities in member 
states who would create the social foundations for durable. This cannot be realized unless and until 
local societies acquire the will and capacity sufficient enough to build and maintain durable peace. 
Since it is difficult to readily find individuals with an aptitude and a predisposition to build peace, 
deliberate efforts ought to be made to identify and capacitate them the provision of human, 
institutional, material and financial resources to enable them to do their conflict transformation 
work.  
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Appendix 3: Consent form 
Topic: A Critical Assessment of Conflict Transformation Capacity in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC): Deepening the search for a Self-Sustainable and 
Effective Regional Infrastructure for Peace (RI4P)  
  
I, Gabriel G.G Malebang, am conducting an enquiry regarding an assessment of SADC’s Conflict 
Transformation capacity. 
I will read the form to you and if you are in agreement with it, you shall append your signature at the bottom: 
the signature is construed as express permission to be interviewed. In instances where the interview is 
conducted telephonically, you may express your consent by reply to the e-mail accompanying this form or 
sign and scan the form and return it to me via e-mail if you are able to do so. 
The conditions of the interview are as follows: 
1. Participation is entirely voluntary. 
2. You are at liberty to refuse to answer any question without giving reasons. 
3. If you so desire, the interview can be anonymous; in which case the interviewer will not record 
your names and address. 
4. You are at liberty to ask questions and seek clarification from the interviewer at any time. 
5. If you volitionally agree to the above conditions, please append your signature at the bottom of this 
form. 
 
I confirm and affirm that I have read and understood the consent form and hereby append my signature.  
 
Full names of the interviewee:   
 
Date and time:                                        
 
